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“I grew up with the understanding that the world I lived in was one
where people enjoyed a sort of freedom to communicate with each
other in privacy without it being monitored, without it being
measured, or analyzed or sort of judged by these shadowy ﬁgures or
systems anytime they mention anything that travels across public
lines.”
— Edward Snowden, excerpt from an interview with Glenn
Greenwald, 2013

EXECUT IVE SUMMARY
Freedom of speech is a core value of our society. While it can be
exercised anonymously towards undesired observers in the physical
world, the Internet is based on unique and nonanonymous identiﬁers
(IDs) for every participant. Anonymity, however, is a crucial require-
ment to exercise freedom of speech using the Internet without having
to face political persecution. To achieve anonymity, messages must be
unlinkable to senders an receivers. That means that messages cannot
be linked to IDs and other identifying information of senders and re-
ceivers. Anonymization services, such as Tor, re-establish anonymity
within the Internet such that, for example, web content can be con-
sumed anonymously.
Nevertheless, this type of solution embodies two challenges: First,
with the appearance of social media, the Internet usage behavior
changed drastically from a one producer with many consumers to a many
producers with many consumers of content paradigm. Second, a social
media website that is used by many producers and many consumers
constitutes a single point of failure (SPoF) regarding both availability
and anonymity. Such a website may collect producer and consumer
proﬁles, ultimately breaking anonymity.
Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is a message dissemination paradigm
well suited to address the ﬁrst challenge, the many-to-many exchange
of content. peer-to-peer (P2P) Pub/Sub eliminates the need for an SPoF
and, thus, partially addresses the second challenge as well. However,
research addressing anonymity as a security requirement for Pub/Sub
has merely scratched the surface.
This thesis improves the state-of-the-art in anonymous Pub/Sub in
several areas. In particular, the thesis addresses the following aspects
of constructing anonymous Pub/Sub systems: (i.) Building blocks that
reduce the complexity of constructing anonymous Pub/Sub systems
are proposed; (ii.) methods for anonymously establishing Pub/Sub
overlay networks are presented; (iii.) a method for inter-overlay opti-
mization to distribute load is introduced; (iv.) methods for optimiz-
ing overlays regarding anonymity are proposed, and (v.) anonymity
attacks and countermeasures are presented.
contributions This thesis contributes to the following research
categories:
anonymous overlay establishment An anonymous Pub/Sub
system is presented along six self-containing building blocks
with the goal of establishing overlay networks that transport no-
tiﬁcations from publishers to subscribers. Each building block
is discussed in detail with a focus on leveraging related work to
realize the building block. For attribute localization, the build-
ing block most relevant for establishing overlays, this thesis
v
proposes multiple contributions: the usage of hash chains as a
privacy-preserving transaction pseudonym and distance metric;
the adaptation of ﬂooding as well as forest ﬁres; and random
walks to distribute attribute knowledge.
anonymous overlay optimization The thesis proposes two op-
timizations for anonymity and one optimization for balancing
the load. The ﬁrst anonymity optimization, probabilistic for-
warding (PF), applies the concept of mimic trafﬁc to the do-
main of Pub/Sub. The second anonymity optimization, the shell
game (SG), shufﬂes the overlay. Both optimizations prevent an
exposure of information to attackers that can gain knowledge
about the overlay topology. The load-balancing optimization
uses a ring communication and Bloom ﬁlters to distribute load
among nodes.
anonymity attacks and countermeasures Several well-known
anonymity attacks are adapted to the domain of anonymous
Pub/Sub and evaluated in detail. Novel attacks, such as the re-
quest/
response-attack and the corner attack, are proposed as well and
complemented with countermeasures.
evaluation The proposed mechanisms and attacks are evaluated
using a qualitative approach, quantitatively with an extensive sim-
ulation, and empirically with a proof of concept (POC) application.
The qualitative approach indicates that the presented mechanisms are
well-suited to protect anonymity against a malicious insider threat.
The quantitative evaluation is performed with the event-based sim-
ulation framework OMNeT++. The results show that the presented
anonymous Pub/Sub system can protect anonymity, even in case ma-
licious insiders are combined with a global observer of a very strong
anonymity threat. The results also reveal in which situations PF or the
SG provides the better anonymity protection. Furthermore, the results
indicate which capabilities are favorable for an anonymity attacker.
An anonymous micro-blogging application for Twitter shows that
the presented system can be implemented for a real-world use case:
With the application, users exchange tweets via hashtag-overlays, and
cryptographic keys via quick response (QR)-codes and near ﬁeld com-
munication (NFC).
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Redefreiheit zählt zu den wichtigsten Werten unserer Gesellschaft.
Während die Redefreiheit in der physischen Welt anonym gegenüber
unerwünschten Fremden ausgeübt werden kann, basiert das Inter-
net auf nicht-anonymen, sondern vielmehr eindeutigen, Identiﬁkati-
onsmerkmalen (IDs). Zur Ausübung der Redefreiheit ohne politische
Verfolgung ist die Anonymität jedoch eine Kernanforderung. Anony-
mity bedingt, dass eine Nachricht nicht mit Sender und Empfänger in
Verbindung gebracht werden kann. Insbesondere darf eine Nachricht
nicht mit IDs oder anderen Identiﬁkationsmerkmalen in Beziehung
gesetzt werden.
Anonymisierungsdienste wie Tor können im Internet verwendet
werden, um etwa Webinhalte anonym abzurufen. Mit einer solchen
Lösung ergeben sich jedoch 2 Arten von Herausforderungen: Erstens
hat sich die Internet-Nutzung mit dem Aufkommen sozialer Medien
verändert; statt einem ein Produzent mit vielen Konsumenten von Inhal-
ten Nutzungs-Paradigma nimmt nun das viele Produzenten mit vielen
Konsumenten-Paradigma eine gewichtige Rolle ein. Zweitens stellt ei-
ne Social-Media-Webseite mit vielen Nutzer eine zentrale Schwach-
stelle da, sowohl in Bezug auf die Verfügbarkeit als auch auf die An-
onymität. Eine solche Webseite kann Proﬁldaten ihrer Nutzer sam-
meln um schlussendlich deren Anonymität zu brechen.
Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) ist ein Konzept zur Nachrichten-
Verteilung, welches die erste Herausforderung sehr gut adressiert.
P2P Pub/Sub kommt ohne zentrale Schwachstelle aus, und deckt da-
mit auch die zweite Herausforderung teilweise ab. Jedoch steht For-
schung, welche Anonymität als Sicherheitsanforderung für Pub/Sub
berücksichtigt, erst am Anfang.
Diese Dissertation erweitert den aktuellen Forschungsstand in meh-
reren Bereichen. Die folgenden Aspekte der Konstruktion von anony-
men Pub/Sub Systemen werden dabei angesprochen: (i.) Bausteine zur
Erleichterung zukünftiger Entwicklung von anonymen Pub/Sub Syste-
men werden vorgeschlagen; (ii.) Methoden zur anonymen Erzeugung
von Overlay-Netzwerken werden vorgestellt; (iii.) eine anonyme Inter-
Overlay-Optimierung zur Verteilung von Last wird präsentiert; (iv.)
Methoden zur Optimierung der Anonymität in Overlay-Netzwerken
werden eingebührt; (v.) Angriffe der Anonymität sowie Schutzmaß-
nahmen werden vorgeschlagen.
beiträge Die Beiträge dieser Dissertation lassen sich in folgende
Forschungsschwerpunkte einteilen:
anonyme overlay-erzeugung Es wird ein anonymes Pub/Sub Sys-
tem anhand von sechs in sich geschlossenen Bausteinen vor-
gestellt. Hierbei wird das Ziel verfolgt, Overlay-Netzwerke zu
erzeugen, welche nachfolgend Nachrichten von Produzenten
zu Konsumenten transportieren. Jeder Baustein wird im Detail
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und in Bezug auf relevante verwandte Arbeiten erläutert. Für
einen der wichtigsten Bausteine, die Lokalisierung von Attri-
buten (attribute localization), werden mehrere Beiträge geleistet:
Hash-Ketten kombinieren Transaktions-Pseudonym und Distanz-
Metrik unter Schutz der Privatsphäre; sogenanntes ﬂooding, fo-
rest ﬁres, und doppelte random walks werden zum Verteilen
von Attributs-Wissen verwendet.
anonyme overlay-optimierung Die Dissertation stellt zwei Op-
timierungen zur Verbesserung der Anonymität sowie eine Opti-
mierung zur Verteilung von Last vor. Die erste Anonymitäts-
Optimierung, probabilistic forwarding (PF), überträgt das Kon-
zept von “mimi trafﬁc” auf Pub/Sub. Die zweite Optimierung,
das Hütchen-Spiel (shell game (SG)), zerwürfelt Overlay-Netz-
werke. Beide Optimierungen verfolgen das Ziel, die Preisga-
be von Information durch die Overlay-Topologie zu vermeiden.
Die Optimierung zur Last-Verteilung verwendet einen Kommu-
nikations-Ring sowie Bloom-Filter um die Last unter den Kno-
ten von Overlay-Netzwerken zu verteilen
anonymitäts-angriffe und schutzmaßnahmen Mehre bekann-
ten Anonymitäts-Attacken werden auf anonymes Pub/Sub ange-
wendet und im Detail analysiert. Weiterhin werden neue Atta-
cken, wie etwa die Anfrage/Antwort-Attacke (request/response-
attack) sowie die Einengungs-Attacke (corner-attack), vorgestellt
und mit entsprechenden Schutzmechanismen versehen.
auswertung Die vorgestellten Mechanismen und Angriffe wer-
den anhand von drei Analyse-Verfahren ausgewertet: einem qualita-
tiven Ansatz, einer umfangreichen Simulation, sowie empirisch mit
einem Prototyp. Der qualitative Ansatz deutet an, dass die vorgestell-
ten Mechanismen gut zum Schutz der Anonymität gegenüber der
Gefahr von bösartigen Insidern geeignet ist.
Die quantitative Analyse wird mit einer Ereignis-diskreten Simula-
tion anhand des OMNeT++ Werkzeugs durchgeführt. Den Ergebnis-
sen folgend ist das vorgestellte anonyme Pub/Sub System in der Tat
zum Schutz der Anonymität geeignet, selbst wenn ein besonders star-
kes Angreifer-Modell aus bösartigem Insider sowie globalen Überwa-
cher angenommen wird. Die Resultate zeigen auch, in welchen Si-
tuation PF oder das SG besseren Schutz bieten. Weiterhin ergeben die
Resultate, welche Fähigkeiten einem Angreifer am Meisten nutzen.
Für die empirische Auswertung wurde eine anonyme Micro-Blog-
ging Anwendung für Twitter entwickelt. Diese Anwendung zeigt,
dass die in dieser Dissertation vorgestellten Mechanismen in der Tat
in realistischen Szenarien eingesetzt werden können. Mit der Anwen-
dung können Teilnehmer Tweets über Hashtag-Overlay-Netz ausge-
tauschen. QR-Codes und NFC dienen der Verteilung von Schlüsselma-
terial.
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INTRODUCT ION
Many of today’s Internet-based applications are centered around the
exchange of information between users. This information exchange
often follows the many-to-many paradigm [147], meaning many users
consume the same information, whereas many users also contribute
to this information. Examples of this paradigm are manifold: in
micro-blogging, many users produce articles on the same topic, and
many users read the same article. Hashtags in Twitter are a prime
example for that: publishers annotate their tweets with hashtags;
Twitter streams search results for hashtags to subscribers. Likewise,
emerging applications such as private ridesharing [127] and Internet
of Things (IoT) applications [124] build upon the same paradigm, i.e.,
many-to-many communication concerning shared interestes. Espos-
ito and Ciampi [49] list many more large-scale Pub/Sub applications
that ﬁt the Pub/Sub paradigm. Nevertheless, most of these application
do not use a Pub/Sub system.
Pub/Sub is a form of message dissemination that follows exactly
this type of information exchange paradigm. Pub/Sub introduces the
notion of a publisher, an entity that produces messages, and a sub-
scriber, an entity that consumes messages. Subscribers articulate their
interest in messages via so-called subscriptions. The Pub/Sub system
facilitates the message exchange from publisher to subscriber. The
two entities are loosely coupled in several ways and are not required
to know each other.
Considering the application scenarios such as micro-blogging and
the IoT, personal information is exchanged using such Pub/Sub sys-
tems. Privacy and anonymity [40] are therefore desirable [65], among
other security requirements.
1.1 problem statement
As of today, this Pub/Sub functionality is typically realized in a central-
ized manner by the platform provider of the application. For instance
with micro-blogging applications, the message dissemination is often
realized by a central cloud service. However, such a central service
results in the service provider learning about all messages exchanged
between users. This causes a privacy issue, i.e., a user having no pri-
vacy towards the service provider. While the lack of privacy might
be considered uncomfortable but tolerable for some users, the lack of
privacy already leads to negative repercussions for some users, such
as those who are blogging under political repression being followed
by persecution, for example. Moreover, emerging applications such
as the mentioned ridesharing and the IoT, may cause yet unknown
consequences without privacy.
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Attempts have been made to resolve the privacy issues; mostly via
access control [6] and encryption [138]. Both approaches, however,
merely protect privacy against undesired users and spying eyes: en-
cryption, without being part of an anonymization service, only pro-
tects the conﬁdentiality of information; encryption does not protect
metadata, and thus not the anonymity. The service provided with
central cloud service remains a SPoF for privacy, and it learns which
users produce and consume information. Worse, a compromise of the
SPoF cloud service can have terrible [144] consequences [156] for the
users, as the recent Ashley Madison data breach [130, 155] revealed
once more in a long history of service provider hacks.
Efforts to distribute the SPoF, as well as to route information from
publishers to subscribers on encrypted messages, have been made
[16]. Still, the ﬂow of messages from publishers to subscribers may
be traced by spying eyes. Combined with background information
about the popularity of information, privacy can be broken. Anony-
mous communication [21, 22] is an approach to protect the senders
or receivers of messages from such message tracing. Anonymization
services used today [44, 47] are designed for point-to-point (PtP) com-
munication rather than many-to-many communication. As a result,
these services cause either signaling overhead regarding messages or
require a centralized service again to mediate the messages.
This thesis aims to overcome the mentioned challenges by combin-
ing distributed Pub/Sub with anonymization services. The following
research questions will be answered in this thesis:
• How can a distribution overlay network for Pub/Sub be estab-
lished without revealing the identities of publishers and sub-
scribers?
• How can these identities be concealed while notiﬁcations of ar-
bitrary size and at arbitrary rate are distributed in such an over-
lay?
• What are realistic anonymity attacker models for such systems,
what attacks can be performed, and how can the attack success
be measured?
• Which approaches can be used to protect anonymity against
these attacks?
• How can an anonymous Pub/Sub system be optimized, e.g., to
handle churn and to balance the load, without compromising
anonymity?
The solutions to these research questions are summarized in the
next section.
1.2 contributions
This thesis provides several novel contributions to research questions
mentioned above as well as anonymous Pub/Sub in general.
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anonymous p2p publish/subscribe Related privacy-preser-
ving Pub/Sub systems [118, 138, 154] address privacy and the pro-
tection of conﬁdentiality against an attacker who possesses no key
material and does not actively inﬂuence the system. These systems,
therefore, cannot protect against malicious insiders [38].
The ﬁrst contribution to this thesis is a generic model for anony-
mous Pub/Sub and has been published in [36]. This model serves
as a framework for a novel categorization of anonymous Pub/Sub in
so-called building blocks, each addressing a speciﬁc functionality. Ex-
isting solutions for the building blocks as well as the generic model
are presented in Chapter 3.
The systematic discussion of technologies is followed by the con-
struction of a new anonymous Pub/Sub system in Chapter 3, which
has been published in [36, 37]. As shown in Figure 1, the system
performs attribute localization—the building block responsible for
localization-relevant publications—on top of the basic membership
layer. Attribute localization is formed by a building block responsi-
ble for establishing connectivity between users.
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The system is then capable of performing content distribution with
low latency and without any restrictions regarding message size and
rate. This system protects anonymity against malicious insiders, i.e.,
nodes in the basic membership that possess key material and can
generate valid messages. POCs of this system have been published in
[35, 59].
attacks against anonymous Pub/Sub Anonymization servi-
ces such as the onion router (Tor) have been analyzed with common
anonymity attacker models such as the malicious insider threat [44].
However, such an analysis is usually performed theoretically [5, 43]
and thus describes the devastating but only theoretical worst case.
Real-world attacks against anonymization have shown that ﬂaws in
the attacker model can easily lead to such a worst case in reality [68,
163]. This lead to the issues that (i) the attacker models considered in
related work are weak and (ii) real-world assessments are missing.
The second contribution of this thesis is therefore practical attacks
in Chapter 5. The request/response-based attack has been published
in [38] and can be applied to the anonymous P2P system by collud-
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ing malicious insiders. This attack adaptively probes the communi-
cation network and evaluates the responses from other nodes. These
responses are used to reﬁne a probability distribution as shown in
Figure 2 that can be ultimately used to de-anonymize the responders,
e.g., subscribers in the case of Pub/Sub.
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Figure 2: Communication network annotated with a probability distribution
after one attack step.
Further attacks contributing to this thesis have been published in
[39] and use more invasive methods, such as interrupting the connec-
tion to a node in the communication network to monitor the response.
anonymity-enhancing technologies Attacks on anonymiza-
tion services [14, 33, 52, 68, 77, 82, 92, 101, 110, 163, 167], as well as
the previous contribution, have shown that even slight alterations to
an anonymity attacker model can cause a system to fail its purpose.
Additional anonymity-enhancing technologies are then required to
overcome the challenge of new attacks.
This thesis proposes two novel anonymity-enhancing technologies
for anonymous Pub/Sub as the third contribution. These technologies
have been published in [36]. The ﬁrst technology is called probabilistic
forwarding and adapts the related concepts of cover trafﬁc and mimic
trafﬁc [57] to Pub/Sub. The concepts are adapted in such a way that
they cannot be abused by known attacks and such that a combination
of other technologies is possible.
The second technology is called the shell game (SG) and shufﬂes an
overlay network—the middle layer in Figure 1. The overlay is shufﬂed
in such a way that an attacker cannot de-anonymize participants by
observing the overlay, e.g., using topological properties.
anonymous overlay optimization Once an overlay network
has been constructed in such a way that anonymity is preserved, it
is subject to continuous changes and may degenerate in its proper-
ties [149]. Overlay paths may increase in length and thus cause mes-
sage delay; forwarding load may become unevenly shared among the
nodes and cause overload. Optimizing such an anonymous P2P is par-
ticularly challenging as knowledge about such an overlay is limited
by design because of the anonymity requirement.
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As a fourth contribution, this thesis introduces an approach for
anonymous load balancing as part of the community management
building block in Chapter 4. This approach establishes random groups
of neighboring nodes in one or more overlay networks. A group then
cycles a probabilistic data structure with each group member’s load
status. Overloaded group members can then reason about suitable
handover candidates.
publications This thesis has been published in 7 publications as
listed on Page ix and summarized in this section [35–40, 59]. Most
notably, the building blocks and anonymity-enhancing overlay tech-
nologies have been published by Elsevier as a highly visible article in
the Computer Communications journal.
Jörg Daubert et al. „AnonPubSub: Anonymous publish-subscribe
overlays.“ In: Elsevier Computer Communications 76 (2016), pp. 42–53.
issn: 0140-3664. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2015.
11.004. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0140366415004211
Moreover, the publication on anonymity attacks [39] has been awar-
ded by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) with
a travel grant.
1.3 structure of this thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 es-
tablishes the background in Pub/Sub followed by an introduction into
anonymity. The introduction to anonymity comprises the founda-
tional concepts, systems that shaped the domain of anonymity, and
an overview of anonymity metrics. This introduction is followed by
a discussion of related anonymization services, their advances, and
lessons to be learned. The chapter then complements the anonymiza-
tion services with an introduction to P2P systems and network simu-
lation, a quantitative evaluation method for such systems.
Related anonymous Pub/Sub systems are analyzed in Chapter 3. For
that, the chapter ﬁrst introduces a formal model for Pub/Sub that
serves as the foundation for an objective analysis. This model is
then complemented by a detailed assessment of anonymity and cor-
responding sub-requirements in the domain of Pub/Sub. The require-
ments are succeeded by a discussion of attacker models. The chapter
then introduces an attack based on the system and attacker model. To
analyze related work in detail, the chapter proposes seven building
blocks of anonymous Pub/Sub and introduces common technologies
used for each building block, followed by a discussion of the related
work.
Chapter 4 presents a novel construction for anonymous Pub/Sub.
The chapter explains this construction according to the building blocks
from the previous chapter, adapting existing technologies and propos-
ing new approaches. This chapter also introduces the anonymity-
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enhancing technologies, probabilistic forwarding, and the shell game,
as well as the anonymous overlay optimization.
The system and various extensions of Chapter 4 are evaluated in
Chapter 5. The evaluation ﬁrst provides a qualitative discussion of
the security requirements established in Chapter 2. An extensive
quantitative evaluation via a network simulation supports the qual-
itative discussion and establishes parameter values for anonymity-
enhancing technologies. A POC with an empirical assessment con-
cludes the evaluation.
Chapter 6 summarizes this thesis and highlights the contributions
and novel insights gained from the evaluation. This thesis then con-
cludes with an outlook on future research directions.
2
BACKGROUND
This chapter introduces concepts as well as the necessary background
for the domains of Pub/Sub and anonymous communication. These
concepts will be used in the state-of-the-art discussion in Chapter 3,
the contributions of this thesis in Chapter 4, as well as the evaluation
(Chapter 5).
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 introduces the
Pub/Sub paradigm. Section 2.2 introduces the concept of anonymity,
the state-of-the-art in anonymization services (Section 2.3), and met-
rics. Section 2.4 introduces P2P systems, followed by a short overview
of network simulation in Section 2.5.
2.1 publish/subscribe
Pub/Sub is a content-based routing scheme [152]. Pub/Sub differs from
other distributed programming patterns such as inter-process com-
munication (IPC), remote procedure call (RPC), distributed objects,
and tuple spaces. These differences are the loose coupling between
sender and receiver, many-to-many communication, and information
dissemination based on interest and ﬁlters [51].
Loose coupling allows exchanging messages between sender and
receiver, wheras sender and receiver are not required to know each
other. Such decoupling between sender and receiver is achieved via
a proxy in between both. Loose coupling is advantageous to provide
anonymity, as senders and receivers are not required to know each
other—senders may remain anonymous towards receivers and vice
versa. However, senders and receivers do not remain anonymous
towards the proxy.
Many-to-many communication enables a sender to disseminate mes-
sages to multiple receivers at once. For that, the sender addresses the
message to a group rather than a single recipient. Having an arbi-
trary number of receivers also beneﬁts anonymity of receivers as they
can blend with the group. Likewise, a receiver may obtain messages
from many senders, too. Senders, therefore, blend with the group of
senders and can be anonymous towards receivers.
The dissemination based upon interests and ﬁlters rather than re-
cipient addresses is key for loose coupling. However, multiple inter-
ests of a receiver can be used to create a proﬁle. Prior research [105]
has shown that such proﬁles can be correlated with proﬁles of other
data sources. Such a correlation may lead to a re-identiﬁcation of the
receiver, and thus to a violation of the receiver’s anonymity.
Example 1. Narayanan and Shmatikov used a pseudonymized dataset con-
taining movie ratings and de-anonymized the raters [105]. In this case, all
ratings provided by the same pseudonym constitute a proﬁle. As similar pro-
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ﬁles can be found in public movie rating databases having an associated ID
(e-mail address), these IDs can be associated with the pseudonyms as well. As
a consequence, the pseudonymized participants become de-anonymized with
their e-mail address. In their analysis, the authors have discovered that eight
ratings per proﬁle are already sufﬁcient to de-anonymize 99% of the proﬁles
within the pseudonymized dataset.
2.1.1 Concept and terminology
This section brieﬂy introduces the core concepts of Pub/Sub and de-
ﬁnes the terminology that will be used throughout this thesis. This
section ﬁrst provides a short overview of the Pub/Sub concept, then
elaborates on comparison (or ﬁltering) methods, followed by sub-
scription methods and message dissemination.
overview A basic Pub/Sub system as depicted in Figure 3 contains
participants ﬁtting one or more of the following roles: the publisher, an
event service, and the subscriber. The publisher is the producer (sender)
of events, and publishes those to the event service. The subscriber is
the consumer (receiver) of events. To receive events from the event
service, the subscriber ﬁrst places a subscription at the event service.
Upon receiving a publication from the publisher, the event service
compares the publication with the subscription, and then sends a
notiﬁcation to the subscriber (push mechanism).
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Figure 3: A simple object-based publish/subscribe system. [51]
comparison methods The event service decides which notiﬁca-
tions the subscriber receives from the publisher. For that, the event
service compares notiﬁcations with the subscription. For that, several
methods of comparison are known:
topics With topics, notiﬁcations are annotated with one or more
topics, e.g., keywords. A subscription is also expressed towards
a topic. The event service, therefore, compares, if the notiﬁca-
tion contains the topic(s) speciﬁed by the subscription.
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subjects With subjects, notiﬁcations are annotated with a subject.
Compared to topics, subjects express additional context, com-
parable to Usenet groups and DNS. With such expressions fol-
lowing the reverse DNS notation, wildcards can be used in the
subscription.
type With types, subscriptions specify the type of notiﬁcation. Such
types can refer to the data type, e.g., text and binary, or object
type.
content With content, subscriptions can specify ﬁlters over the full
notiﬁcation, including its content. For instance, the subscription
can express predicates (key, operator, value) on key/value pairs.
Filters over multiple notiﬁcations are possible as well.
Additional comparison methods exist: spatial comparison [70], se-
mantic comparison [9, 20, 72, 118, 139, 146], parametric content-based
comparison [78]. However, this methods primarily resemble special
cases of the aforementioned methods.
Example 2. The Java message service (JMS) [41] is a Pub/Sub Application
Programming Interface (API) used for Java enterprise applications. A sub-
scription in JMS is called a selector. It combines subject, type, and content-
based comparison methods. For the content-based comparison, an expression
language derived from SQL92 [73] can be used to ﬁlter a property map (key/-
value pairs).
Privacy-preserving Pub/Sub solutions tackle the challenge of real-
izing comparison methods via cryptographic (conﬁdentiality) means
[23, 103, 154]. For that, content-based comparisons pose the most
challenging method. As this thesis is dedicated to anonymous rather
than conﬁdential Pub/Sub, the topic-based comparison will be used
throughout the remainder of the thesis. Topic-based comparison in-
troduces the least cryptographic complexity, and thus least deviates
from anonymization mechanisms.
subscription methods Pub/Sub with subscriptions causes pro-
cessing overhead as the event service has to compare every notiﬁca-
tion with every subscription. If a publisher uses the same topic/-
subject/type for consecutive notiﬁcations, a comparison may not be
necessary for consecutive notiﬁcation. To overcome this drawback
of subscription-based Pub/Sub, a variation with advertisements can be
used.
With advertisements, a publisher ﬁrst advertises the topic/subject/-
type it will use for notiﬁcation to the event service. Together with
the subscription, the event service establishes a ﬁxed routing path
between publisher and subscribers. As a consequence, no consecutive
comparisons are necessary.
This thesis focusses on advertisement-based subscription methods.
As topic-based comparison has been selected, notiﬁcation distribu-
tion paths can be established via advertisements, as no additional
comparison per notiﬁcation is required.
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message dissemination A variety of methods are used to trans-
port notiﬁcations from the event service to subscribers as shown in
Figure 4. The node type f represents forwarders (brokers, event ser-
vice), R transport layer multicast (TLM) capable routers, and s sub-
scribers. The infrastructure nodes f and R are marked in gray, the
subscribers s in white.
point-to-point The event service establishes a direct connection
to each matching subscriber and delivers the notiﬁcation.
tlm The event service makes use of network- and transport layer
multicast mechanisms [42], e.g., protocol independent multicast
(PIM) [2, 55], to deliver a notiﬁcation to multiple subscribers at
once.
application layer multicast The event service uses a P2P mul-
ticast [8] to distribute the notiﬁcation via overlay members to
multiple subscribers at once.
broker network The event service distributes the notiﬁcation to
multiple brokers via application layer multicast (ALM). The bro-
kers then disseminate the notiﬁcation via PtP, TLM, or ALM to
subscribers. The SIENA Pub/Sub system [19] uses this approach.
f
s s s s
(a) Point-to-point
f
R
R
s
s R
s
(b) TLM
f
s
s s s
(c) ALM
f
f
s
s f
s
(d) Broker network
Figure 4: Methods for disseminating notiﬁcations
PtP connections are easy to implement and resilient. However, these
connections only scale linearly with the numbers of subscribers. Fore-
most, point-to-point connections cannot provide publisher and sub-
scriber anonymity towards the event service; the event service is re-
quired to know publisher and subscriber IDs to establish connections.
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TLM mechanisms such as PIM-SM establish distribution trees and
thus scale with the number of subscribers. Furthermore, TLM does
not require the event service to know subscribers. However, TLM
infrastructure entities, such as routers, learn the IDs of subscribers.
Thus, subscriber anonymity against the infrastructure cannot be guar-
anteed.
ALM mechanisms also establish distribution trees and meshes, and
thus scale with the numbers of subscribers as well. However, ALM
relies on peers to execute the notiﬁcation dissemination algorithm at
the application layer. Thus, existing infrastructure such as routers can
hardly be used for ALM, and new peers are required. According to
Esposito and Ciampi [49], ALM appears to be the dominant solution
for secure Pub/Sub system from academia.
In summary, ALM offers scalability as well as the ﬂexibility to de-
sign the application-layer routing algorithms in an anonymity-pre-
serving manner. The remainder of this thesis, therefore, focuses on
ALM-based Pub/Sub approaches.
2.1.2 Requirements
A Pub/Sub system must comply with a plethora of functional and
security requirements. Some of these requirements diametrically op-
pose anonymity. For instance, sender authenticity obviously conﬂicts
with sender anonymity. For that reason, functional as well as security
requirements have to be discussed in combination with anonymity.
Surveys [49, 51, 162] enumerate these requirements as follows:
confidentiality Conﬁdentiality as the ﬁrst requirements of the
CIA triage enforces information not to be disclosed to an unau-
thorized participant. Such information occurs in three varia-
tions in Pub/Sub:
information confidentiality No information must be dis-
closed to the event service, i.e., the infrastructure. This is
particularly challenging as the event service requires infor-
mation to make routing decisions, e.g., with content-based
Pub/Sub.
subscription confidentiality No information about a sub-
scription—and thus about the interests of a subscriber—
must be leaked to another subscriber and publisher.
publication confidentiality No information about a pub-
lication (notiﬁcation)—and thus information about a pub-
lisher—must be leaked to another publisher and unautho-
rized subscriber.
integrity Integrity as the second conﬁdentiality integrity availabil-
ity (CIA) triage requirement ensures the completeness and cor-
rectness of data. For Pub/Sub, Wang et al. [162] distinguish the
following thee variations:
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information integrity Information integrity requires that
no information, e.g., stored data or message in transmis-
sion, is altered or lost without authorization.
subscription integrity Subscription integrity requires that
no subscription be altered or lost.
service integrity Service integrity requires that the event
service is not altered. Counter examples are the failure
of a broker and the compromise of a broker. Service in-
tegrity in combination with information and subscription
integrity ensures that that no subscription is lost, and that
all matching notiﬁcations are delivered without unautho-
rized modiﬁcations. This requirement is also called relia-
bility [50]
availability Availability as the third CIA triage requirement en-
sures that information is available when needed. That includes
that notiﬁcations are delivered without delay. Therefore, the
event service must be available when needed. Counterexamples
are failures of the event service due to denial of service (DoS) at-
tacks. While a distributed denial of service (DDoS) might be
initiated intentionally by an attacker, subscriptions and publi-
cation may also cause overhead leading to a DoS. Examples
of such subscriptions and publications are subscriptions that
are computationally expensive to evaluate as well as wildcard
subscriptions that cause the mass delivery of notiﬁcations, and
publications that are large. This requirement can be also called
scalability [50].
authentication Authentication in Pub/Sub requires receivers to
be able to verify the identity of senders and vice verse. That
applies to PtP communication, e.g., publishers and event ser-
vice, and to end-to-end (E2E) communication, e.g., subscriber
and publisher.
accountability Accountability requires all actions, e.g., sending
and receiving a message, to be associated with an actor. Fur-
thermore, the actor cannot be able to dispute the action. For
instance, it must be clear if a subscriber received a notiﬁcation,
and if so, that the subscriber cannot deny the reception.
user anonymity User anonymity requires users—subscribers and
publishers—not to be identiﬁed and observed by other users
or the event service. That is, users maintain anonymity in the
sense that they cannot be identiﬁed, e.g., via an IP address.
Furthermore, the actions of a user cannot be linked together,
e.g., proﬁling is not possible. This requirement directly con-
ﬂicts with authenticity (the identity of the user must be veriﬁ-
able) and accountability (every action is linked to an actor). An
anonymous Pub/Sub system should therefore not ignore these
requirements but rather balance them, e.g., with authenticity.
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low overhead This thesis extends the list of requirements [50, 162]
by minimal overhead. First, minimal overhead serves as sub-
goal, e.g., for availability/scalability. Second, mechanisms to
protect anonymity introduce additional overhead. For instance,
despite the computational overhead caused by cryptography,
anonymization services hardly reach the predicted performance
[145].
low computational overhead Low computational over-
head requires that computation, in particular for the Pub/Sub
functions match and cover (down below).
low space overhead Low space overhead requires that the
consumed space regarding memory be as low as possi-
ble. Low space overhead can be also considered a sub-
requirements of availability/scalability.
low signaling overhead Low signaling overhead requires
the number and sizes of messages to be as low as possible.
Signaling overhead occurs in Pub/Sub regarding advertise-
ments, subscriptions, and notiﬁcations. Further messages
may occur, e.g., conﬁrmation messages to ensure integrity.
Mechanisms to protect anonymity may introduce signaling
overhead by mixing messages [21].
To comply with service integrity, an event service needs to match
subscriptions with publications. Optionally, the event service may
aggregate subscriptions by checking if one subscription is already
covered by another. This function addresses scalability.
matching Assuming a set of attributes A, given a notiﬁcation
mnotif as well as a subscription msub, and a function A(m) that extracts
all attributes from a message m, match(mnotif ,msub) returns true if
A(msub) ⊆ A(mnotif ), i.e., the notiﬁcation matches all attributes of the
subscription.
covering Given two subscriptions, msub,1 and msub,2, cover(msub,1,
msub,2) returns true if A(msub,1) ⊆ A(msub,2), i.e., msub,1 is more gen-
eral and covers msub,2.
The match operation is mandatory and must be computable by the
event service, i.e., every broker. However, this operation also reveals
information that may violate conﬁdentiality and user anonymity. Im-
plications regarding anonymity are deeply anchored within Pub/Sub.
The next section elaborates further on anonymity.
2.2 anonymity
The terms anonymity and privacy are intrinsically related. Privacy
refers to the ability to seclude oneself. Privacy can be understood as
a fundamental right, as Maslow [99] enumerates the “need for pri-
vacy” as a core property of self-actualization. Poore speciﬁes [116]
the subject, i.e., the what, of privacy as “[. . . ] information leaving
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the control of the person whose information it is [. . . ]”. Such infor-
mation indicating the identity of a person is called personally iden-
tiﬁable information (PII) [106]. Further deﬁnitions address the pro-
tection of PII and thus privacy, e.g., Lessig [90] mentions “empower-
ment to control” as one requirement for privacy. Standards such as
ISO/IEC [74] and Common Criteria [29] decompose the requirement
class privacy into anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, and unob-
servability. Anonymity is deﬁned as “Anonymity requires that other
users or subjects are unable to determine the identity of a user bound
to a subject or operation”. Following these deﬁnitions, this thesis con-
siders anonymity as a part of privacy. In particular, anonymity as
requirement concerned with the protection of PII.
A technical solution to anonymous communication was ﬁrst pro-
posed by Davin Chaum in 1988 via the Dining Cryptographers Problem
[22]. Since then, many solutions for anonymous communication have
emerged. Some of them leverage Chaum’s solution to the dining cryp-
tographers problem. Dining cryptographers networks (DC-nets) rely
on proxy servers or use group communication. The following two
subsections introduce the concepts of anonymous communication, as
well as metrics to measure the success of these concepts.
2.2.1 Concepts
With an anonymization service, participants usually use a public com-
munication channel, e.g., the Internet, and are thus exposed to vari-
ous attackers [48]. Anonymization services attempt to fulﬁll the fol-
lowing requirements in such a scenario [113]:
unlinkability Two or more messages cannot be linked together,
i.e., to the same sender, to the same receiver, or to the same
attribute
sender anonymity No message must be linked to its sender.
receiver anonymity No message must be linked to any of its
receivers.
relationship anonymity No receiver must be linked to the sender
and vice versa.
In the case of a continuous conversation between sender and re-
ceiver, the sender is also called initiator, and the receiver is called
responder.
During the past decades, three main concepts to achieve these
anonymity goals have emerged. First, group communication that en-
sures that senders and receivers “hide” within a group of potential
sender and receivers. Second, proxy nodes that act “on behalf” of a
sender or receiver. As a special version of a proxy, a MIX may provide
better anonymity, but also causes latency. Third, DC-nets as a special
case of group communication. The following paragraphs introduce
each of the concepts.
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group communication Group communication follows the con-
cept of hiding in a group, e.g., when a shared medium is used. For
instance, a message addressed to many receivers at once provide re-
ceiver anonymity. While group communication can protect anonymity,
additional protection such as encryption is required to ensure conﬁ-
dentiality.
Examples of this method are IP broadcast (receiver anonymity), IP
multicast PIM [2]. Broadcast and multicast are however not suited
for Internet-scale communication. On the one hand, IP broadcasts
are limited to a subnet. Thus, only a few subscribers can be reached,
which limits the user anonymity for receivers as well as scalability.
On the other hand, PIM is typically restricted to subnets as well, but
not due to technical but rather organizational reasons.
proxy servers Proxy servers relay messages on behalf of the orig-
inal sender. Assuming that only the relayed messages are observable,
proxy servers can provide sender anonymity. Multiple proxy servers
can be connected to form a chain, a so-called jondo. Assuming that
the last relayed message is not observable, such a proxy chain can pro-
vide receiver anonymity. First such systems have been implemented
in the form of remailers for e-mail [111].
Proxy servers may also recode messages before relaying them. Such
recoding can be performed by (re-) encrypting the message. The
recoding ensures that an incoming message cannot be linked to an
outgoing message. Hence, recoding attempts to protect unlinkability.
However, if the proxy server relays messages in the same order as it
received the messages, the outgoing and incoming messages can be
still linked together according to their sequence, despite recoding. To
overcome this issue, proxy servers reorder messages. For that, proxy
servers collect several messages–batch processing–and relay them in
shufﬂed order.
A proxy server, which recodes, shufﬂes, and relays messages, is
also called a MIX [21]. A collection of MIX nodes forms a MIX-net.
MIX-nets may occur in the topology of free-routes and cascades. With
free-routes, every sender chooses a sequence of MIX nodes indepen-
dently. With cascades, the sequence of MIX nodes is predetermined,
only the ﬁrst MIX node can be chosen by the sender. Free-routes are
considered the preferable variation [45], as they are resilient against
MIX node failures.
Figure 5 depicts the types of MIX-nets. From left to right: a cascade
with 2x2 nodes, a stratiﬁed MIX with 2x2 nodes–messages can be
relayed from any node to any node, and a 4x2 free-route MIX.
A MIX is also called a high-latency anonymization service, whereas
a proxy is called a low-latency anonymization service. The high la-
tency of a MIX occurs as a MIX shufﬂes messages, i.e., it collects
several messages rather than forwarding those messages directly. De-
pending on the number of messages a MIX collects—the batch size—
the latency of a MIX may increase.
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(a) Cascade (b) Stratiﬁed (c) Free-route
Figure 5: Types of MIX-nets [45]
dc-nets dining cryptographers networks (DC-net) are a principle
of secretly sharing a message within a group introduced by Chaum
in 1988 [22]. With DC-nets, noise is added to every message, so that
neither a global observer nor any participant learns the contents of
the messages. After all messages are exchanged, the noise balances
itself out, and the content of the message is revealed, but the sender
remains anonymous.
With the original and most basic version of a DC-net, three cryptog-
raphers desire to determine if any of them paid the bill for the dinner.
I.e., at most one cryptographer would send the message 1 (paid the
bill); all other would send the message 0 (did not pay the bill). The
cryptographers establish pairwise shared secrets via a coin ﬂip—0 or
1 depending if head or tail. The cryptographers then “encrypt” their
message by adding the shared secret via the logical xor ⊕ to the mes-
sage, and send the encrypted message to the corresponding neighbor.
Every cryptographer can establish if someone sent 1 by combining
the two received messages with their message via ⊕ again. As the
same shared key—the noise—is used twice, it balances itself out by
the deﬁnition of ⊕.
2.2.2 Anonymization systems
The introduced concepts for anonymous communication have been
implemented in a plethora of systems. This Section introduces se-
lected systems that have a notable impact or have introduced novel
mechanisms to anonymous communication. The state-of-the-art in
anonymous Pub/Sub systems will be discussed in Chapter 3.
onion routing (tor) the onion router (Tor), ﬁrst proposed by
Syverson [151] and then revised by Dingledine [44], implements a
low-latency MIX network. Compared to a free-route MIX, Tor omits
the shufﬂing step and forwards messages immediately (low-latency).
However, Tor uses the concept of onion routing to encrypt a message
in such a way that every node of a free-route path only learns its
immediate predecessor and successor.
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Figure 6: Illustration of onion routing [168].
With onion routing [151] the initiator of a message encrypts the
message multiple times and thus creates layers of encryption around
the message—the onion as shown in Figure 6. An onion layer is
formed as follows: the initiator I takes the message, appends the
address of a node R, and encrypts the message with the public key
of a node 3. As a result, node 3 can decrypt the message (peel off an
onion layer), read the address of node R, and forward the message to
node R. Following this approach, multiple layers of encryption can
be applied to a single message, starting with the responder, the last
Tor proxy node—also called exit guard, the second to last Tor proxy
node, [...], and the ﬁrst Tor proxy node—called entry guard. As every
Tor proxy node possesses its own secret/public key pair, every node
can only peel off one onion layer, read the address of the next node,
and get to known the previous node as the sender of the message.
freenet (darknet mode) Freenet is a P2P information storage,
search, and retrieval system [24]. Freenet contains two operation
modes, opennet and darknet. The opennet mode of Freenet already ad-
dresses anonymity by omitting E2E addresses in information search.
Freenet uses ﬂooding (recursive routing) instead [160]. That means
that neighbors act as proxies and forward requests on behalf of their
neighbors. The darknet mode further restricts the opennet mode by
limiting neighbors to trusted nodes. With that, Freenet attempts to
protect anonymity in the presence of malicious insiders. As users
only connect to neighbors they trust, they can exclude malicious insid-
ers in their neighborhood. As their trusted neighbors also only con-
nect to trusted nodes, malicious insiders within the extended neigh-
borhood are unlikely. As the darknet mode of Freenet uses recur-
sive routing, no node IDs, e.g., IP address, leaves the direct, trusted
neighborhood. This type of overlay is therefore also referred to as
membership-concealing overlay network (MCON) [160]. Sender ano-
nymity, receiver anonymity, unlinkability and relationship anonymity
are assumed to be fulﬁlled in a darknet.
Darknets have emerged from a mode in Freenet to a generic con-
cept in anonymous communication, e.g., darknets with Tor [80], where
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proxies are selected based upon their trustworthyness. Darknets are
not to be confused with the dark web [7], the non-indexed part of the
Internet.
2.2.3 Metrics
Anonymization concepts and system are intrinsically tied to the ques-
tion, how well they fulﬁll anonymity goals. In the attempt to an-
swer that question, several metrics have been proposed to measure
anonymity requirements. This thesis summarizes the dominant met-
rics set size, probability, entropy, and Euclidean distance.
set sizes Anonymity can be measured by the size of an anonymity
set.
Deﬁnition 1. “Anonymity is the state of being not identiﬁable within a set
of subjects, the anonymity set.” [112, 113]
Following this deﬁnition, sender anonymity can be measured by
the number of all potential senders (Figure 7 left). Likewise, the re-
ceiver anonymity can be measured by the number of all potential
receivers (Figure 7 left). A similar deﬁnition of anonymity is used by
k-anonymity [150], DC-nets [22] and MIX-nets [21].
Figure 7: Anonymity set sizes. [112]
k-anonymity The case of k-anonymity well illustrates the chal-
lenge of deﬁning anonymity metrics. The original approach pub-
lished by Sweeney et al. in 2002 deﬁned a record in a medical dataset
as k-anonymous (with k  2) if for every key (equivalence class) of
the record, at least (k − 1) other records in the dataset shared the
same value (are indistinguishable). However, k-anonymity could be
established by just inserting (k − 1) copies of every record into the
dataset. An anonymity attacker with knowledge of this approach
could trivially remove these copies.
To overcome the drawbacks of the k-anonymity approach, Macha-
navajjhala et al. proposed l-diversity in 2007 [98]. They enforce that
every key in the dataset should, at least, occur with l diverse val-
ues (every equivalence class has, at least, l well-represented values).
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With that property, the combined anonymity metric becomes the tu-
ple (k , l). While inserting copies of the same record would still in-
crease k, l would not improve.
With l-diversity, even if the values of an equivalence class are l well
represented, the sensitivity of the values may differ. E.g., having been
tested positive for a terminal illness is more sensitive than having
been tested negative. To overcome this issue, Li et al. proposed t-
closeness in 2007 [91]. With t-closeness, values of an equivalence
class have to be close to each other with a maximum distance of t. As
a result, the distribution of values of an equivalence class show less
skewing and are less sensitive. The anonymity metric becomes the
triple (k, l, t).
With t-closeness, it is still assumed that the dataset is only anony-
mized and released at once. However, some dataset may be released
in intervals with incremental updates. For instance, medical records
of patients may be released quarterly. In such a case, some records
may persist between multiple releases or not. An anonymity attacker
may correlate information over multiple “snapshots” (data release)
to reduce the anonymity of records. To overcome this issue, Xiao
et al. proposed m-invariance in 2007 [169]. With m-invariance, at
least, m records must persist (remain invariant) across two consecu-
tive dataset releases. As a result, the anonymity metric becomes the
quadruple (k, l, t,m).
The excursion on the well-studied subject of k-anonymity shows
that it is difﬁcult to establish an anonymity metric. In particular, it
seems to be difﬁcult to show that a metric cannot be attacked. For
instance, Kesdogan et al. showed [83] that anonymity sets can be
reduced signiﬁcantly depending the attacker’s capabilities.
entropy Set sizes as anonymity metric do not model additional
knowledge of an anonymity attacker. For instance, regarding sender
anonymity, an attacker could consider some potential senders more
likely than others. Set sizes cannot incorporate this knowledge. To
overcome this drawback, Serjantov and Danezis propose entropy [132]
as an anonymity metric, based on the Shannon entropy [133].
The entropy is deﬁned as a scalar value over a probability distribu-
tion of all potential subjects Ψ. For every subject u ∈ Ψ, pu (Equa-
tion (2)) models the a posteriori probability—after the attacker ob-
served messages—of u acting in role r ∈ R. R can be either sender or
receiver. The Shannon entropy S (Equation (1)) provides the entropy
over this probability distribution p [132].
S =−
∑
u∈Ψ
pu log2(pu) (1)
pu =U(u, r) (2)
Entropy as anonymity metric allows expressing ﬁne-grained knowl-
edge pu about every subject u. An entropy of S = 0 indicates no
anonymity. An entropy of S = log2 |Ψ| indicates perfect anonymity,
i.e., the anonymity set has the size |Ψ|.
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Diaz et al. extend this notion by the so-called degree of anonymity [43],
a value derived from the normalized entropy that expresses how
much the attacker learned by observing messages. Following the
notation of Serjantov and Danezis, the degree of anonymity d ∈
[0, 1] is deﬁned as (Equation (4)), the relation of the a-posteriori en-
tropy S about the maximum entropy HM (Equation (3))—the perfect
anonymity.
HM = log2 |Ψ| (3)
d =1−
HM − S
HM
=
S
HM
(4)
Therefore, the degree of anonymity represents a normalized scalar
metric, which is independent of the population of subjects. With
d = 0, the system provides no anonymity; with d = 1, the system
provides perfect anonymity.
Clauss and Schiffner argue that Rényi entropy [122] can be used
as well as an anonymity metric [25]. Following Equation (5), the
Rényi entropy Hα(P) is a generalization of the Shannon entropy via
the parameter α. With limα → 1, the Rényi entropy converges to
Shannon entropy. Clauss and Schiffner furthermore point out that
entropy metrics are heavily inﬂuenced by outliers.
Hα(P) =
1
1−α
log2
∑
u∈Ψ
pαu (5)
Anderson and Lundin propose a scaled version of Shannon entropy
as anonymity metric [5]. The scaled anonymity set size A (Equa-
tion (6)) is directly derived from the Shannon entropy (Equation (1)).
Values of A = |Ψ| denotes the maximum anonymity set size; A = 1
denotes no anonymity, i.e., a uniquely identiﬁed sender (or receiver
respectively).
A = 2S (6)
Tóth et al. argue that a so-called global metric, such as entropy, is in-
sufﬁcient as an anonymity attacker could already exploit a small devi-
ation of pu from the a priori probability. Therefore, they propose the
local metrics source-hiding property Θ and destination-hiding property Ω.
An anonymization service is considered source-hiding with param-
eter Θ if Equation (7) holds. Likewise, an anonymization service is
considered destination-hiding with parameterΩ if Equation (8) holds.
Also, statements about global metrics (Shannon entropy S) can be de-
rived from the local source-hiding property via Equation (9).
∀pu ∈ Ψ : pu  Θ (7)
∀pu ∈ Ψ : pu  Ω (8)
S  − log2Θ (9)
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Reiter and Rubin use six degrees of anonymity [120]: absolute pri-
vacy, beyond suspicion, probable innocence, possible innocence, ex-
posed, and provably exposed. This metric is local, i.e., it is unique for
every subject, and it incorporates the graph topology of the crowd
as well as assumptions regarding the anonymity attacker. For in-
stance, Equation (10) describes the condition of probable innocence for
the sender. Here, pf > 0.5 describes the probability for forwarding in
the system; c denotes the number of colluding anonymity attackers.
|Ψ|  pf
pf − 0.5
(c+ 1) (10)
summary In summary, no perfect metric to measure anonymity
seems to exist. While the Crowds metric is intuitive, it is also highly
speciﬁc to the Crowds system. The set size metric is also easy to
comprehend but lacks the capability to model ﬁne-grained attacker
knowledge. The entropy-based metrics seem to be the most compre-
hensive metrics so far.
2.3 anonymization implementations & services
Based on the concepts and systems summarized in Sections 2.2.1 -
2.2.2, several ready to use implementations and even commercial
services have emerged. While these implementations and services
hardly introduce relevant novel concepts, they have been studied ex-
tensively regarding anonymity attacks. Therefore, this Section brieﬂy
discusses the most cited implementations & services, as well as re-
spective attacks and lessons to be learned.
2.3.1 anon.penet.ﬁ
The service anon.penet.ﬁ was a centralized proxy service for e-mail.
The proxy receives messages from a sender, assigns a pseudonym
to the sender, stores the sender ↔ pseudonym mapping, replaces
the sender in the messages with the pseudonym, and forwards the
message to the receiver. Due to the pseudonym mapping, the proxy
can assign responses to a pseudonym to the correct originator.
While the service was successful and handled many messages per
day, lawful copyright claims forced the operator to disclose pseudonym
mappings [48]. This case shows that a centralized pseudonym map-
ping causes issues safeguarding these mappings.
2.3.2 Cypherpunk remailers
This service extends the concept of anon.penet.ﬁ with multiple proxy
servers. For that the onion routing concept is used, i.e., the senders
adds an encrypted header for every proxy to the e-mail. To enable
the receiver to respond to an e-mail, the sender can also add a reply
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block to the message. This block contains the headers describing the
proxy chain to be used by the receiver to respond [48].
Cyberpunk remailers share concepts with today’s onion routing.
However, these remailers do not pad messages, and may not imple-
ment good shufﬂing of messages (high batch size). Nevertheless, e-
mail typically allows for some latency, and thus would allow remail-
ers to implement good shufﬂing.
2.3.3 Mixminion
Mixminion [32] is another incarnation of the remailer concept. Com-
pared to Cyberpunk remailers, Mixminion nodes maintain hashes
of relayed messages for some time to prevent replay attacks. Like-
wise, Mixminion also restricts the reply blocks to be used only once.
Mixminion also introduces the concept of directory servers to dis-
cover Mixminion nodes. This concept is still used today by Tor.
2.3.4 Crowds
Crowds [120] applies a routing scheme via proxies—not unlike hot
potato routing— to anonymize senders. Within crowds, every node
runs a routing process called jondo. Therefore, Crowds is a P2P ap-
proach. Every jondo belongs to a crowd of jondos, thus the name of
the system. Jondos are assigned to crowds via the blender process.
Such a decision can be made for instance based on physical locality.
Whenever a sender wants to reach a receiver, it ﬁrst establishes a
path within the crowd. Compared to Tor (cf. next paragraph) circuits,
the sender does not specify this path in Crowds. Every jondo, includ-
ing the sender, just picks the next hop. For that, every jondo that
receives a message chooses with a forwarding probability pf > 0.5 to
forward the message to another jondo, or to the receiver otherwise.
Once this path is established, sender and receiver communicate via
this path.
Crowds protects against de-anonymization from malicious insider
threats. No jondo can tell, if the previous jondo is just a relaying jondo
or the original server. However, Crowds does not apply any mixing or
padding technology. Therefore, an anonymity attacker who observers
the message ﬂow can trace a path in Crowds back to the origin. Ex-
tensions of Crowds exist, for instance, to relay messages in between
crowds [131].
2.3.5 Tarzan
Tarzan [57] constructs circuits consisting of proxy servers to relay
UDP packets. Like Crowds, all nodes act as proxies. As there is
no “crowd” assigned to Tarzan nodes by a central server, Tarzan re-
lies on gossiping to discover neighbors. With gossiping (P2P), Tarzan
connects to a known neighboring node, and asks it for more neigh-
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bors [48]. Using this approach, Tarzan nodes learn about proxies that
can be used to build circuits.
To prevent anonymity attackers from tracing message ﬂows, Tarzan
uses cover trafﬁc between nodes. For that, every node selects a couple
of Tarzan nodes with which it exchanges cover trafﬁc (mimic trafﬁc).
These nodes are called mimics. The mimic selection process is based
on a deterministic function and publicly veriﬁable information such
as IP address and date [48]. Having this information, mimics can ver-
ify their selection, and thus prevent malicious insiders from forcing
mimics to generate cover trafﬁc and overload the system.
2.3.6 Tor
Tor [44] is the reference implementation of onion routing as intro-
duced in Section 2.2.2. This section elaborates on additional functions
of Tor beyond onion routing, as well as attacks against Tor.
2.3.6.1 Hidden services
The concept of onion routing is supposed to protect sender anonymity,
but not receiver anonymity. An initiator is required to know the ad-
dress of the responder. The second generation of Tor introduced a
concept to protect receiver anonymity as well. To reach an unknown
responder, Tor uses the notion of hidden services. With hidden ser-
vices, the initiator addresses a particular type of service but does not
care who provides this service. Hence, the name hidden services.
With hidden services, the service provider (responder) establishes
a Tor circuit but does not contact any node outside of the Tor network.
The service provider rather instructs the exit guard of the circuit to
keep the TCP port of the circuit open. As a result, every initiator
contacting the guard using the speciﬁc port will reach the service
provider, but will not reveal its identity. To inform initiators how to
reach the guard, the service provider publishes a hidden service list-
ing, containing guard, TCP port, public keys, in a central repository.
Assuming that the initiator also establishes a circuit before con-
necting to the service provider’s circuit, both, initiator and respon-
der, each control a circuit to ensure their anonymity. Tor recommends
changing circuits on a regular basis to prevent prolonged trafﬁc corre-
lation by a malicious onion router. Hidden services, however, require
the service provider to publish every new circuit (the guard) in the
central repository. Furthermore, initiators have to obtain this infor-
mation. As a result, regular circuit changes are less practical with
hidden services.
2.3.6.2 Attacks
Tor [44] is one of the most popular anonymization services today.
Consequently, Tor has been subject to attacks and in-depth analysis.
These attacks provide valuable insights regarding the construction
anonymization services and anonymous Pub/Sub systems, too. Tor at-
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tacks can be categorized in passive and active attacks. With passive at-
tacks, an attacker observes network trafﬁc. This attacker can be a ma-
licious onion router that is part of a Tor circuit, or an attacker that can
perform large scale Internet trafﬁc analysis. With active attacks, an
attacker inﬂuences the behavior of the Tor system deliberately. Such
an attacker can take the role of an initiator, which establishes a Tor
circuit, and generates trafﬁc, e.g., to overload the circuit. An active
attacker can also take the role of an onion router that delays messages
or marks packets.
congestion With the congestion attack, an attacker attempts to ex-
haust resources of onion routers to force initiators to pick other
onion routers for their circuit [52]. This attack can be used to
concentrate trafﬁc onto onion routers controlled by the attacker.
This attack is an active attack an can be used in conjunction with
other active or passive attack to de-anonymize Tor users.
packet spinning The packet spinning attack [110] is a more elab-
orate version of the congestion attack. It abuses the fact that Tor
nodes cannot detect loops in circuits, and thus create such loops
and cause packets to spin in this loop forever. As a result, this
attack causes a congestion of the involved onion routers as well,
also causing initiators to select other onion routers. Both con-
gestion attacks work as they cause signaling overhead as well
as computation overhead—onion routers have to perform cryp-
tographic operations when relaying messages after all. When-
ever an initiator attempts to establish a circuit, it contacts every
onion router which is supposed to be part of the circuit one after
another via the growing Tor circuit. If an onion router does not
respond within a timeout, the user will choose another onion
router.
traffic analysis [82] The trafﬁc analysis attack attempts to cor-
relate incoming and outgoing trafﬁc of onion routers. Ideally,
every conversation between initiator and responder follows a
unique trafﬁc template (a function mapping from time to band-
width). If an attacker can trace this pattern through all onion
routers of a circuit, the attacker can link initiator and responder.
While this attack would require global observing capabilities of
the attacker, the attacker can be reﬁned to work with a weaker
attacker model [101]. As everyone can establish arbitrary Tor cir-
cuits, a single active attacker can establish circuits and measure
the delay (and thus load) of individual onion routers. Together
with a malicious responder that generates load patterns, the at-
tacker can predict which other onion routers are in the circuit
based on the observed delay pattern.
sniper The sniper attack [77] is a special version of the congestion
attack. It uses a weakness of Tor’s ﬂow control to exhaust the
memory of an onion router quickly with minimal resource con-
sumption. This attack is possible as Tor does not use E2E dupli-
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cate detection. Therefore, it is possible to instruct onion routers
to send large message many times with a small request.
cell counter The cell counter attack [92] is one example of mark-
ing trafﬁc in a Tor circuit. Marking trafﬁc helps colluding attack-
ers to trace message ﬂows. In an ideal case, the attacker controls
the entry guard—the ﬁrst onion router of a circuit—and the last
onion router of a circuit (exit guard). Then, the entry guard
would mark packets in a way such that the exist guard could
detect these markings. As a result, the attacker could link initia-
tor and receiver. The cell counter attack is one speciﬁc method
to mark packets. As Tor does not use TCP streams to commu-
nicate along the circuit, and as the payload is encrypted, only
metadata ﬁelds of Tor can be used for marking. The cell counter
is a metadata ﬁeld used by Tor for ﬂow control, similar to the
TCP sequence number. Slight alterations to the cell counter can
be used to mark circuits.
bad apple The bad apple attack [14] uses an onion router to per-
form man in the middle (MITM) attacks (active attacks). The
attack exploits that communication between the Tor exit guard
and the receiver may occur without conﬁdentiality and authen-
ticity protection. A malicious exit guard can, therefore, read the
message from the sender and modify the response. In the exam-
ple [14], the exit guard modiﬁed the response from BitTorrent
tracker to introduce malicious peers. Assuming that the tar-
geted node will directly connect to the malicious peer without
Tor, the target node can be de-anonymized.
fingerprinting Fingerprinting attacks [68, 163] exploit the fact
that the application layer may leak information that is reﬂected
in Tor circuits by a ﬁngerprint. With a database of ﬁngerprints,
every onion router of a circuit can correlate this circuit with ap-
plication layer receivers. For instance, with HTTP / a web page
as application layer responder, the attacker can build a database
of ﬁngerprints from common websites. The ﬁngerprint is then
constituted by the timed sequence of requests (HTML, JS, CSS,
images)—also called timing attack—and the sizes of the respon-
ses. With this information, a Tor entry guard can link initiators
with web pages, i.e., link initiators and receivers.
statistical disclosure The statistical disclosure attack [33] as-
sumes that some properties of anonymous communication re-
main invariant over time. Therefore, statistics can be used to
reveal these invariant properties. For instance, if the commu-
nication between initiator and responder is invariant and the
path through the anonymization service variant, simply count-
ing messages of initiators and receivers would statistically re-
veal this pair. However, this attack requires an attacker that has
global observation capabilities.
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predecessor The predecessor attack [167] is a speciﬁc version of
the statistical disclosure that has been applied to Tor. This at-
tack assumes that it is possible to associate a Tor circuit with a
responder, e.g., via the ﬁngerprinting attack. Then the initiator
would connect more often to a malicious onion router over time
than any other onion router. Thus, via the statistics, the attacker
could assume that this node is indeed the initiator and not an
onion router. This attack assumes that the initiator creates many
circuits over time to connect to the same responder. However,
the current speciﬁcation of Tor prevents the creation of a new cir-
cuit as long as the conversation between initiator and responder
is ongoing.
2.3.7 MorphMix
MorphMix [121] is a MIXnet that does not rely on ﬁxed MIX cas-
cades or directory servers. MorphMix uses gossiping to discover
MIX nodes. Hence, every node is required to know at least one MIX
node upfront. The node asks the other MIX node for additional MIX
nodes. To establish conﬁdential communication with newly discov-
ered MIX nodes, MorphMix applies a modiﬁed Difﬁe-Hellman (DH)
key exchange to establish a symmetric key. This key exchange is as-
sisted by two already known nodes to prevent a MITM attack.
2.3.8 Anonymizer.com
Anonymizer Inc. offers a commercial anonymization service1 via the
proxy concept. To forward all TCP/IP trafﬁc via their proxy server,
they use a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel between sender and
proxy.
As Anonymizer is built on VPN connections and a proxy, it intro-
duces low latency. However, as VPNs usually do not provide padding
of messages, incoming messages of the proxy may be linked to out-
going messages.
2.3.9 JonDo / AN.ON & JAP
JonDo is another commercial anonymization service2 offered by Jon-
Dos GmbH. Unlike Anonymizer, JonDo follows the MIX concept.
JonDo is based on the open source AN.ON, which again is derived
from Java Anon Proxy (JAP) [12]. JAP is a desktop application that
acts as a web proxy server and connects to a MIX cascade. The
MIX nodes of the cascade are operated by supporters of the AN.ON
project, and JonDo respectively.
As JonDo is a high-latency MIX system, the MIX nodes should en-
sure unlinkability of incoming and outgoing messages. However, due
to a request from a law enforcement agency [107], JonDo introduced
1 https://www.anonymizer.com
2 https://www.anonym-surfen.de
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a message ﬂag to make messages linkable across multiple MIX nodes.
Still, as the MIX nodes of AN.ON and JonDo are operated by sev-
eral legal bodies, court orders seldomly address all operators (MIX
nodes), and are thus hardly successful [62].
2.3.10 P5
P5 is an anonymization service that uses the broadcast concept [134,
135]. However, P5 has not been realized yet and has only been mod-
eled as a packet-level simulation. P5 assumes participants to organize
an overlay tree. Within that overlay tree, a sender encrypts a message
with the receiver’s public key, and broadcasts the encrypted message
to all successors in the tree. These successors will then re-broadcast
into their subtrees. Furthermore, all messages a padded to the same
size of 1KiB.
With P5 nodes can trade anonymity with message overhead: if
the sender takes the tree root position, the receiver anonymity set
becomes maximal. Likewise, the message overhead becomes maximal
as all other nodes will receive the broadcast. This mechanism protects
receiver anonymity. To protect sender anonymity as well, P5 nodes
generate noise, i.e., packets without meaningful content.
2.3.11 Summary
Many of the implementations & services addressed in Section 2.3
show pedigree and have been reﬁned and improved over years. Still,
few seem to successful regarding active users, Tor being the dominant
one. The survey from Edman and Yener [48] offers further insights
into less known implementations.
Even though Tor is the most popular implementation and has been
improved and analyzed countless times—Google Scholar lists 2, 639
citations of [44] as of August 20th, 2015—crucial challenges remain.
First, Tor was not designed to and cannot protect against colluding
anonymity attackers. Second, the application layer should be always
considered when designing anonymization services. In particular,
strict network layer separation has not worked out well for anonymity
in the case of Tor so far. With Tor being located at transport (4) and
session (5) layer in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference
model [171] (transport layer (3) in the TCP/IP model), some of Tor’s
mechanisms are highly inﬂuenced by the application layer (7) (layer 4
in the TCP/IP model). Moreover, attacks on the application layer can
still violate anonymity. Likewise, other network layers are susceptible
to attacks, e.g., as shown by the de-anonymization of originators of
BitCoin transactions [81].
2.4 p2p systems
P2P overlay networks are an abstraction on top of an existing network
layer, the underlay. Compared to the client-server model, where one
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or more nodes take the role of a server and the clients solely connect
to such server nodes, P2P omits this role distinction. Instead, all nodes
assume both roles and are therefore equal. Usually, P2P systems as-
sume IP as an underlay to establish overlay networks. P2P systems
can be classiﬁed based on how they establish overlay networks: un-
structured and structured [95]. Some P2P systems, such as Napster [54]
and [26, 86], use the client-server model for some functionality and
are thus called hybrid.
The most important functions performed by a P2P system are store,
lookup, and retrieve [95]. The lookup may be combined with retrieval.
As lookup does not require much bandwidth compared to store and
retrieve, lookup is realized by a central server in a hybrid combination
of central and P2P system. This approach speeds up the lookup of
information regarding delay and the number of messages.
2.4.1 Structured overlays
When storing information, structured overlays place this information
at a location (node) that is determined by some structure. This struc-
ture is typically a distributed hash table (DHT). A DHT consists of
(key, value) pairs, where the key identiﬁes the information and the
value where (which node) to ﬁnd it. To establish a uniform key rep-
resentation, typically a hash of the information is used. As the DHT is
distributed, no single node is required to keep a complete table. In-
stead, nodes determine from the key which neighboring peer is closer
to the value, i.e., the information. Hence, a progressive localization is
possible.
To maintain a structure that allows the determination of the cor-
rect neighboring peer, nodes organize themselves in a ring that main-
tains a predecessor/successor relation among nodes. For that, nodes
obtain an ID, typically from the interval [0, 1); each ID represents a
position within the ring [148].
The lookup of information via such a ring structure may require
traversing half of all nodes in the ring. To speed up the process, nodes
may maintain more than two neighbors (predecessor, successor), and
thus, introduce shortcuts within the ring—skip lists [67]. A DHT in
combination with skip lists provides fast lookup of information with
guarantees of the upper bound of nodes to traverse.
2.4.2 Unstructured overlays
Opposed to structured overlays, unstructured overlays store informa-
tion at random nodes. A lookup, therefore, requires searching for
the information in the overlay. Two methods are being used to per-
form such a search, the graph traversal algorithms ﬂooding, and ran-
dom walks [114]. Following the properties of algorithms, ﬂooding and
random walk are efﬁcient for looking up popular (highly replicated)
information, whereas structured overlays are more efﬁcient for rare
information.
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flooding With ﬂooding, the initiator forwards its request to all
neighboring peers. These peers again continue to forward the request
to all their peers. Eventually, the request reaches a responder, who
discontinues the ﬂooding. To allow the responder to send a message
back to the initiator, all forwarding peers are required to store some
information about the request for a limited time. Such information
can be the tuple consisting of message ID and previous peer.
While ﬂooding is well suited to reach a responder quickly, it causes
signaling overhead. To overcome this drawback, the ﬂooded mes-
sages contain a time to live (TTL) counter. The initiator initializes
the TTL counter with a positive value. Every peer that forwards the
message ﬁrst decrements the TTL counter before sending the message.
Once the TTL counter reaches 0, the ﬂooding stops.
random walk Random walks can be considered a variation of
ﬂooding. Rather than ﬂooding the message to all neighboring peers,
with the random walk the message is only forwarded to exactly one
randomly selected neighboring peer. The forwarding sequence there-
fore constitutes a random walk across peers.
Compared with ﬂooding, random walks may cause less signaling
overhead. However, the distance between requester and responder
may be longer. Furthermore, random walks do not guarantee to reach
a responder, even in case a responder is within the TTL counter dis-
tance of the initiator.
2.4.2.1 Summary
Summarizing P2P approaches, structured overlays provide the best
performance for sparse data, whereas unstructured overlays are best
suited for highly replicated data. Structured overlays expose the most
information to anonymity attackers as IDs are necessary, and as the
attacker can therefore easily target the node with the closest ID to the
desired information. Unstructured overlays are therefore best suited
for anonymity. The next section introduces network simulations; a
method to evaluate how suitable a P2P approach is given a perfor-
mance metric.
2.5 network simulation
Simulations are one of the three core methods for evaluating the per-
formance of computer systems [75]. A simulation abstracts from the
real systems in the sense that only certain properties considered rel-
evant are modeled in the simulation. Simulations of computer net-
works are well suited as empirical evaluation are often not possible:
a replication of a computer network might not be affordable (the Inter-
net), and evaluation of a productive system may cause interferences.
Anonymous communication services are particularly hard to evalu-
ate empirically as they are designed to prevent analysis in the ﬁrst
place [76]. Therefore, network simulations, as well as formal analy-
sis, are the dominant evaluation methods for anonymization services.
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For some services, e.g., Tor, speciﬁc network simulation tools such as
Shadow [76] exist.
This section brieﬂy introduces the concept of discrete event simula-
tion as well as OMNeT++, the discrete event simulator chosen for the
quantitative evaluation of this thesis for various reasons as explained
below.
2.5.1 Discrete event simulation
A discrete event simulation is based on components emitting and
consuming events. The discrete event simulation processes events
in chronological order without concurrency (discrete). A discrete
event simulator, therefore, stores events within an event queue, sorted
chronologically according to the simulation time. An event scheduler
takes care of queuing events, deleting events, re-ordering events, and
processing events.
The workﬂow within a discrete event simulation is as follows: the
active component emits an event and hands it over to the event sched-
uler. The scheduler determines at which simulation time the event is
going to be processed, and inserts the event at the appropriate posi-
tion in the event queue. After all actions of the active component are
complete, e.g., processing an event, emitting events, and updating its
internal state, the schedule pops the next event from the queue. If
the event is scheduled to be processed in the future about the cur-
rent simulation time, the schedule advances the simulation time to
the processing time. Then the discrete event simulator activates the
consuming component, hands over the event, and waits for the com-
ponent to ﬁnish processing.
Discrete event simulations capsulate the behavior of computer net-
works. For instance, nodes of a computer network can be represented
as components, messages as events, and transmission delay as ad-
vancing time.
2.5.2 OMNeT++
Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ (OMNeT++) [115, 159] is
a discrete event simulator written in C++. Other common simula-
tors are OPNET, and Network Simulator 2 & 3 [109]. This thesis
considers OMNeT++ the the simulator of choice as it is free of charge
for academic usage3 and provides many ready to use components
from the Internet domain. Moreover, opposed to the other simula-
tors, OMNeT++ has been publicly available including all sources since
1997. OMNeT++ also supports all major operating systems and not
only for Unix-based systems (Network Simulator 2,3).
The following sections summarize the structure of OMNeT++, the
markup languages, and the add-on framework INET.
3 A commercial version is available under the name OMNEST.
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Figure 8: OMNeT++ simulation GUI. [94]
2.5.2.1 Structure
OMNeT++ is structured around the concept of modules, much like com-
ponents in discrete event simulation. These modules can be intercon-
nected and exchange messages, the OMNeT++ concept of events. Each
connection consists of two gates—one for each module—and a mod-
ule representing the channel between these gates. A gate can be in-
coming, outgoing, and bidirectional. Emitting an event, therefore,
corresponds to sending a message out via a gate in OMNeT++. The
OMNeT++ simulation GUI is depicted in Figure 8.
OMNeT++ distinguishes two types of modules: simple modules and
compound modules. A simple module is a C++ implementation of
application-speciﬁc functionality. A compound module aggregates
one or more modules—simple or compound—gates, and channels
into a unit of abstraction. Following the object orientation, modules
are typed and inherit from one of OMNeT++’s base classes, e.g., cMod-
ule, cSimpleModule, cCompoundModule.
2.5.2.2 Markup languages
While, for instance, compound modules can be implemented in C++
directly, OMNeT++ offers three markup languages to ease simulation
development:
ned The Network Description (NED) language describes networks
and its elements in OMNeT++. The simplest network can be mod-
eled as two modules with one gate each and a channel connect-
ing both gates. NED can be also used to model modules and
channels, including the inheritance of these, their parameters,
and gates. The OMNeT++ simulation kernel parses NED ﬁles at
runtime.
msg The MSG language describes messages. A MSG ﬁle describes
the inheritance of a message, e.g., cMessage and cPacket, as well
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as the ﬁelds of the message, such as headers and payload. The
OMNeT++ toolset translates MSG ﬁles into header and C++ ﬁles
at compile time. During this process, OMNeT++ enriches the mes-
sages by additional constants and variables used by the simula-
tion kernel internally.
ini INI ﬁles provide the initialization for simulations. In essence,
INI ﬁles specify or overwrite parameters declared in NED ﬁles.
The OMNeT++ simulation kernel parses INI ﬁles at runtime. INI
ﬁles are structured into sections called Conﬁg. Every conﬁg de-
scribes an individual simulation setup. Such a simulation setup
may contain parameter studies, i.e., multiple values of one pa-
rameter, and multiple repetitions.
2.5.2.3 INET framework
The OMNeT++ ecosystem consists of manifold frameworks, providing
ready to use modules and channels. These frameworks cover speciﬁc
network simulation areas such as wireless sensor networks, vehicle
networks, and INET for Internet components.
Figure 9: StandardHost compound module of INET, depicted in NED visual-
ization.
INET provides an implementation of a typical Internet connected
device, called StandardHost as shown in Figure 9. Within this com-
pound module, INET contains module implementations for IPv4 and
IPv6 routing, mobility and battery, transport layer protocols such as
TCP and UDP, link layer protocol suits such as Ethernet including
ARP, IEEE 802.11, and PPP, as well as physical layer channel imple-
mentations for these protocols. Further hosts based on these modules
are included as well, such as switches, routers, and gateways. Lever-
aging these components, INET allows building realistic Internet ap-
plications on top of this stack.
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2.5.3 Summary
In summary, network simulations are well suited to simulate anony-
mization services. Such simulations can abstract unnecessary details
still required for application simulations such as Shadow. OMNeT++ is
a mature tool for such simulations and already provides many imple-
mented components from the Internet domain.
2.6 summary
This chapter has introduced the concepts of Pub/Sub, anonymity, P2P,
and network simulation with the goal of establishing the necessary
background knowledge that is being used throughout this thesis.
Publish/subscribe is well suited to realize many-to-many applica-
tions in a distributed rather than a centralized manner. The paradigm
also suits the goal of anonymous communication due to the loose
coupling of entities. However, Pub/Sub also requires access to possi-
ble conﬁdential information to route this information. Such a lack of
conﬁdentiality also poses a threat to anonymity. Thus, anonymous
Pub/Sub has to be carefully designed.
Next, this chapter explained the background of anonymous com-
munication. Anonymity can be sub-divided into the four goals un-
linkability, sender/receiver anonymity, and relationship anonymity.
Three foundational concepts exist to fulﬁll one or more of these goals:
group communication, proxy servers / MIX nets, and DC-nets. Based
on these concepts, this chapter brieﬂy surveyed several systems. To
measure the anonymity within such systems, a plethora of metrics ex-
ist. The metric families of set sizes and entropy have been explained.
With the knowledge of concepts and metrics, this Chapter surveyed
several well known anonymous communication systems and elabo-
rated on their respective contributions and shortcomings.
Following the insight that P2P systems constitute a common founda-
tion for anonymous communication services, this chapter provided a
brief overview of P2P terminology and concepts. This chapter con-
cluded with an introduction into network simulation and the net-
work simulation tool OMNeT++. A network simulation constitutes one
of three mail evaluation techniques for networked systems, such as
Pub/Sub applications, and anonymization services.

3
REQUIREMENTS AND STATE OF THE ART
The previous chapter introduced necessary background concepts, in
particular, Pub/Sub and anonymous communication services, for this
thesis. This chapter analyzes the related work, systems that combine
Pub/Sub and anonymous communication in detail.
To analyze the related work in a structured manner, the follow-
ing approach is used: a formal anonymous Pub/Sub system model is
introduced in Section 3.1, which allows evaluating requirements for
anonymous Pub/Sub systematically. The requirements for anonymous
Pub/Sub are established in Section 3.2 based on the model.
Anonymity attacker models are mapped to the system model in
Section 3.3. These attacker models aim to break the anonymity re-
quirement. Also, this thesis presents novel attack approaches to over-
come the main shortcoming of prior anonymity evaluation: existing
attacker models are often only formulated on a high abstraction layer,
ignore the heterogeneity of P2P, and thus only provide a worst-case
but not realistic anonymity assessment. Section 3.4 apply the attacker
models to the domain of Pub/Sub by discussing several methodologies
to break anonymity. Moreover, a novel attack that can be applied to
unstructured P2P systems is proposed in Section 3.4.1.
A generic architecture is extracted from related systems in Sec-
tion 3.5. Based on the architecture, reoccurring technologies for the
architectural building blocks are discussed in Section 3.6. Having
established and discussed all common elements, sixth, the related
anonymous Pub/Sub systems are analyzed in Section 3.7. Section 3.8
concludes this chapter.
3.1 publish/subscribe system formalization
This section introduces notation and model for distributed Pub/Sub
systems. This model serves as common ground for the discussion
of anonymity attacker models, related work, as well as contributions
throughout this thesis. Section 2.1.1 has introduced the concept of
Pub/Sub message dissemination. This section reﬁnes this concept by
applying a formal notation that also incorporates the concept of ano-
nymization services (cf. Section 2.2) as well as P2P systems (cf. Sec-
tion 2.4).
attributes A core property of Pub/Sub is the loose coupling be-
tween participants [51]. Loose coupling is achieved by routing mes-
sages according to their content and the interests of participants rather
than participant IDs. Section 2.1.1 has introduced common compari-
son methods of Pub/Sub, i.e., methods to match message contents with
interests. The modeling of content and interests is, therefore, a crucial
part of the Pub/Sub formalization.
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This thesis uses the concept of attributes to formalize message con-
tents and participant interests. Attributes have emerged as an expres-
sive concept in the domain of IT security. Methods of attribute-based
access control (ABAC), e.g., eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) [63], for achieving authorization and attribute-based
encryption (ABE) [128] for achieving conﬁdentiality in combination
with authorization serve as an example.
To model participant interests, this thesis introduces an attribute
set A. Each attribute a ∈ A reﬂects a participant’s interest. Every par-
ticipant may be interested in multiple attributes; likewise, messages
may be labeled with multiple attributes.
Example 3. As an example, topic-based Pub/Sub can be directly translated
into attributes. Topic x becomes attribute x ∈ A. Subject-based Pub/Sub
can be translated by either (i) creating attribute sets out of subjects or (ii)
ﬂattening each subject to one attribute. For the ﬁrst option, a subject x.y.z,
where x represents the major subject with y being a minor subject, can be
modelled as attribute set {x,y, z} ∈ A. In this case, the order is lost. For the
second option, the subject x.y.z can be represented by attributes representing
the valid attribute combinations {x, x.y, x.y.z} ∈ A. Type-based Pub/Sub can
be modelled via attributes as well by introducing an attribute for every type.
Finally, content-based Pub/Sub might be modelled via attributes to some
extent. Some content-based Pub/Sub implementations, e.g., JMS [41], model
“content” as a list of properties attached to every message. Such properties
can be directly replaced by attributes.
Social media serve well as an example of attributes: Twitter uses so-called
hashtags as labels for tweets (messages). Participants can add hashtags to
their tweets, e.g., #TharirSquare. Other participants can then search and
even stream (subscription) this hashtag.
graph & overlays A Pub/Sub system can be modelled as a graph,
with computer systems represented by nodes, and with communica-
tion links represented by edges. In a centralized Pub/Sub system, one
node represents the designated broker, and all other nodes (publish-
ers and subscribers) are connected to this node. This thesis general-
izes this topology to a P2P system.
P2P-based Pub/Sub systems, such as [138, 153] [37], distribute the
broker functionality among all peers. Peers are interconnected via an
underlay, e.g., the Internet. To abstract from the underlay, this model
assumes that all peers establish a basic overlay via an underlying P2P
approach.
The basic overlay is represented as the graph G = (V ,E) that incor-
porates all peers V and interconnects them via overlay edges E. This
model assumes that the graph G is connected and unidirectional, i.e.,
∀vx, vy ∈ V there is an edge progression from vx to vy. As a result,
this model can also incorporate underlays without E2E connectivity,
such as wireless sensor networks. Each peer v has a set of neigh-
bors deﬁned by adjacent edges. The function N(v) (cf. Equation (11))
returns these neighbors.
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roles The set of nodes V can be partitioned into publishers P,
subscribers S, and brokers that are named forwarders F to follow the
P2P generalization. Hence, V = P ∪ S ∪ F. A node may take up to
all of these roles in a P2P system. In particular, a node can take the
publisher and subscriber role at the same time. Thus |P ∩ S ∩ F|  0
holds.
The roles can be further split according to the attributes. The set
Pa denotes the publishers for attribute a ∈ A. Likewise, Sa and Fa
denote the subscribers and forwarders for a. The uniﬁed set of all
nodes involved in handling messages related to a is denoted by Va.
Following the attribute-speciﬁc node notation, the neighborhood
functionN(v) can be further differentiated in inbound neighborsN+a (v)
⊆ N(v) (see Equation (12)) that will forward messages regarding a to
the local node v and outbound neighbors N−a (v) (see Equation (13))
that node v sends messages regarding attribute a to.
N(v) = {w} : v,w ∈ V ∧ ((v,w) ∈ E∨ (w, v) ∈ E) (11)
N+a (v) = {w} : v,w ∈ Va ∧ (w, v) ∈ Ea (12)
N−a (v) = {w} : v,w ∈ Va ∧ (v,w) ∈ Ea (13)
messages Messages in this model are denoted by m. The message
m may relate to one or more attributes A ′ ⊆ A and is written as mA ′ .
For simplicity, this thesis uses one attribute a ∈ A, and the message
becomes ma.
A Pub/Sub system typically distinguishes three types of messages:
notification A notiﬁcation, sometimes also called publication, with
attribute a contained, is written as manotif .
subscription A subscription for attribute a is written as masub. Sub-
scriptions serve the purpose of setting up routing tables such
that all publishers and forwarders on the paths from publishers
to subscribers know, in which directions they have to forward
notiﬁcations.
advertisement If Pub/Sub with advertisements is used, the ad-
vertisement of attribute a is written as maadv. Advertisements
aid the subscription process by informing forwarders and sub-
scribers from which directions to expect notiﬁcations from.
In combination with the roles: a subscriber s ∈ Sa ⊆ Va subscribes
to the attribute a ∈ A via subscription messages masub and receives
notiﬁcation messages manotif originated by the publishers in set Pa for
attribute a. Every publisher p ∈ Pa ⊆ Va may initially advertise
the availability of the attribute a via advertisement messages maadv
that are disseminated in G, e.g., by ﬂooding the neighbors of p. All
messages between a subscriber and a publisher may be carried out
over multiple hops in G.
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attribute overlay The multi-hop dissemination of messages
can be considered as another overlay on top of the basic overlay G.
Without loops and duplicate paths, such an overlay per attribute
forms a mesh Ma = (Pa ∪ Sa ∪ Fa,Ea) that includes all publish-
ers Pa, all subscribers Sa and depending on the speciﬁc P2P-based
Pub/Sub approach it will also include a certain number of nodes, so-
called forwarders Fa, that are not interested in attribute a at all, but
will perform brokering in between publishers and subscribers. Ea (cf.
Equation (14)) denotes the set of edges that connects the nodes in Ma.
This is the most basic deﬁnition of overlay edges. A Pub/Sub system
may remove edges and introduce new edges. Nodes in Ma can be
summarized as Va := Pa ∪ Sa ∪ Fa.
Ea = {(n1,n2) ∈ E : n1,n2 ∈ Va} (14)
patha(p, s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
{p, s} if (p, s) ∈ Ea
{p}∪ patha(x, s) if (p, x) ∈ Ea ∧ patha(x, s) 
= ∅
∅ else
(15)
∀p∈Pa ∀s∈Sa : patha(p, s) (16)
The function patha(p, s) (cf. Equation (15)) describes the overlay
path in Ma between nodes p and s. The function returns this path as
a node progression. With the assumption of no loops and no dupli-
cate paths in Ma, there exists at most one path between two nodes.
To ensure the requirements of subscription integrity and service in-
tegrity (cf. Section 2.1.2), there exists a path between every publisher
and every subscriber as deﬁned by Constraint (16).
time & churn A Pub/Sub system can be also subject to churn over
time and thus inherently dynamic. The time t ∈ T : T = {1, 2, . . . }
indicates snapshots, e.g., Gt and Sta. Every system snapshot is repre-
sented by an increment of t.
Node churn ϕ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the ratio of nodes of the total node
population V that are subject to churn during a time interval [ti, ti+1].
Three variations of churn are considered:
• With ϕjoin, ϕjoin × |V | nodes join the basic overlay G during the
time interval [ti, ti+1].
• With ϕleave, ϕleave × |V | nodes of the basic overlay G leave during
the time interval [ti, ti+1].
• With ϕ, this ratio is distributed among ϕjoin and ϕleave. That
means, ϕjoin = ϕ2 and ϕjoin × |V | nodes join during the time
interval; ϕleave = ϕ2 and ϕleave × |V | nodes out of the nodes that
are already part of G at time ti leave within the interval.
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symbol explanation
A Set of attributes
G = (V ,E) Graph of the basic overlay
V All nodes / peers / participants
E Direct connections between nodes
N(v) Shortcut function for neighbors of v
Pa Publishers with attribute a
Sa Subscribers for attribute a
Fa Forwarding peers for attribute a
Ma = (Va,Ea) Overlay mesh for attribute a
manotif Notiﬁcation message with attribute a
masub Subscription message for attribute a
maadv Advertisement message for attribute a
N+a (v) ⊆ N(v) Neighbors sending manotif to v
N−a (v) ⊆ N(v) Neighbors v sends manotif to
patha(p, s) Overlay path from p to s for attribute a
t ∈ T The time or snapshot t of the system
Table 1: System formalization
The churn rate ϕ remains constant over time intervals. Churn oc-
curs in two characteristics: ﬁrst, nodes join and leave G, which also
affect overlays Ma. Second, subscribers and publishers join and leave
attribute overlays Ma but not G. Nodes send a subscription mes-
sage (msub) to join an attribute overlay. Advertisement messages
madv from publishers indicate the availability of overlays. To leave
an attribute overlay, they have to send an unsubscription (munsub) or
unadvertisement (munadv), depending on their role in the attribute
overlay. When nodes fail, their neighbors act as if they received an
unsubscription / unadvertise message from that node.
summary Table 1 summarizes the introduced notation. This no-
tation describes two network abstraction layers of a Pub/Sub system,
the basic overlay and the attribute overlay. Furthermore, the nota-
tion describes participants and their roles, messages exchanged in
such a system, and churn. The notation does not explain how Ma is
constructed out of G. This overlay creation is part of the respective
Pub/Sub systems.
3.2 anonymity requirements for Pub/Sub
Security requirements for Pub/Sub have been introduced in Section 2.1.2.
This section elaborates on requirements particular to anonymity and
puts them into perspective the formal model established in the previ-
ous section.
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Xiao [168] enumerates publishing anonymity, sending anonymity, and
receiving anonymity as anonymity goals. Publishing anonymity re-
quires that the information can be created without the creator being
discovered. Sender and receiver anonymity have been discussed in
Section 2.2.1 and require that a message is not linkable to a sender or
receiver.
Further requirements exist [113]: the combination of sender and
receiver anonymity leads to relationship anonymity, i.e., the require-
ments of sender and receiver not being linked together. Unlinkability
requires no two messages to be linked together.
The less differentiated term privacy is also being used [118, 162] in
the context of Pub/Sub. It is important to note that this requirement
originates from the insight that anonymity should be considered in
combination with conﬁdentiality [129]. A violation of either require-
ment can easily lead to the violation of the other one as well:
anonymity without confidentiality Anonymity without con-
ﬁdentiality means that data or messages are available in plain-
text, but the sender and receiver are anonymized. Prior research
has shown that proﬁling and correlation are possible, resulting
in a potential de-anonymization of sender and receiver [105].
confidentiality without anonymity Conﬁdentiality without
anonymity means that data or messages are linked to sender
and receiver, but the plaintext of the data or message is not
available.
Example 4. One example of the anonymity without conﬁdentiality issue
is the transmission of unencrypted information, or information that contains
metadata, with an anonymization service. The amnesic incognito live system
(Tails) for instance explicitly warns1, that although Tails uses Tor to anonymize
the communication metadata, application metadata such e-mail addresses are
not protected.
An example for conﬁdentiality without anonymity is the non-anony-
mous but encrypted access of web pages. Even if the information transmitted
via the HTTPS protocol is encrypted, the communication destination, e.g.,
the Internet protocol (IP) address and thus an associated regime-critical blog,
reveals the potentially transmitted information.
This thesis transforms the terms sender and receiver anonymity
into publisher anonymity and subscriber anonymity to better ﬁt Pub/Sub.
That means, given a Pub/Sub system including all exchanged mes-
sages:
1. An anonymity attacker cannot link any of the messages—manotif ,
masub, m
a
adv—to a publisher or subscriber.
2. An anonymity attacker cannot link any attribute a ∈ A to a
publisher or subscriber.
1 https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/warning/
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The second requirement follows from the observation that conﬁ-
dentiality and anonymity must be considered in combination [129].
To measure the anonymity—the inverse success of an anonymity attacker—
, this thesis uses the two metrics anonymity set size [112] and de-
gree of anonymity/entropy [43] (cf. Section 2.2.3). With these metrics,
anonymity can be formalized as follows:
subscriber anonymity Every subscriber can hide in a reasonably
large anonymity set anonSetadv from the perspective of an ano-
nymity attacker. The attacker attempts to establish the minimal
anonymity set containing only subscribers, and thus disclosing
these subscribers, for a given attribute a from a set of attribute
A. Thus, a Pub/Sub system meets subscriber anonymity w.r.t.
to an adversary A, and a set size k, if Equation 17 holds, i.e.,
the attacker cannot reduce any anonymity set below the size of
at least k participants. Using anonymity degree as metric, the
system provides anonymity if Equation 18 holds, the attacker A
cannot learn more than threshold T about the system (cf. Equa-
tion (4) on page 20 for the deﬁnition of d).
∀a ∈ A : |anonSetA(a)|  k (17)
∀a ∈ A : dA(a)  T (18)
publisher anonymity Similar to subscriber anonymity, the Equa-
tions (17), (18) can be applied to publisher anonymity as well.
summary This section established the terms subscriber and pub-
lisher anonymity. Furthermore, the two metric anonymity set size
and anonymity degree were chosen to measure the anonymity. The
conditions if publisher and subscriber anonymity hold are based on
an anonymity attacker A. The next section will elaborate on models
for this attacker.
3.3 attacker models for anonymity
Manifold anonymity attacker models have been proposed, differing
in their capabilities and the attack approach. Dingledine et al. [44]
discuss capabilities extensively, although their anonymization service
Tor is only designed to protect against a subset of these capabilities.
Compared to capabilities, attack approaches have been less exten-
sively studied. Attacks, e.g., the ones studied by the anonymity met-
rics discussed in Section 2.2.3 (page 18), are evaluated via theoretical
worst-case capabilities.
This section summarizes existing attacker models in Section 3.3.1
and elaborates further on two attacker models in the context of the
system formalization in Section 3.3.2. These attacker models describe
the capabilities of anonymity attackers. The following Section 3.4
will then elaborate on how these capabilities can be applied to break
anonymity in Pub/Sub systems.
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3.3.1 Properties & capabilities
Edelman and Yener [48] summarize the attacker properties used to
evaluate anonymization services as capability, visibility, mobility, and
participation. These properties can be adapted as follows to the do-
main of anonymous Pub/Sub:
capability The capability deﬁnes what actions the attacker can
take. A passive attacker eavesdrops and monitors; an active at-
tacker extends the passive attacker with the Dolev-Yao model
[46]. The active attacker can therefore delay, drop, duplicate,
modify, recombine, and generate messages. The passive at-
tacker is particularly strong in Pub/Sub when it takes a forwarder
role f ∈ F as it may observe many messages. The active attacker
is powerful in the publisher and subscriber roles as it may stim-
ulate the other roles to react.
visibility The visibility or scope deﬁnes to which extent the at-
tacker can eavesdrop the interaction with a Pub/Sub system. This
scope can be deﬁned as a subset of nodes V ′ ⊆ V and edges
E ′ ⊆ E. Two types of visibility are commonly used as attacker
model: the global attacker can observe or interact with all edges
E. The local attacker is restricted to one node v ∈ V and the set
of adjacent edges E ′ as deﬁned by Constraint (19).
∀w ∈ V , e = (v,w) ∈ E ′ : w ∈ N(v)∧ (v,w) ∈ E (19)
In the case of |V ′| > 1, the attacker can be also called colluding.
mobility The mobility deﬁnes if the visibility of the attacker is in-
variant over time. The static attacker observes and interacts with
the same part of the system over time, i.e., ∀t ∈ T : V ′t =
V ′0 ∧ E ′t = E ′0. The adaptive attacker choses always the visibil-
ity that suits best. For instance, P2P systems that allow IDs to be
changed can be used for the adaptive attacker.
participation The participation distinguishes if the attacker is in-
ternal, i.e., part of the system, or external. An internal attacker
takes the visibility of nodes V ′ ⊆ V . It, furthermore, has ac-
cess to secrets and key material of these nodes. The external
attacker typically takes the visibility of edges E ′ ⊆ E and thus
lacks access to secrets.
Literature in the domain of anonymous Pub/Sub often refers to the
honest but curious attacker [27, 103, 118]. This attacker has the prop-
erties passive, local/global, static, and internal. This attacker often
takes the role of the only forwarder (broker) in the system, and thus,
the visibility covers all edges E ′ = E. Therefore despite having a
visibility of only one node, the attacker can be considered global as
well.
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3.3.2 Selected attackers
This thesis uses two attacker models (property combinations): the
global observer GA and the malicious insider IA. Both attackers describe
realistic attacker properties—the GA large-scale US National Security
Agency (NSA) like eavesdropping and the IA compromised comput-
ing devices. Both attackers are also used in combination. Also, the
malicious insider is also used with the collusion of multiple nodes.
global observer GA The goal of this passive, global, static, and
external attacker is to break publisher and subscriber anonymity by
eavesdropping on all edges und thus observing all messages.
Example 5. One scenario for this attacker is intelligence organizations at-
tempting to obtain network IDs of online social network (OSN) users commu-
nicating about a certain attribute, e.g., monitoring the message ﬂow of many
Internet service providers (ISPs) to determine IP addresses of micro-bloggers
using a certain hashtag. The Snowden leaks discussed in the media suggest
espionage programs capable of eavesdropping at ISP and Internet exchange
level. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that ISPs and Internet exchanges
are capable of performing such monitoring by themselves.
This attacker remains passive as it does not manipulate messages.
It is external as it does not possess (a priori) secrets or key material.
The attacker is furthermore global as it can observe the full commu-
nication network (E). From the global property follows that this at-
tacker is also static, and there is no need for adaptivity. According to
the system model (cf. Section 3.1), the attacker observes notiﬁcations
mnotif , knows an attribute a without associated secrets, possess topol-
ogy information of the basic membership management G := (V , E),
and attempts to learn Sa or Pa. That is, break subscriber or publisher
anonymity.
The attacker can achieve this goal for instance via the statistical
disclosure attacks [31, 33, 158]. Here, the attacker discloses message
sinks, as well as nodes that remain persistent in Ma after overlay
restructuring, as subscribers.
malicious insider IA The goal of this active, internal, and lo-
cal attacker is to break publisher and subscriber anonymity by partic-
ipating in the anonymous Pub/Sub system and exploiting the protocol.
Depending on the protocol, this attacker is static or adaptive. Further-
more, this attacker can be colluding with other malicious insiders as
well as with the global observer.
Example 6. One example for this attacker is one or more compromised nodes
in the control of criminals, e.g., computers that have been infected with tro-
jans and thus, expose key material and connectivity to the attacker.
This attacker is active and therefore modiﬁes and suppresses mes-
sages at will, decrypts, and forges valid messages with key material
for an attribute a, and colludes with several attacking nodes. In com-
bination with the global observer, this attacker can also access the
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topology information G as well as observe messages. An attack us-
ing this model has been published in [37]. To formalize collusion of
malicious insiders, the system formalization in Table 1 is extended by
the set of colluding attackers C = V ′ ⊆ V .
summary This section has brieﬂy summarized common anonymity
attacker properties. Two models were discussed in detail: the global
observer GA is a passive observer of the whole Pub/Sub system; the
malicious insider IA takes one or more nodes (collusion) and actively
attempts to break anonymity. The next section introduces a novel
and concrete anonymity attack approach based on the combination
of both models.
3.4 attacks on anonymous pub/sub
Following the attacker capabilities presented in the previous section,
a multitude of attack approachs are possible to break anonymity in
Pub/Sub. This section structures the attacks on anonymization services
presented in the previous chapter (Section 2.3.6.2, page 23) according
to their type, and explains how the attack can be applied to Pub/Sub.
Afterwards, a novel attack on anonymous Pub/Sub that exploits timing
information is proposed in Section 3.4.1.
statistical disclosure Statistical disclosure [33] leverages the
information gained over prolonged periods of information. This type
of attack assumes that over time, true receivers handle more mes-
sages than pure forwarders. Applied to Pub/Sub, the anonymity at-
tacker assumes that subscribers receive more notiﬁcations than pure
forwarders. Alternatively, the attacker may assume that subscribers
remain as members of an attribute overlay for more time intervals
than pure forwarders. This may happen due to churn, i.e., subscribers
reconnect to the attribute overlay in case of leaving neighbors, but
pure forwarders may not.
To mount this type of attack, the global observer is required. An
attacker with the capabilities of the global observer model traces the
ﬂows of notiﬁcation. Given the trace of a notiﬁcation ﬂow, the at-
tacker knows which nodes are part of this ﬂow, and are therefore
member of an attribute overlay. By tracing multiple notiﬁcations of
the same attribute overlay, the attacker gains the necessary statisti-
cal information. Malicious nodes can be used to enhance this attack:
malicious insiders attempt to become pure forwarders, and then in-
terrupt connections to neighbors.
topology analysis Topology analysis uses the topology of at-
tribute overlays to reason about the role of nodes. This type of attack
assumes that the topology of an attribute overlay follows a determin-
istic construction. As before, the anonymity attacker traces the ﬂow
of a notiﬁcation and identiﬁes the involved nodes as well as their
connections. Given this topology and knowledge about the overlay
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construction method, the attacker may infer that a publisher is likely
to be located in the center of such a topology. Likewise, subscribers
may be located in leaf positions. To mount this type of attack, the
global observer is required as well.
grayholing Grayhole or eclipse attacks concentrate trafﬁc in ma-
licious nodes. This type of attack assumes that the anonymity at-
tacker can increase his neighborhood or steal trafﬁc by some other
means, e.g., by gaining popularity. The attacker may then reason that
its neighbors in an attribute overlay are likely to be publishers and
subscribers—as the attacker steals more trafﬁc, less pure forwarders
can be part of the attribute overlay. The attacker may also use the
grayhole attack as an aid for another attack, such as the statistical
disclosure or the topology analysis. To mount this type of attack, the
capabilities of a malicious insider are required.
timing attacks Timing attacks exploit the reaction time of nodes.
This type of attack assumes a difference in the reaction time of pure
forwarders and publishers and subscribers. The attacker either acts
itself, e.g., by sending a request and waiting for a response, or mea-
sures the reaction time of nodes given observable actions. A node
that reacts immediately to an advertisement may be considered a
subscriber, whereas a node that reacts delayed or not at all may be
considered a pure forwarder. A subscriber may also forward notiﬁca-
tions slower than a pure forwarder, as the subscriber also processes
the content of notiﬁcations, whereas the pure forwarder does not.
To mount this type of attack, the capabilities of a global observer
are required. A malicious insider may also analyze its neighbors
or aid the global observer. The following section presents a novel
anonymity attack that belongs to the category of timing attacks.
3.4.1 A timing attack in anonymous communication
This section presents a timing attack published in [38] to break sub-
scriber anonymity. This attack exploits the principle that many anony-
mous communication systems are based on request/response seman-
tics in their protocols. These request/response semantics can be used
by the malicious insider IA in collusion with the global observer GA
to de-anonymize responders—subscribers in the context of Pub/Sub.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: ﬁrst, the at-
tack approach is presented and formalized in Section 3.4.1. Second,
methods to determine delays are discussed in Section 8.
This attack is based on the assumption that the attacker can send re-
quest messages regarding an attribute a. Then, a target node, which
the attacker desires to de-anonymize, responds, and the attacker rea-
sons about this node’s position in the basic overlayG. That means, the
attacks aims to identify nodes related to a, e.g., the set of subscribers
Sa in a Pub/Sub systems. This attack can be applied to various types
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of anonymous communication systems, e.g., the anonymous Pub/Sub
system [37] and Freenet [24]
This attack assumes that both attackers, GA and IA collude. The
GA provides topology information about the anonymous communi-
cation system, the graph G. The IA provides secrets and key material
about a, and can send messages. With both attackers colluding, the
GA can furthermore trace message ﬂows related to a and reduce G
to the attribute mesh Ma.
For this attack to work, it is also important that the analyzed sys-
tem does not impose artiﬁcial message delay, i.e., that the dominating
factors in the message transmission delay are node and edge capabil-
ity and load. Also, the system must provide some option to estimate
or measure such delays.
attack approach To perform the attack, the IA sends a request
into G, awaits a response, and measures the round-trip time (RTT).
Given the attacker can estimate average delays between nodes, the
attacker can establish a candidate set (anonymity set) of potential
responders within the attribute mesh Ma provided by the GA. The
major challenges for a realistic implementation of this approach are:
1. How can the attacker derive an anonymity set/entropy from
the RTT?
2. How can the attacker model and reﬁne the anonymity set/en-
tropy over multiple iterations?
Regarding the ﬁrst questions: given the stated assumptions hold,
after sending a request from the IA, the attacker will receive zero or
more responses. For the remainder of this explanation, one response
is assumed. Between request and response, the attacker observes
the RTT denoted as δ. Given that the transmission delay is equal for
every edge in Ma, the attacker can estimate the number of edges d.
Give the number of edges, the attacker can establish the anonymity
set of nodes at the appropriate distance, i.e., nodes with v ∈ Va :
|path(IA, v)| = d.
Example 7. For a Pub/Sub system that requires advertisements, the request/re-
sponse behavior can be modelled as an advertisement for requests, and sub-
scriptions for responses. For Pub/Sub via unstructured P2P, it is necessary to
distribute advertisements before subscriptions are sent. Without advertise-
ments, every node would have to setup routing tables such that a notiﬁcation
from every node can be forwarded to every subscriber. That would cause stor-
age overhead for every node. That means a subscriber will subscribe once it
received an interesting advertisement. The RTT δ can then be modelled as
given in Equation (20).
observable︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ(mxadv,m
x
sub) =
advertisements︷ ︸︸ ︷
d−2∑
j=0
δ(mjadv,m
j+1
adv )+
subscriptions︷ ︸︸ ︷
0∑
j=d−2
δ(mj+1sub ,m
j
sub) (20)
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The left-hand part of Equation (20) is observable by the IA, the right-hand
part describes what happens inside the Pub/Sub system. The symbol d denotes
the distance or path length between the attacker and the responder. However,
as this distance is on the right-hand side, the attacker cannot observe it.
Function δ(mxw,m
y
v ) measures the time in between sending message mw
from node vx = IA and receiving mv at node vy.
As an alternative to this example, subscriptions and notiﬁcations
can be used as well. Assuming a high notiﬁcation rate, a subscrip-
tion can be considered as the request, which is answered by the next
notiﬁcation.
Following up on the example, to obtain d from Equation (20), the
attacker needs an estimate for the delay components δ on the right-
hand side of the equation. These delay components can be approxi-
mated via an average delay δavg that fulﬁlls Equation (21).
δavg =
∑d−2
j=0 δ(m
j
adv,m
j+1
adv )
d
(21)
Given that the attacker obtains such an average delay, it can ap-
proximate the distance d as in Equation (22). The division by 2 is
necessary as δ(madv,msub) describes the RTT. However, the attacker
aims at obtaining the one-way distance to the responder, and not the
round-trip distance.
d ≈ δ(madv,msub)
2× δavg (22)
With d given, the attacker can rule out nodes closer than d, as
theses nodes would have responded earlier. That is, all nodes v ∈ Va :
|path(IA, v)| < d are not in the anonymity set. However, the attacker
cannot rule out nodes further away, i.e., v ∈ Va : |path(IA, v)| > d. The
responder at distance d may suppress responses further away than d.
Thus, the attacker may not observe responses from those nodes, even
those nodes relate to a and, therefore, should be de-anonymized.
This behaviour is a challenge for the attacker when modeling the
attack results via an anonymity set: nodes at distance d are likely to
be responders, nodes closer than d are impossible to be a responder.
Hence, the attacker adjusts his initial probability distribution v. Equa-
tion (24) shows how probabilities are set after an attacker, i.e., after
the attacker established d. Here, a probability of 0 means that a node
is not in the anonymity set.
v1 = (0, 0, 0,
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Example 8. Figure 10 shows an example graph G with nodes v1, . . . , v9 ∈
Va. Nodes v4, v5, v7 are the nodes IA attempts to expose. At this stage (1),
the probability distribution the attacker set up is given in Equation (23).
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Figure 10: Example graph with node IDs and probabilities.
v[vx] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if vx closer than d or vx ∈ Ca (j times)
λ
(k+l) , if vx at distance d (k times)
φ
(k+l) , if vx further than d (l times)
(24)
The equation shows how the attacker can eliminate j out of |Va|
nodes that are closer than d hops on the shortest path in basic overlay
G. Hence, all remaining (k at distance d, l at a distance greater than
d) nodes get a higher probability. The parameters λ and φ model
how the probabilities are distributed among likely nodes at distance
d and possible nodes further away than d. The parameter λ should
be set to λ  1.0 and the parameter φ  1.0 solved in accordance (cf.
Equation (26)).
Interpreting Equation (24), every node vx with v[vx] > 0 is in
the anonymity set. Using this approach, the attacker can derive
anonymity sets from the RTT. Following up on the second question,
the attacker can reﬁne the probability distribution over multiple iter-
ations via four steps:
1. A node vx which probability has been set to 0 remains at 0.
2. A node vx with a positive probability that is closer than d is set
to 0.
3. The probabilities of nodes at or further away than d are added.
4. The probability distribution is normalized.
The attacker sets up an initial probability distribution. Equation (25)
provides such an initial assignment. Here, the probabilities are as-
signed based on an estimation of the total number of responders—for
Pub/Sub the set of subscribers for attribute a given as Sa. The set Ca
models the malicious insiders IA. Constraint (26) ensures that the
distribution can be normalized in step 4.
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∀v ∈ Va : v[v] =
{
0 if v ∈ Ca
|Sa|
(|Va|−|Ca|)∗|Sa| else
(25)
∑
vi∈Va
v[vi] = 1 (26)
estimating the average delay The malicious insider depends
upon the average delay δavg to calculate the distance d. Approaches
estimating this delay exist [66], but depends upon additional proto-
cols such as DNS that do not incorporate the application layer delays
of anonymization services. The cryptography used by anonymiza-
tion service may introduce signiﬁcant delay. This section, therefore,
proposes three strategies to obtain average delay estimates.
neighbor rtt The IA can use its neighbors N(IA) to extrapolate
the average delay. Assuming that the attacker can send mes-
sages to the neighbors that will trigger an immediate response,
the attacker can measure the RTT and estimate δavg ≈ RTT÷ 2.
Some basic overlay protocols provide the necessary means for
such immediate responses. For instance, the last packet of a
TCP window and the following acknowledgement; neighbor-
hood requests as part of gossiping; heartbeats in conjunction
with responses. Having multiple neighbors, the attacker can
establish the average delay over all neighbors as given in Equa-
tion (27).
δavg =
∑
∀v∈N(IA) δ(mrequest,mresponse)
|N(IA)|
(27)
While the requirements for the anonymization service for this
strategy are low, it is biased by the connectivity of IA.
hop count A strategy that reduces the bias of the IA uses a hop
counter of messages in conjunction with loops in G. For that,
the attacker sends a message with a hop counter, waits until it
receives the message again (loop), and divides the RTT by the
hop count difference. Typical instances of (inverse) hop coun-
ters are TTL counters. Such counters are used by ﬂooding al-
gorithms, and random walks. For instance, search requests in
Freenet use a TTL. Another example is advertisement messages
in [37]. Alternatively, the global observer might trace the path of
a message and can thus observe the length of the path without
a hop counter.
This strategy reduces the bias of the IA. However, is also im-
poses additional requirements on the anonymization service.
Furthermore, this strategy is less stealthy as the attacker has to
send messages compared to deriving information from already
existing messages. Hence, the attacker may expose itself.
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collusion Collusion is an extension of the hop count strategy. Rather
than relying on loops and RTT, multiple colluding IAs can mea-
sure the delay on a path in between them as given in Equa-
tion (28).
δavg =
δ(mIA1 ,mIA2)
|patha(IA1, IA2)|
(28)
This strategy does not rely on loops and can be reﬁned by
adding more colluding attackers. Furthermore, assuming that
both attackers are on a path between a requester and respon-
der, the attackers may derive the transmission delay from exist-
ing messages rather than generating new messages. Thus, this
strategy is potentially stealthier than the hop count strategy.
summary This section presented a novel anonymity attack that
makes use of a malicious insider and a global observer. The attack
aims to create anonymity sets for responders given an attribute a.
The attack furthermore reﬁnes and reduces the anonymity set over
multiple iterations. Also, malicious insiders can collude to provide
more iterations. The attack can be applied to anonymization services
that build upon a request/response semantic, e.g., search in P2P ﬁle
sharing, and advertisements with subscriptions in Pub/Sub.
The attack also requires some delay information about the basic
overlay besides the request/response semantic. Therefore, three meth-
ods to obtain delay estimation via the malicious insider were pro-
posed as well.
The next section structures related anonymous Pub/Sub systems
into common building blocks, i.e., following the system model, and
discuss these building blocks.
3.5 structuring system architectures
This section introduces an architecture that splits anonymous Pub/Sub
into so-called building blocks. Then, common solutions for these build-
ing blocks are discussed. First, the formation of building blocks is
explained along the roles participants can take. Second, the forma-
tion of building blocks along the lifecycle phases of a system are dis-
cussed.
Anonymity is often considered [102, 118, 162] as an add-on require-
ment that can be fulﬁlled by an anonymization service (cf. Section 2.2.2,
page 16) such as Tor [44]. This approach protects communication
metadata, e.g., IP addresses, from exposure towards anonymity at-
tackers.
Applications running on top of such a service, e.g., Pub/Sub may
introduce additional metadata that circumvents the anonymity pro-
tection as shown in Figure 11. For instance, attacks on web browsing
as an application in conjunction with Tor have been proposed (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3.6.2, page 23). These attacks use metadata leaked by the web
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Figure 11: Anonymization service cannot full the application from exposing
information to the attacker.
protocol hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to de-anonymize users [14,
69] and break even conﬁdentiality, e.g., by revealing visited web sites
[1, 68]. A lesson learned from these attacks is that anonymity should
be considered throughout the whole technology stack of an applica-
tion. The Privacy by Design initiative [71] postulates this approach as
well. This section proposes an architecture that splits systems into
manageable building blocks. While anonymity has to be considered
for every building block, designing and analyzing building blocks
with one speciﬁc functional goal each is easier and less error-prone
as with one monolithic system.
design considerations A particular challenge for anonymous
Pub/Sub arises from conﬂicting goals between anonymization services
and Pub/Sub—the ﬁrst one attempts do distribute message routing
among many nodes to protect anonymity, and the latter attempts to
centralize routing functionality to increase efﬁciency.
Within the traditional Pub/Sub paradigm, which still reﬂects the
typical usage of Pub/Sub middleware today, e.g., JMS [41], a broker
acts a as central entity [51] and controls communication; participants
just state interests and provide content. Compared, anonymization
services such as Tor and Crowds empower the participant to orga-
nize communication, e.g., build Tor circuits, and thus take control
over the infrastructure. Anonymous Pub/Sub, therefore, must bal-
ance both extremes, preferably in an adjustable manner. Thus, the
architectural goal of this thesis is a solution that maintains a balance
in-between both concepts. Every participant must be able to man-
age her anonymity, i.e., control privacy enhancing technologies (PETs)
and measures the current level of protection, whereas the infrastruc-
ture may only take some control to maintain requirements such as
integrity and availability.
Example 9. Anonymity may conﬂict with availability if a malicious user
abuses the system by spamming other participants with messages. These
participants may become unavailable due to message overload. To counter
this issue, the malicious user must be detected and isolated from the system.
For that, correlation of messages to users is required. However, correlation
of messages violates unlinkability. As a consequence, the infrastructure re-
quires some control to correlate messages and protect availability. In return,
some control over anonymity is taken away from the user.
This thesis follows the Privacy by Design principle 3: “Privacy Em-
bedded into Design”. Therefore, anonymity as an aspect of privacy
has to be considered for every component of the architecture. This
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approach minimizes issues that arise from add-on anonymity solu-
tions like Tor [44] due to the missing consideration of application
layer leak of information. Furthermore, this thesis follows the design
principles of “high cohesion and loose coupling” [18] and applies it
to the components. High cohesion, on the one hand, requires that
elements of one building block highly depend on and interact with
each other. Loose coupling, on the other hand, reduces interdepen-
dencies between building blocks. These principles support exchange-
able building blocks—depending on the selection and prioritization
of requirements. This structure should, therefore, ease the selection
of building block technologies for applications and their respective
requirements.
Example 10. If one building block encapsulates the direct communication
between participants, this building block also deﬁnes how neighbors are dis-
covered, and a connection is established. With add-on anonymity protection,
the process of neighbor discovery would be left out from anonymity analysis.
overview of building blocks The overview and dependen-
cies of all six building blocks are depicted in Figure 12. The diagram
presents the building blocks of one node participating in the Pub/Sub
system (see Figure 13).
• Basic membership establishes and maintains the connection of
each participant with the system.
• Attribute localization allows subscribers to ﬁnd attributes offered
by publishers and is thus used by both roles.
• Matching covers the functional Pub/Sub requirement (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1.2) to maintain routing tables to route messages. This
block applies to the forwarder role.
• Community management repairs and optimizes overlay networks
whenever topological changes occur. This block applies to for-
warders, too.
• Content distribution distributes notiﬁcations to subscribers. This
block applies to the forwarder role.
• Key management handles all secrets required for conﬁdentiality
and authenticity and thus applies to the publisher and sub-
scriber role.
role considerations The concept of roles in Pub/Sub has been
introduced in Section 3.1 (page 35). The three roles publisher, sub-
scriber, and forwarder (also called broker) allow for a split of Pub/Sub
nodes according to these roles
Figure 13 depicts an example that splits each participant into the
three role-based building blocks publisher P, subscriber S, and for-
warder F. The left most participant acts as mere publisher and thus
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Figure 12: Design considerations—building blocks and interactions. The
numbers indicate the lifecycle phases.
does not require the subscriber building block. The bottom left par-
ticipant only acts as forwarder, the bottom center participant as for-
warder and subscriber, and the right most participant assumes all
roles. The top center participant is not active in any role.
?????????
?????????
?????????
?????????
??????????
?????????
????????? ??????????
Figure 13: Building blocks—role considerations
Depending upon the role, some of the building blocks do not have
to be considered, i.e., such building blocks can be disabled. For in-
stance, a node not taking the publisher or subscriber roles is not re-
quired to provide the key management building block.
lifecycle considerations Beside roles, runtime phases of a
system constitute another method to split building blocks. The fol-
lowing phases reoccur in Pub/Sub systems (see Figure 12):
1. First, a participant has to connect to the system. This phase is
covered by basic membership.
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2. Next, the participant locates and subscribes to attributes—attri-
bute localization.
3. To transport notiﬁcations to the participant, forwarders have to
decide if a notiﬁcation matches a subscription via the matching
building block.
4. Furthermore, notiﬁcations have to be distributed with minimal
overhead and conﬁdentiality, which is covered by the content
distribution building block.
5. To protect conﬁdentiality, cryptographic keys are required that
are managed using the key management building block.
6. Finally, connected nodes form a community that is subject to
churn and node failure, which have to be compensated via the
community management building block.
Depending upon the lifecycle phase, a node does not need to pro-
vide all building blocks. For instance, the matching and attribute
localization building blocks are not required while a node is distribut-
ing content.
3.6 building blocks
Having split anonymous Pub/Sub systems into building blocks accord-
ing to Figure 12, this section discusses existing solutions to realize
each building block.
3.6.1 Basic membership
To goal of basic membership is to supply every participant with neigh-
bors to connect with and to maintain these connections. Following
the formalization, basic membership management manages N(v) for
every node v. Other building blocks then use these connections (Fig-
ure 12).
In detail, basic membership performs the following tasks: First,
basic membership needs to supply every participant with an initial
neighborhood set. This enables a participant joining the anonymous
Pub/Sub system for the ﬁrst time to connect. That means, Constraint (29)
must be fulﬁlled as all times. Without this constraint, nodes of the
basic overlay G could be disconnected and not be able to fulﬁll the
publication and subscription integrity requirements.
∀v ∈ V : |N(v)| > 0 (29)
∀v ∈ V : l  |N(v)|  u (30)
Second, basic membership needs to maintain a neighborhood set
under churn. For instance, given that participants join and leave the
system, a neighborhood size within a certain bound is maintained.
That includes the discovery of new neighbors, as well as the removal
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of excess neighbors. Formally, ensure Constraint (30) for some de-
ﬁned lower boundary l and upper boundary u. The lower bound-
ary prevents G from degenerating to a chain of nodes (SPoFs); the
upper boundary prevents G from degenerating to a fully meshed
graph. Every subscriber is directly connected to every publisher in
a fully meshed graph, and malicious insiders can therefore trivially
de-anonymize participants.
Third, basic membership needs to maintain the integrity of the con-
nections with the neighbors to ensure no messages are lost (unde-
tected).
Formally, basic membership supplies each participant, referred to
as node v in a graph G := (V ,E) with v ∈ V , with a set of neighbors,
referred as N(v) (see formal model in Section 3.1). Hence, each node
runs a membership management protocol that establishes the set of
edges E of G. The edges E are assumed to be unidirectional.
Example 11. A centralized Pub/Sub system with one dedicated forwarder
(broker) that runs on top of IP uses a basic overlay that differs from the
underlay. The basic overlay G consists of all publishers, subscribers, and the
forwarder as V . Every node shares exactly one edge with the forwarder. The
underlay, however, may consist of additional nodes, e.g., proxy servers, VPN
gateways, and routers.
Basic membership follows one of the underlying structures of the
message dissemination approaches discussed in Section 2 (page 10).
These structures (topologies) are centralized, semi-centralized, and
P2P. With a centralized topology, all publishers and subscribers con-
nect with one central forwarder. With semi-centralized, connections
to multiple forwarders are possible; the forwarders are connected
via either of the topologies themselves. The underlay may inﬂuence
the possible basic membership topologies, e.g., friend-to-friend (F2F)
networks prevent a centralized topology. The following paragraphs
discuss centralized, semi-centralized and P2P topologies.
central Central basic membership constitutes the most common
Pub/Sub topology [51, 103, 118, 146]. While this topology does not
provide any anonymity—except when used in conjunction with an
anonymization service such as Tor as shown in [118], this topology
serves as a reference for the lowest signaling overhead. Every node
connects to one central forwarder. This forwarder is the only node
that takes the forwarder role and is, therefore, the only node with a
matching building block.
Formally, the forwarder is denoted as v1 and every node v2, . . . , v|V |
has exactly one neighbor as deﬁned by Constraint (31).
∀vi|i ∈ [2, |V |] : N(vi) = {v1} (31)
|E| = |V |− 1 (32)
As a result, the number of edges is minimal as shown in Equa-
tion (32). Likewise, the path length and number of messages to dis-
tribute a notiﬁcation exceed optimum by only 1. However, v1 is the
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bottleneck (SPoF) for scalability as it takes over the building blocks
of matching, community management, and content distribution for
all other nodes. Furthermore, this node obtains global knowledge of
all messages (attacker model GA), and can thus break subscriber and
publisher anonymity, unlinkability, and relationship anonymity.
semi-centralized A semi-centralized topology mitigates the SPoF
drawback via additional forwarders. Typically, every node connects
to one forwarder, and forwarders interconnect via another basic mem-
bership approach.
Formally, k nodes v1, . . . , vk take the role of forwarders for nodes
vk+1, . . . , v|V |. As a result, the |V |− k nodes only require one edge
to connect to one of the k nodes. Within a centralized topology v1
(k = 1) is the only forwarder; all vi|i ∈ [2,k] connect to v1. The
number of edges remains unchanged as shown in Equation (33).
|E| = (|V |− k) + (k− 1) = |V |− 1 (33)
For this approach, failure of v1 segments the system (SPoF). This
node also monitors the communication with all other nodes (attacker
model GA). As this attacker is also internal, i.e., can read all mes-
sages, it can deanonymize all participants. Meshed connectivity be-
tween forwarders may prevent segmentation. Regarding overhead
induced by this approach, the space required by each of the k for-
warders to manage subscribers and publishers requirements for the
other forwarders by approximately (k− 1)/|V |. Hence, the scalability
improves even with a centralized forwarder basic membership sig-
niﬁcantly. The central forwarder does not learn about the messages
of normal participants compared to the central approach. However,
the collusion of the k forwarders still allows breaking all anonymity
requirements as with the centralized topology.
fully distributed (p2p) A P2P topology interconnects peers di-
rectly without any forwarders. A static neighborhood deﬁnition as
with the previous two topologies, i.e., the forwarders are predeﬁned
for all publishers and subscribers, does not work for P2P. Every peer
can take the forwarder role, and peers are subject to churn (join and
leave the system). To overcome this issue, P2P systems provide neigh-
borhood discovery mechanisms such as gossiping [61]. Also, P2P
systems may enforce a structure among the nodes (cf. Section 2.4,
page 27). Both, structured and unstructured Pub/Sub systems exist.
Scribe [125] uses a DHT (structured) for topic-based Pub/Sub. Flood-
ing can be used as advertisement approach in unstructured P2P [137].
Structured overlays provide better guarantees, e.g., the number of
messages and path lengths, than unstructured overlays. However, a
structure, e.g., DHT can also be abused by malicious insiders: such an
insider could obtain an ID that is responsible for a certain attribute
a. Having such an ID, this attacker could observe messages related
to this attribute. With a structure, an attacker can, therefore, obtain
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P2P
property central semi-c . struct. p2p unstruct.
Signalling
overhead
+ o o o
Space
overhead
- - + ?
Path
length
+ o o o
Failure
resilience
- o + +
Anonymity - o o +
Table 2: Comparison of basic membership approaches. The symbols +, o, -
indicate how well the approaches perform for the given properties.
a “position” similar to a forwarder in a centralized topology. Proto-
cols for unstructured P2P systems create randomized overlays. Within
such an overlay, the attacker cannot obtain an ID as with structured
overlay to monitor message. However, unstructured systems cause
more signaling overhead for the attribute localization component as
messages are handled by multiple peers before reaching the destina-
tion.
Alternatively, a P2P-based Pub/Sub basic membership can also be
“piggybacked” on top of existing overlays like Darknets [24] or OSNs
like Twitter [35]. The basic membership management only needs to
provide the capability to communicate with neighboring nodes, inde-
pendent of the depths of the underlying communication stack.
summary Table 2 summarizes the discussion. The table is struc-
tured according to the properties discussed in this section: the signal-
ing overhead Msgs., the storage overhead Space, short transmission
paths Paths, failure tolerance / not SPoF Resilience, and how suitable
the approach is to protect Anonymity.
Centralized topologies cause the lowest signaling overhead, while
P2P is favored for anonymous Pub/Sub [103, 154]. Structured P2P mit-
igates the drawbacks in space overhead and resilience at the cost
of more message overhead and longer paths. Semi-centralized ap-
proaches perform in between centralized and structured P2P. Com-
pared, unstructured overlays induce more space and message over-
head, but maintain better resilience against failures. Furthermore,
unstructured overlays provide better anonymity as no single point of
observation can be determined.
3.6.2 Attribute localization
The attribute localization building block is responsible for establish-
ing paths between publishers and subscribers, i.e., localize which
nodes use a given attribute. Attribute localization tells publishers
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where to send messages to, given an attribute; attribute localization
tells subscribers where to subscribe to for a certain attribute.
Attribute localization has to fulﬁll the following tasks: First, it has
to ensure that the attribute localization is complete, i.e., that a path
to every publisher and every subscriber for an attribute is established
(requirement subscription integrity). Second, attribute localization
must complete with subscription conﬁdentiality. The attribute of sub-
scriptions and advertisements should remain on the attackers global
observer and malicious insider; assuming the malicious insider is not
a publisher or subscriber for the respective attribute. Third, attribute
localization should maintain a low overhead concerning signaling
and space.
Attribute localization can either follow a proactive approach, i.e.,
attribute knowledge is distributed before a subscriber attempts to
localize, or a reactive approach, i.e., subscribers have to localize at-
tribute knowledge by themselves upon interest. Proactive attribute
localization can be also referred to as Pub/Sub with advertisements [51].
Proactive attribute localization inﬂuences the signaling overhead.
It may even distribute attribute knowledge for attributes that will
be never subscribed to. Likewise, reactive attribute localization can
cause higher signaling overhead for popular attributes. Hence, proac-
tive best ﬁts popular attributes whereas reactive best ﬁts unpopular
attributes.
Attribute localization highly depends upon basic membership; a
similar structure is used here. This thesis distinguishes centralized,
decentralized, as well as P2P approaches. Either approach can be
performed proactively and reactively.
central forwarder A central forwarder maintains all knowl-
edge for attribute localization in one place. All nodes place their
subscription at this single forwarder. Consequently, all notiﬁcations
are distributed via this single forwarder.
This method provides complete localization. Furthermore, like
for basic membership management, the message overhead is low
(|Pa|+ |Sa| messages per attribute a ∈ A). Likewise, the space over-
head remains low. However, the central forwarder also becomes a
SPoF. Like with the basic membership building block, the central for-
warder represents the global observer threat GA which can, therefore,
observe all messages. As a consequence, this attribute localization
cannot provide anonymity.
decentralized To overcome the SPoF issue of a central forwarder
on anonymity and availability, the functionality can be distributed
among some or all nodes. For a semi-centralized attribute localiza-
tion, the same arguments as for basic membership apply. For a fully
distributed approach, the following methods for implementing a lo-
calization building block can be considered: ﬂooding, random walks,
and DHTs.
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flooding With ﬂooding, knowledge is distributed to all nodes
from neighbor to neighbor. For instance, with blind ﬂooding [170]
knowledge is distributed to every neighbor except the incoming one,
similar to the breadth-ﬁrst search (BFS) algorithm. This mechanism is
used by several P2P applications, e.g., Freenet [24], Gnutella [157] (to
all nodes, a TTL terminates) and Kazaa (only among super peers).
Flooding minimizes the delivery time of notiﬁcations as subscribers
can subscribe via the path with the shortest transmission time. How-
ever, the proactive distribution of attribute knowledge requires up to
|E| message per attribute. Hence, a centralized approach with Equa-
tion (34)—holds for all basic membership topologies except a chain
of nodes—causes less message overhead. Furthermore, this approach
requires |N(v)| space for every node per attribute, less than the |V |
entries for a central broker, but replicated for every node.
central︷ ︸︸ ︷
|Pa|+ |Sa|  |V | 
P2P︷︸︸︷
|E| (34)
random walk The random walk is an algorithm used for graph
traversal, for instance to lookup information in unstructured P2P over-
lays (cf. Section 2.4.2, page 28).Random walks are probabilistic by na-
ture regarding the traversed path [96]. Every message is forwarded
via a randomized path through the basic overlay. In case the mes-
sage loops or no more neighbor is available, the random walk has to
backtrack or restart.
Given the probabilistic nature of random walks, the algorithm typ-
ically uses two termination criteria, the successful traversal, and the
upper limit on the path length or execution time. As a result, a ran-
dom walk may not succeed in traversing a graph, e.g., locating an
attribute. The probability of a successful random walk is given in
Equation (35) according to [96] where p denotes the average probabil-
ity of ﬁnding the attribute at a node, and H the number of hops the
walk performs, which is thus the message overhead H. Applying this
formalization to the previously presented Pub/Sub system formaliza-
tion, the probability p corresponds to the density of publisher among
all nodes. This density can be deﬁned as Equation (37) given an at-
tribute a. For low densities, the message overhead H is high. Multiple
(k) simultaneous random walks [13] only reduce localization time but
not message overhead: for k random walks the success probability
becomes Equation (36) according to [96] and, therefore, the message
overhead kH.
P(p,H) = 1− (1− p)H (35)
P(p,H,k) = 1− (1− p)kH (36)
pa = |Pa|÷ |V | (37)
dht In case the basic membership management uses a structure,
this structure can be used for attribute localization. For instance, a
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P2P
property central flood random w. dht
Completeness + + - +
Conﬁdentiality - + + -
Signalling
overhead
+ - o o
Table 3: Comparison attribute localization approaches
DHT approach such as Chord [30] maps both, node IDs and attribute,
to the address space of a DHT via a hash function. The node with
the hash value closest to the hash value of the attribute serves as the
forwarder for this attribute (rendezvous point).
The characteristic of the hash function, as well as, the use of so-
called ﬁnger tables lead to log|V | messages to ﬁnd an attribute. Like-
wise, Chord only requires log|V | space per attribute per node. How-
ever, this approach requires global node IDs. Therefore, an attacker
may distinguish nodes, and thus senders and recipients of a mes-
sage with ease, and link them as well. Moreover, an internal attacker
could exploit knowledge of the hash of an attribute to obtain the clos-
est node ID and take control as designated forwarder. Hence, the
attacker would learn Sa and Pa immediately.
summary Table 3 summarizes the discussion. Centralized approa-
ches beneﬁt from low message overhead and can easily guarantee
complete localization. However, subscription conﬁdentiality cannot
be preserved. Structured P2P also guarantees complete localization
with reasonable overhead. However, global node IDs allow to link
message and thus potentially violate subscription conﬁdentiality. Flood-
ing as unstructured approach provide localization completeness as
well, does not depend on global node IDs but induces high message
overhead. Probabilistic approaches such as random walks do not
require global IDs as well, have less message overhead, but cannot
guarantee complete localization.
3.6.3 Key management
Cryptography is required to provide conﬁdentiality, authenticity, and
anonymity as well. Therefore, keys have to be managed: generated,
stored, exchanged, renewed, and destroyed/revoked. While crypto-
graphic primitives are out-of-scope of this paper, key management is
a critical building block of anonymous Pub/Sub as key management
may leak information and thus break anonymity.
Example 12. Asymmetric cryptography via the RSA [123] scheme is com-
monly used to sign messages digitally. While a RSA key pair is not nec-
essarily bound to a node ID, RSA key pairs constitute their unique ID in
combination with a certiﬁcate. Therefore authentic (digitally signed) mes-
sages are linkable, even if the basic membership protects anonymity.
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Besides key IDs, the distribution of keys between nodes must be
realized in an anonymity-friendly manner. For instance, subscribers
Sa must be able to obtain decryption keys for messages encrypted by
publishers Pa while preserving unlinkability.
In detail, key management must fulﬁll the following requirements:
• Anonymity. Key escrow protocols must protect the anonymity
of participants. In particular, publisher and subscribers cannot
be linked together by an attacker.
• Ofﬂine capabilities. Content distribution (notiﬁcations) should
work ofﬂine, i.e., without requiring online key exchange or ver-
iﬁcation. Online activities would allow an attacker to link noti-
ﬁcations with participants.
• Revocation / re-keying. The key escrow should support dy-
namics of a Pub/Sub system such as churn within Sa and Pa by
revoking keys.
An anonymous Pub/Sub system must provide conﬁdentiality and
authenticity between publishers and subscribers as well as between
neighboring peers. Otherwise, the global observer could infer mes-
sage relations, and the malicious insider could forge and replay mes-
sages. Cryptographic keys and certiﬁcates are required to provide
conﬁdentiality and authenticity of advertisements, subscriptions, and
notiﬁcations.
The following alternatives can be distinguished: out-of-band key
exchange, a TTP, and decentralized key exchange.
out-of-band An out-of-band key exchange, which is not per-
formed via the system under review, is often used for privacy-pre-
serving communication systems [162] as it circumvents the challenge
of information disclosure. Methods are manifold: keys can be posted
on websites, sent via e-mail, exchanged within close vicinity via NFC,
ad-hoc networks, and via QR-codes. The latter mechanism bridges
the gap between the digital and physical world as keys can be even
exchanged in printed form, e.g., via a postal service.
An out-of-band key exchange does not leak any information to
the global observer threat GA. The malicious insider IA may break
anonymity within an out-of-band key exchange. In particular, di-
rect key exchange between participants, e.g., via mail, cannot ensure
relationship anonymity. To analyze anonymity correctly, additional
attacker models should be considered for out-of-band key exchange.
Key revocation can be considered expensive out-of-band as either a
revocation list or re-keying has to be performed.
ttp-based A TTP can disseminate keys in different variations: a
single TTP that knows all keys, a separate TTP for attribute localization
and content distribution keys each [85], or two TTPs that separate
authorization and key escrow. For the latter option, a participant
ﬁrst connects to the ﬁrst TTP, obtains an authorization token, then
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property oob ttp decentr .
Ofﬂine capability - + +
Anonymity o - o
Revocation - + +
Table 4: Comparison key exchange approaches.
anonymously connects to the second TTP, presents the authorization
token, and obtains the key. A TTP can be also used in ofﬂine and
online mode. For the ofﬂine mode, the TTP issues keys combined with
certiﬁcates with a limited time validity. During the validity period,
participants can use the keys and validate them via the certiﬁcates
without contacting the TTP.
Certain TTP functions can be performed ofﬂine. However, the TTP
is still a SPoF. Therefore, a TTP is an attractive target to break availabil-
ity, conﬁdentiality, authenticity, and potentially anonymity as well.
Furthermore, the TTPs must remain decoupled from centralized for-
warders to ensure no single entity possess keys and can observe mes-
sages simultaneously, i.e., becomes a very powerful malicious insider.
decentralized Decentralized key escrow approaches overcome
the SPoF drawback of TTPs. Such approaches split participants into
subgroups, each subgroup managed by a separate TTP, and these TTPs
connect hierarchically [117]. Key distribution in such topologies can
then, for instance, be realized via multicast protocols.
summary Table 4 summarizes the discussion. The out-of-band
key exchange is ofﬂine, but does not provide suitable revocation
and may not provide anonymity. Compared, a TTP can provide of-
ﬂine mode and revocation, but can hardly protect anonymity with-
out responsibility split among several TTP entities. Decentralized ap-
proaches improve over a single TTP concerning anonymity due to de-
coupling.
3.6.4 Matching
The building block matching is responsible for routing decisions of
notiﬁcations. That is, deciding given a subscription and a notiﬁca-
tion if the notiﬁcation should be forwarded to the subscriber or not.
Matching is crucial for conﬁdentiality as notiﬁcation and subscrip-
tion conﬁdentiality must be persevered when a third party, e.g., a
forwarder, matches them.
Formally, matching can be decomposed into the two functions match
and cover [51] (cf. Section 2.1.2, page 13) and represented in the
model used in this thesis:
match Given a notiﬁcation mnotif and a subscription msub, match is
deﬁned by Function 38.
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cover The cover function merges subscriptions to reduce space over-
head. Given two subscriptions, msub,1 and msub,2, cover is de-
ﬁned by Function 39. It thus returns true if msub,1 is more gen-
eral and thus covers msub,2.
match(mnotify,msub)
{
true : A(msub) ⊆ A(mnotif )
false : otherwise
(38)
cover(msub,1,msub,2)
{
true : A(msub,1) ⊆ A(msub,2)
false : otherwise
(39)
Unlinkability as part of anonymity is a major challenge with match-
ing: the output of the match function exactly determines if a sub-
scription links to a notiﬁcation or not. Hence, unlinkability cannot be
fully preserved with matching. However, linkability between other
message combinations, e.g., two subscriptions, can be prevented.
In detail, matching must comply to the following requirements:
• Conﬁdentiality. The functions match and cover must not leak
the contents of notiﬁcations and subscription, in particular not
the attribute, towards the executing node.
• Anonymity. Matching and cover must not leak IDs of publisher
and subscriber. Furthermore, linkability of messages should be
limited as much as possible while it cannot be prevented.
• Low computational overhead. Matching has to be performed
whenever a routing decision is necessary. Hence, computational
overhead must be minimized.
The following alternatives can be distinguished: pseudonyms, Bloom
ﬁlters, private matching, order-preserving cryptography, and zero-
knowledge proofs (ZKPs).
pseudonyms A pseudonym denotes a pseudonymous ID, a re-
placement for a real name or ID. A pseudonym is a mapping from the
space of IDs or attributes to another space, the pseudonym space [97].
The mapping has to be designed such that the pseudonym cannot
be linked to the attribute. Therefore, a secret is required to establish
this mapping, e.g., via a keyed hash function. Pseudonyms can be
associated with subjects and information objects [113]. Pseudonyms
are used in Pub/Sub to protect conﬁdentiality [146] as well as to locate
information in P2P systems [100].
Pseudonyms can be categorized along many dimensions [112], for
instance to what a pseudonym refers to. A person pseudonym is used
by only one person; a group pseudonym can be used by multiple per-
sons. Such a group pseudonym can be related to a particular role,
a role pseudonym. A pseudonym can also refer to a speciﬁc type of
use. A relationship pseudonym is only used within the context of one
particular relationship between persons; the type of relationship, as
well as, the person deﬁne the relationship pseudonym. Pseudonyms
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categories can be also combined to form new types of pseudonyms,
such as the role-relationship pseudonym. A pseudonym may also refer
to just one single action—the transaction pseudonym. The pseudonym
types differ in how linkable the performed actions, e.g., sent mes-
sages, are to the associated person(s). A transaction pseudonym is
most unlinkable, whereas the person pseudonym is most linkable.
Pseudonyms are computationally efﬁcient to create, e.g., via a keyed-
hash message authentication code (HMAC) function, and are also ef-
ﬁcient to compare. Furthermore, pseudonyms protect conﬁdentiality
assuming it is ﬁrst computationally hard to reverse them, and it is
hard to create a dictionary without possession of the secrets.
bloom filters Bloom ﬁlters [15] are probabilistic data structures
that allow testing if an element is likely to be contained in the struc-
ture. Bloom ﬁlters fulﬁll the following two properties:
1. An element that is part of the Bloom ﬁlter is guaranteed to test
positive.
2. A positive test does not guarantee the element is indeed in the
Bloom ﬁlter.
Due to the second property, Bloom ﬁlters are well suited to protect
conﬁdentiality. Bloom ﬁlters may produce false positives (FPs) but
no false negatives (FNs) and, therefore, ensure functional correctness
in the sense that no notiﬁcations are missed despite the probabilistic
nature of the ﬁlter.
Formally, a Bloom ﬁlter bf is a m-bit binary array, and a set of
k hash functions H. For an input element a, a Bloom ﬁlter can be
deﬁned as Function (40). Each hash function sets exactly one of the
m bits to 1 or sets nothing at all. Hence, k  m hash functions are
required. Every bf is initialized with all m bits set to 0.
bf = ∀i ∈ [1,m] : bf[i] = maxmj=1Hj(a) (40)
∀i ∈ [1,m] : bf[i]  bf ′[i] (41)
To create a Bloom ﬁlter, every hash function is applied to the input
elements and may set the corresponding bit to 1. A bit that is already
1 will remain 1 independent of additional elements added to the ﬁlter.
To test if an element a is contained in a Bloom ﬁlter bf, one creates
bf
′
from a, and test for every bit in bf
′
if this bit is 1, and if so, the
corresponding bit in bf is 1 as well as shown in Equation (41). Note
that 0’s in a ﬁlter are not considered for testing.
A Bloom ﬁlter can also hold more than one element, i.e., it supports
the cover function. For that, additional elements are consecutively
added to the Bloom ﬁlter. However, additional elements increase the
probability of FPs [15]. This drawback of FPs for Bloom ﬁlters can
be partially mitigated via counting Bloom ﬁlters [53], which were de-
signed to allow for element deletion from Bloom ﬁlters. A counting
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requirement pseudo. bloom f . peks
Conﬁdentiality o o +
Anonymity o o o
Minimal overhead + + -
Table 5: Comparison of matching approaches.
Bloom ﬁlter consists of m buckets of n bits that count the 1’s. There-
fore, the minimal count of 1’s per position can be compared, which
gives a lower FP rate.
Bloom ﬁlters are efﬁcient to create and to compare. Furthermore,
they are space efﬁcient for multiple attributes. Bloom ﬁlters can be
used to prevent linkability by adding noise, i.e., setting random bits
to 1. Hence, two identical subscriptions could use different Bloom
ﬁlters. However, to protect conﬁdentiality, m must be chosen small
to create more FPs and thus render brute force attack non-economical.
Bloom ﬁlters are used for privacy-preserving Pub/Sub systems [9, 84,
118, 139].
private matching Private matching schemes, e.g., public key
encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [16], are a derivation of asym-
metric cryptography that provides an additional match function be-
side encrypt and decrypt. Match only requires two ciphertexts and
no secrets, and thus can be performed by a third party. The ﬁrst ci-
phertext has to be encrypted with the secret key whereas the second
ciphertext has to be encrypted with the public key. The ciphertext
created with the public key can be furthermore randomized such that
two ciphertexts created with the same key cannot be linked.
Private matching is used in privacy-preserving Pub/Sub [79, 118,
136, 139] and ensures conﬁdentiality. Furthermore, private match-
ing can prevent likability due to ciphertext randomization. How-
ever, an attacker in possession of a publicly and a corresponding pri-
vately encrypted ciphertext can also link all additional ciphertexts.
Furthermore, asymmetric cryptography is less efﬁcient than hash
functions and, therefore, imposes higher computational overhead as
pseudonym and Bloom ﬁlters.
summary Table 5 summarizes the discussion. Pseudonyms and
Bloom ﬁlters impose low computational overhead but have shortcom-
ings with conﬁdentiality and anonymity, depending the assumptions.
Cryptographic approaches such as PEKS provide good conﬁdentiality
but also have shortcomings for anonymity, and cause computational
overhead.
3.6.5 Community management
On the basis of the basic membership and attribute localization, pub-
lishers, subscribers, and forwarders establish attribute meshes Ma
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per attribute awith the support of the matching building block. These
attribute meshes—or communities—have to be maintained, e.g., in
the presence of node churn. Furthermore, such overlays can be opti-
mized. Such optimization criteria can be for instance:
minimal message overhead The number of messages is mini-
mized by removing forwarders from the attribute mesh.
minimal delay The transmission delay between publishers and
subscribers is minimal given the path lengths in the attribute
mesh are minimal. This can be achieved by increasing the
fanout degree.
resilience against node and edge failures Resilience against
such failures can be reduced by maintaining alternative connec-
tions from the basic membership at increasing space overhead.
Possible optimizations and inter-dependencies with other optimiza-
tions goals are manifold. However, community management highly
depends on the basic membership, e.g., if new edges are possible or
not, and other building blocks.
3.6.6 Content distribution
Content distribution ensures that subscribers receive the desired con-
tent. Therefore content distribution must prevent message loss, en-
sure correct order, and protect the conﬁdentiality of notiﬁcations.
Many of the Pub/Sub security requirements apply to content distri-
bution: conﬁdentiality, integrity, authenticity, anonymity. In detail,
the content distribution must realize the following functionalities.
First, the content of notiﬁcations (payload) must be transported
conﬁdential. Second, notiﬁcations must not be lost and reach all sub-
scribers given a particular attribute (notiﬁcation integrity). Third, no-
tiﬁcations should be authentic in the sense that subscribers can ver-
ify that the notiﬁcations originated from some publisher given a par-
ticular attribute and that notiﬁcations have not been tampered with.
Content distribution must not leak any information leading to a de-
anonymization of subscribers or publishers (publisher and subscriber
anonymity). Furthermore, notiﬁcations should not be linked to each
other, e.g., expose that two notiﬁcations related to the same attribute,
publisher, or subscriber.
To comply with these requirements, content distribution relies on
key management. The approaches asymmetric cryptography, multi-
layer encryption, and attribute-based cryptography are discussed here.
asymmetric encryption and digital signatures Asym-
metric cryptography uses two different keys, a public key pk to en-
crypt, and a secret key sk to decrypt. This approach is valuable to
Pub/Sub as this cryptography strongly separates the roles of encrypter
and decrypter—publisher and subscriber. Therefore, a subscriber can-
not take the role of a publisher and encrypt information. Moreover,
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the term public key does not imply public to everyone, but can be
rather shared with a set of participants, e.g., Sa.
The common asymmetric encryption scheme RSA [123] works as
follows:
generate keys Select primes p,q and compute n = pq as well as
n ′ = (p− 1)(q− 1). Select e ∈ (1,n ′) ⊂ N with gcd(e,n ′) = 1,
i.e., e is not a divisor of n ′. Calculate d = e−1 mod n. Then
the secret key is deﬁned as sk = (d,n) and the public key as
pk = (n, e).
encrypt(m , pk) With plaintext m calculate ciphertext c via c =
me mod n. Short notation: c = Epk(m).
decrypt(c , sk) With ciphertext c calculate plaintext m via m =
cd mod n. Short notation: m = Dsk(c).
sign(m , sk) With plaintext m calculate a message digest h = H(m)
and obtain signature sigm = Esk(h).
verify(m , sigm , pk) With plaintext m and signature sigm check if
H(m)
?
= Dpk(sigm).
Asymmetric cryptography can be used to achieve conﬁdentiality,
and in combination with a message digest integrity and authentic-
ity as well. Asymmetric cryptography imposes low computational
overhead in combination with symmetric encryption.
multi-layer encryption Multiple layers of encryption can be
used to prevent a single internal attacker from learning unnecessary
path information, for instance, onion encryption [151]. With this
onion encryption, a node only learns predecessor and successor in
a message ﬂow. Hence, this approach protects against an internal at-
tacker. However, the sender must deﬁne the full path and thus knows
the public keys of every node on this path, which violates anonymity.
An anonymous Pub/Sub system that builds upon unstructured P2P
basic membership gains no beneﬁts from onion encryption, as each
node can only learn predecessor and successor due the lack of global
IDs. As onion encryption imposes computational overhead, it is only
useful for systems with basic membership management that require
global node IDs.
The multiple layer commutative encryption (MLCE), e.g., used in
[137] for secure Pub/Sub, does not require the sender to know the full
path in advance, but rather allows to add and remove encryption
layers in arbitrary order. However, MLCE still induces computational
overhead and thus also only beneﬁts basic membership with global
IDs as well.
attribute-based encryption The attribute-based encryption
(ABE) extends the concept of asymmetric encryption to attributes. Rather
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than having to possess one secret key to decrypt a message, ABE en-
forces the possession of one or more attributes to decrypt a message
[128].
This concept can be realized via attribute keys. With attribute keys,
every attribute is associated with a public/secret key pair; the pos-
session of an attribute is equivalent to the possession of the secret
key associated with the attribute. Possessing all secret attribute keys
is necessary to decrypt a message, ABE uses some mechanisms to
derive a symmetric decryption key for the message [128]. Such a
key can be derived by methods, not unlike polynomial interpolation.
Attribute keys are used to decrypt support points, and sufﬁcient sup-
port points provide the polynomial, which is then used to derive the
decryption key. Similar mechanisms have been used for ﬁne-grained
access control for a long time [4] (Chapter 13, Nuclear command &
control).
broadcast encryption Broadcast encryption [56] tackles the
challenge of distributing a secret key to many receivers while being
able to revoke receivers. Assuming one sender and a group of re-
ceivers, broadcast encryption allows the sender to share a secret with
any subgroup with minimal signaling overhead.
Broadcast encryption assumes that every receiver is initially equipped
with some keys. Then the sender splits the secret into secret shares
and sends them encrypted in such a way to the group of all users that
only the desired subgroup of receivers can restore the shared secret.
3.6.7 Guideline for Pub/Sub system construction
Constructing a privacy-preserving Pub/Sub systems can be challeng-
ing considering the interdependencies of the discussed approaches.
This section provides guidelines for building anonymous Pub/Sub sys-
tems by discussing alternatives in the context of application require-
ments.
The matching building block inﬂuences the available options for
other building blocks the most. Thus, it should be considered ﬁrst. If
the performance of forwarders is most important, pseudonyms [97, 100,
113, 146] and Bloom ﬁlters [9, 15, 84, 118, 139] are good options. If com-
posite subscriptions are required, (counting) Bloom ﬁlters [53] per-
form well. Attribute key overlay trees [17, 153] are well suited when at-
tribute value comparison is required. Private matching requires more
computational overhead but does not lead to FPs as Bloom ﬁlters do,
and provides stronger unlinkability than pseudonyms. Pseudonyms,
ﬁlters, and private matching are compatible with all types of attribute
localization and membership management. Key-based overlay trees re-
quire end-to-end connectivity between subscribers, and participants
have to establish a tree structure, which is incompatible with random
walk and ﬂooding based mechanisms. If few attributes and many
subscribers are expected, proactive, e.g., via ﬂooding, will result in
the least overhead and short delivery path. In the case of hardly used
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attributes, a random-walk based proactive subscription is the better
option.
Regarding community management, it is beneﬁcial regarding re-
silience to failures and attacks to maintain more than one route per
node to other nodes of the overlay. This overhead is compensated
by quicker overlay repair with lower message overhead. If publish-
ers distribute many publications over a relatively stable overlay, op-
timizations after community establishment, e.g., via Bullet [87], pay
off. However, community optimizations may leak information to ad-
versaries.
Key management and content distribution both depend on match-
ing. In case many participants are expected, shared keys or groups
keys, as well as a key escrow service, are desirable. In such a sce-
nario, re-keying performs better than revocation, but longer periods
of conﬁdentiality violation have to be acceptable.
This thesis uses the following methods throughout the next two
chapters: SCAMP [61] for basic membership management as an un-
structured P2P network that provides neighborhood sets and end-to-
end connectivity. Attribute knowledge is distributed proactively via
ﬂooding. Pseudonyms are used for matching. An ofﬂine TTP as the
basic method for key management as to keep the focus on anonymity
rather than conﬁdentiality.
3.7 anonymous Pub/Sub systems
This section discusses related anonymous Pub/Sub systems on the for-
mal system model and the building blocks. First, a short overview of
the development of anonymous Pub/Sub is provided. Second, selected
anonymous Pub/Sub systems are discussed in detail.
3.7.1 Development of anonymous Pub/Sub
Wang et al. [162] ﬁrst introduced anonymity as a requirement for se-
cure Pub/Sub. In particular, they pointed out that Pub/Sub may provide
anonymity against the passive malicious insider, a weaker model of
IA, assuming each path between publisher and subscriber contains,
at least, three nodes in the basic overlay. This assumption follows
the proxy server principle (cf. Section 2.2.1, page 14). However, a de-
tailed solution was not provided. Key management, a building block
not only relevant for anonymity but also conﬁdentiality, has also been
left as an open challenge.
Datta et al. [34] proposed the ﬁrst anonymous Pub/Sub system.
They applied topic-based Pub/Sub to P2P networks. Every topic is
represented by a dedicated P2P overlay. One special basic overlay con-
tains super peers, who know some nodes from the topic overlays. To
join a topic overlay, a new node must ﬂood a request in the basic over-
lay to be directed to a node from the desired topic overlay. The paper
mostly tackles the challenges of ensuring that the edges of the over-
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lays are directed such that no cycles occur, and all nodes are reached.
Anonymity is not analyzed against common attacker models.
The key management challenge was addressed by Srivatsa and
Lui [146] as well as Raiciu and Rosenblum [118] via an online TTP. The
TTP issues cryptographic keys to ensure conﬁdentiality and authentic-
ity. In the case of Srivatsa and Lui, the TTP also issues pseudonyms
to participants to provide publisher and subscriber anonymity within
the limits of pseudonyms. This approach protects anonymity against
the IA, assuming that the TTP is not compromised. Both systems [118,
146] still rely on a central forwarder and thus assume that this node is
not compromised. Also, no anonymity protection against GA is pos-
sible. Chen et al. [79] distributed the forwarder role. In addition they
used the searchable ciphertext method PEKS for matching to protect
conﬁdentiality. However, the key management remaines out-of-band.
Parallel to searchable ciphertext, also ﬁrst P2P-based approaches
surfaced, e.g., Shikfa et al. [136, 138] and Tariq et al. [153]. These
approaches explicitly address anonymity and also include the key
management building block. However, the anonymity attacker model
remaines limited resulting in leaked information that can be used
by a stronger attacker to break publisher and subscriber anonymity.
Shikfa et al. require nodes to obtain some information about the path
towards the respective publisher or subscriber. A malicious insider
can use this information to reduce anonymity sets. The approach
from Tariq et al. allows subscribers to learn about other subscribers
with the same or similar attributes. Likewise, the malicious insider
can use this information to adjust anonymity sets.
Nabeel et al. [102, 103] added homomorphic cryptography to al-
low matching for content-based Pub/Sub, i.e., compare values of key/-
value pairs, while preserving conﬁdentiality. Di Crescenzo et al. [27]
added oblivious transfers (OTs) to prevent a central TTP to learn the
attributes of publishers and subscribers. This TTP remains a SPoF for
availability, but it cannot break anonymity as a malicious insider. The
global observer may however still de-anonymize participants in these
systems.
Vo and Bellovin [161] discussed anonymous Pub/Sub. Besides the
proposal to use anonymization services to connect to a central broker,
they also proposed structured P2P networks. Assuming that nodes
can use some anonymous addressing, they can interconnect via a
DHT. In both cases, centralized and structured P2P, Bloom ﬁlters are
used as subscriptions to protect the privacy. The system protects the
anonymity against malicious insiders. However, evaluation regarding
outsiders—potentially a global observer—is missing.
3.7.2 Discussion of anonymous Pub/Sub systems
eventguard EventGuard is a secure Pub/Sub system to protect
each type of operation with the system, e.g., subscribe, with a so-
called guard [146]. The architecture of EventGuard is depicted in
Figure 14. The guards are well represented by the previously in-
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troduced building blocks—attribute localization for the subscription
guard and advertisement guard, community management for the un-
subscription and unadvertisement guard, community management
for the publish guard and content distribution for the routing guard.
Figure 14: EventGuard architecture [146]
Within the guards, EventGuard uses tokens, keys, and signatures
as mechanisms. Tokens represent pseudonyms for attributes that
are being used for advertisements, subscriptions, and notiﬁcations.
The keys are managed by a central and replicated TTP, the Repli-
cated Trusted Meta-Service. Every operation with the Pub/Sub system
requires an interaction with this meta-service. ElGamal signatures
[60] are used to ensure the authenticity of all messages. ElGamal
signatures are probabilistic with similar properties to PEKS; one mes-
sage translates to many possible signatures, but every signature is
only valid for one message. As the basic membership, EventGuard
already assumes a fully functional Pub/Sub system.
While EventGuard does not aim to provide anonymity, pseudonyms
and probabilistic signatures constitute valuable steps towards anony-
mous Pub/Sub. The pseudonyms can be used to hide attributes during
routing. The probabilistic signatures can be used to provide authen-
ticity while preventing multiple messages to be linked to the same
publishers.
c-cbps Raiciu and Rosenblum proposed a conﬁdential content-based
publish/subscribe (C-CBPS) [118]. Like EventGuard, this system does
not aim to protect anonymity by itself. However, the C-CBPS uses PEKS
as encryption scheme to protect conﬁdentiality. PEKS is a probabilis-
tic asymmetric encryption scheme. The trapdoor produced by the
receiver via the secret key is probabilistic; the searchable encryption
produced by sender via the public key however can be randomized.
With that mechanism, one plaintext attribute maps to many search-
able encryptions, while a searchable encryption only matches exactly
one trapdoor (attribute).
PEKS provides unlinkability between messages: an advertisement,
containing the searchable encryption, cannot be linked to another ad-
vertisement for the same attribute. However, advertisements can be
still linked together with subscriptions, i.e., the information that the
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match function must leak. Having a matching subscription, adver-
tisements may however still linked together transitionally. To protect
anonymity, the authors recommend either DC-nets or Tor for publishers
and subscribers to connect to forwarders.
broker-less Pub/Sub Tariq et al. proposed a secure Pub/Sub sys-
tem [154] with a P2P basic overlay and a P2P key management as
well. The key management uses a variation of identity-based encryp-
tion (IBE) to ensure conﬁdentiality. The IBE-based P2P key manage-
ment also realizes attribute-localization and content distribution—all
three building blocks are highly interconnected here.
The core assumption in this approach is that attributes, in this case,
key/value pairs can be represented in a trie, an information retrieval
tree. Within such a tree, the root node represents the full value range,
successive child node broad value ranges, and leaf nodes speciﬁc val-
ues. Tariq et al. use this trie to construct the identity part for IBE keys.
The keys are organized in such a way that each key of a leaf node
presents the value of this node, and parent nodes inherit all child
keys. As a result, the root node has the key to decrypt all values, i.e.,
match the whole value range, whereas leaf nodes can only decrypt
one speciﬁc value.
Given this key structure, a P2P overlay tree is established where
nodes take the position depending on which key they possess. Parent
nodes, therefore, take the key management responsibility for their
child nodes. Every notiﬁcation for a speciﬁc attribute is sent to the
root node of that key/value trie. This root node then recursively
forwards the notiﬁcation in the subtree with matching value. The
tree, therefore, also handles the content distribution.
The P2P trees ensure nodes only receive messages they can decrypt,
i.e., for which they subscribed. This hinders malicious insiders from
gaining knowledge beyond the limits of their key material. Still, while
the actions of malicious insider are limited, subscriber anonymity is
not provided.
epidemic forwarding Shikfa et al. proposed a so-called epi-
demic forwarding scheme [138]. Their approach is not a Pub/Sub sys-
tem per se, but the message dissemination resembles high similarity
with Pub/Sub.
A distributed ofﬂine TTP, IBE, and PEKS are used. However, epi-
demic forwarding violates minimal overhead and scalability require-
ments, as false positives might be forwarded, and forwarders perform
expensive operations.
scribe Rowstron et al. proposed SCRIBE [126], a Pub/Sub sys-
tem based on the P2P Pastry [125], developed by the same authors.
SCRIBE does not aim to protect anonymity; however approaches of
SCRIBE are well suited for anonymity.
Pastry is a structured P2P system. SCRIBE, therefore, uses a struc-
tured P2P where every Pub/Sub attribute has a designated central for-
warder, called rendezvous point. A publisher will always obtain the
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Figure 15: Base Mechanism for Subscription and Multicast Tree Creation.
[126]
ID of the designed forwarder ﬁrst, and send notiﬁcations directly to
this forwarder. Subscribers recursively connect to the designated for-
warder via their neighbor with the closest ID. These neighbors then
become forwarders. The resulting network topology is a distribution
tree as shown in Figure 15, routed by the chain of publisher and des-
ignated forwarder, and having only subscribers as leaves.
Assuming the designated forwarder is a malicious insider, SCRIBE
cannot provide publisher anonymity. However, this malicious insider
threat in the distribution tree cannot tell forwarders from subscribers.
SCRIBE, therefore, may provide subscriber anonymity against a mali-
cious insider.
3.7.3 Summary
The discussion of the related work showed that anonymous Pub/Sub
progressed concerning the usage of cryptography to protect subscrip-
tion privacy as well as conﬁdentiality. This allows preserving con-
ﬁdentiality against forwarders (malicious insider) as well as global
observers. However, the cryptography does not prevent these attack-
ers from learning the relationship between nodes, e.g., break relation-
ship anonymity. Furthermore, while a malicious insider is consid-
ered, the capabilities of this insider are limited: passive rather than
active; only in the role of forwarders rather than publishers and sub-
scribers. These assumptions also limit the publisher and subscriber
anonymity; publisher anonymity only holds against forwarders but
not subscribers (likewise for subscriber anonymity).
Table 6 summarizes this discussion with the most lacking require-
ments. The four anonymity requirements, publisher anonymity, sub-
scribers anonymity, relationship anonymity, and unlinkability were
each assessed by the malicious insider and the global observer (IA/GA).
Key management describes if the key management is sufﬁciently de-
tailed and respects the anonymity requirements.
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requirement eventg . c-cbps broker-l . epid. scribe
Publisher
anonymity
(IA/GA)
-/- o/- +/- +/- -/-
Subscriber
anonymity
(IA/GA)
-/- o/- -/- +/- +/-
Relationship
anonymity
(IA/GA)
-/- o/- +/- +/- +/-
Unlinkability
(IA/GA)
o/o o/- -/- -/- -/-
Key
management
+ ? + ? -
Table 6: Comparison of related work. The symbols +, o, - indicate how
well the approaches perform for the given properties. EventGuard
requires add-on anonymity protection to fulﬁll the requirements
marked as o.
3.8 summary
This section summarized the state-of-the-art in the area of anony-
mous Pub/Sub. For that, a formalization for Pub/Sub was created. This
formalization expressed multiple network abstraction layers, node
roles, attributes as Pub/Sub concept, as well as node churn. Based
on this model, anonymity requirements were formulated for Pub/Sub.
These anonymity requirements were complemented with an attacker
model discussion. The two attacker models global observer GA and
malicious insider IA are used in combination in this thesis as realis-
tic attacker model. With the attacker model in mind, a novel attack
for the malicious insider was presented, which abuses the request/re-
sponse protocol semantic found in many network protocols and ap-
plications.
Having established a formalization and attacker model, this section
proposed a segmentation of anonymous Pub/Sub in so-called build-
ing blocks: basic membership, attribute localization, key manage-
ment, matching, community management, and content distribution.
Dominant technologies were explained and discussed for each of the
building blocks. The following chapter presents a novel anonymous
Pub/Sub system by assembling the discussed technologies as well as
new approaches into building blocks.
With the formalization and building blocks, the most relevant re-
lated anonymous Pub/Sub as well as comparable systems were intro-
duced and discussed with respect to the attacker model. These sys-
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tems seem to favor add-on anonymization services such as Tor and
do not consider anonymity any further. As however discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3.6.2 (page 23), anonymity attacks target the lack of anonymity
consideration in the system. Few anonymous Pub/Sub systems do
consider anonymity throughout the whole system but use a limited
attacker model that greatly restricts the attackers capabilities. The
next chapter, therefore, discusses anonymity for each building block
with a strong attacker model.

4
AN ANONYMOUS UNSTRUCTURED
PUBL I SH/SUBSCR IBE OVERLAY
This chapter introduces a novel anonymous Pub/Sub system based
upon P2P communication. The system protects publisher and sub-
scriber anonymity against the global observer and the malicious in-
sider threat as presented in Section 3.3 (page 41). The system is modu-
lar by design; the novel contributions to each of these modules protect
against various attacker capabilities and can be selected as needed.
This chapter is structured as follows: after a brief system overview,
Sections 4.1 - 4.6 introduce the system in more detail according to
the building blocks as deﬁned in the previous chapter. Section 4.3
introduces three variations for anonymous bootstrapping, i.e., the at-
tribute localization building block, with hash chains. Section 4.5 intro-
duces inter-overlay optimization with counting Bloom ﬁlters as a con-
tribution to community management. Section 4.7 presents cover trafﬁc,
an extension of the base system that protects anonymity against ma-
licious insiders. Section 4.8 introduces the shell game, an extension of
the base system that protects anonymity against the global observer.
Section 4.9 concludes this chapter.
The system AnonPubSub realizes anonymous topic-based Pub/Sub
by utilizing an existing basic membership approach, and by contribut-
ing protocols for attribute localization, matching, and content distri-
bution. The system enables Pub/Sub with advertisements in the sense
that advertisements are distributed prior to subscriptions to aid the
subscription process. AnonPubSub models key management explic-
itly as opposed to the out-of-band assumption found in related work.
AnonPubSub also provides several means and optimizations for com-
munity management. This is the ﬁrst system providing participant
anonymity in Pub/Sub without relying on external anonymization ser-
vices. Furthermore, the system does not assume out-of-band key
management. Foremost, the system offers several means to protect
anonymity against a strong anonymity attacker model and allows
to balance anonymity against message overhead as needed. Several
parts of this system and core contributions of this thesis are published
in conference proceedings and journals [36–39].
The system is structured according to Figure 16 (right) from bottom
to top.
Example 13. Figure 16 (left) provides an example for this chapter: two pub-
lishers (squares 1, 5) and two subscribers (diamonds 7, 9) form an attribute
overlay such that the publishers can efﬁciently distribute notiﬁcations (top
layer). The bottom layer shows the connections of the basic membership,
i.e., the graph G = (V ,E). The middle layer depicts the overlay M to be
established via attribute localization and matching. The overlay includes
forwarders (circles 3, 6), too.
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Figure 16: Basic membership (bottom), Pub/Sub overlay (middle), commu-
nity (top)
The next sections are structured in accordance with the building
blocks depicted in Figure 16. First, Section 4.1 introduces the basic
membership via SCAMP followed by key management via a TTP in
Section 4.2. Then, attribute localization in Section 4.3, and matching
in Section 4.4 based upon hash chains, pseudonyms and ﬂooding
are explained. Community management in Section 4.5 and content
distribution in Section 4.6 complete this chapter with a summary in
Section 4.9.
4.1 basic membership
For basic membership, we rely on the SCAMP [61] algorithm. SCAMP
is a network sampling algorithm that distributes neighborhood sets
(network samples) via gossiping. SCAMP ensures that every node
always maintains a neighborhood set. SCAMP deﬁnes the neighbor-
hood size for every node with Equation (42); c deﬁnes the ratio of
tolerable node failures. While SCAMP provides a ﬁxed neighbor-
hood size, the following building blocks neither depend on a ﬁxed
nor static neighborhood. However, each connection is assumed to
work both ways.
|N(v)|  (c+ 1)× log(|V |) (42)
Example 14. The example in Figure 16 has a variable neighborhood size
|N(v)| ∈ [2, 5] with an average of |N(v)|avg ≈ 3.11. The resulting graph
diameter is 3, and the average path length ≈ 1.81.
In addition to using SCAMP for basic membership, conﬁdential
connections are established via an initial DH key exchange. Conﬁ-
dential connections are crucial concerning the global observer threat
to prevent the attacker from observing messages beyond the mes-
sage length. The key exchange establishes a key Kvx,vy between two
nodes vx, vy that are neighbors. Both nodes then apply symmetric en-
cryption, advanced encryption standard (AES) in cipher-block chain-
ing (CBC) mode to protect the conﬁdentiality of packets transmitted
via UDP. The CBC mode avoids consecutive equal messages to be
encrypted to the same ciphertext. UDP prevents the exchange of un-
4.2 key management 79
desired messages, e.g., ﬂow control and acknowledgments, outside
the control of the anonymous Pub/Sub system.
These properties ensure that an attacker with global observing ca-
pabilities may learn the existence and size of messages, but not the
content. A malicious insider may read and generate messages. That
means that the anonymous Pub/Sub system has to control the mes-
sage ﬂow to prevent inference of communication relations, i.e., pro-
tect anonymity. Furthermore, malicious insiders have to be prevented
from violating the anonymity and scalability of the system, e.g., by
spamming the system with false or replayed messages. The attribute
localization building block covers these tasks.
To cope with node and connection failures–independent of mali-
cious intent or not–basic membership is required to notify attribute
localization about such event. Likewise, newly connected neighbors
have to be reported as well. This process is further described in Sec-
tion 4.3.
4.2 key management
The system uses two ofﬂine TTPs for the initial distribution of keying
material to ensure conﬁdentiality and authenticity. The TTPs can be
ofﬂine in the sense that every participant only need to connect ini-
tially to it, but functions afterwards without a connection to the TTP.
Symmetric cryptography serves as basis for conﬁdential message ex-
change. Asynchronous cryptography with signatures and certiﬁcates
for ofﬂine veriﬁcation protects the authenticity and integrity of mes-
sages. The separation of the TTP into authorization and key distribu-
tion limits the TTP from linking attributes/keys to participants.
Each participant connects with the anonymization TTP and shows
one or more desired attributes as well as the desired role—publisher
or subscriber. If this TTP grants the respective participant access to
the desired attributes and role, it releases the corresponding keying
material from the credential TTP. Publishers distributing the same
attribute obtain the same key. This ensures publishers are indistin-
guishable from each other. Likewise, all subscribers Sa interested in
an attribute a are equipped with the same keying material.
ttp arrangement A single TTP would know all participants,
their attributes, and all key material. Attacking the TTP would lead to
a breach of anonymity, conﬁdentiality, and authenticity. Two separate
TTPs, the anonymization TTPanon and the credential TTPcred, realize
separation of concerns, i.e., a single TTP does not know both, node ID
and attributes. This scheme ensures that TTPanon relays requests from
participants to the TTPcred, i.e., anonymizes the participants towards
TTPcred, but cannot decrypt the response from TTPcred.
The anonymization TTPanon links node IDs and attributes of the par-
ticipants, but does not know the respective keys. The TTPcred links
attributes and key material, but does not know participant identi-
ties. Like basic membership management, TTPanon and TTPcred use a
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conﬁdential channel to interconnect. This channel furthermore must
provide authenticity, e.g., via transport layer security (TLS) and an
out-of-band exchange of public keys.
The TTPcred owns a secret key sk
cred
TTP and a public key pk
cred
TTP . Like-
wise, TTPanon owns skanonTTP and pk
anon
TTP . Both public keys are made
available to all participants.
key generation The TTPcred prepares keys and certiﬁcates for
all attributes with these functions: for each attribute a ∈ A, it ex-
ecutes the function keyGeneneration(a) and obtains the output triple
(a, ska,pka). Furthermore, it generates a random symmetric key Ka
for every attribute a as well. Hence, the TTP stores (a, ska,pka,Ka).
For certiﬁcate generation, TTPcred calculates pseudonyms ta by ex-
ecuting ta = {H(a)}Ka . These pseudonyms are then used for the
matching and attribute knowledge building blocks in the following
two sections. Next, TTPcred creates certa by executing the function
sign(pka, skcred), and stores it. In summary, TTPcred maintains a tu-
ple for each attribute a, called attribute record recorda as deﬁned in
Equation (43).
recorda = (a, ska,pka,Ka, certa) (43)
key distribution New publishers and subscribers contact TTPanon
to retrieve the keying material for their attributes. Publishers obtain
the tuple (ska,Ka, certa) for each attribute a, subscribers obtain (Ka).
The key exchange protocol must ensure that TTPanon never learns
the keys, while the TTPcred never learns node IDs. The keys are ob-
tained as illustrated in Figure 17, with a||b denoting the concatena-
tion of elements a,b and {a}b denoting the symmetric encryption of
plaintext a under key b:
1. Publisher p ﬁrst generates a nonce N and a symmetric transac-
tion key Ktx, and sends (a, {N||Ktx}pkcred) to TTPanon.
2. TTPanon veriﬁes the eligibility of p for a, e.g., via an authentica-
tion and authorization scheme, and sends ticket (a, {N||Ktx}pkcred)
to TTPcred.
3. Then TTPcred decrypts nonce and key, looks up key material for
a, encrypts nonce and keys with Ktx and sends ({N||keys}Ktx)
back to TTPanon.
4. Finally, TTPanon sends the latter message back to p. Afterwards,
the publisher decrypts the message, veriﬁes the nonce, and ob-
tains the keys. Likewise, subscribers obtain Ka.
This scheme ensures that TTPanon never learns Ktx. Therefore, TTPanon
cannot obtain the keys and cannot link p with keys. As a result,
TTPanon cannot link messages, such as advertisements, to participants
and attributes. Nonce N proves to p that the keys are from TTPcred
and TTPanon behaved correctly. TTPcred never communicates with p.
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p TTPanon TTP cred
(a, {N ||Ktx}pkcred )
(a, {N ||Ktx}pkcred )
({N ||keys}Ktx )
({N ||keys}Ktx )
Figure 17: Key distribution sequence
Moreover, Ktx as well as N only leak the number of transactions per
attribute to TTPcred to an attacker, but not the ID of p. That means,
TTPcred cannot link p with a or keys. After that, publishers as well as
subscribers do not require further TTP interaction.
4.3 attribute localization
Attribute localization serves the purpose of supplying participants
where to ﬁnd attributes. That is for publishers, in which direction
to send notiﬁcations given an attribute; for subscribers in which di-
rection to subscribe to attributes. Attribute localization must protect
the anonymity of publishers and subscribers such that no node IDs
are revealed to anonymity attackers. Furthermore, publishers and
subscribers must not be linkable to attributes. That also requires that
attributes themselves are kept conﬁdential. In addition, the signaling
overhead of attribute localization should be kept low. Attribute local-
ization should also scale with the number of attributes. That means
in particular that malicious insiders cannot overload the system with
false attribute knowledge.
This system requires advertisements to be distributed before sub-
scriptions are sent. That means, no subscriptions for an attribute
that has not been advertised by at least one publisher before is sent.
This leads to several advantages: (i) if there is no publisher for an
attribute, no attribute overlay must be maintained, (ii) subscribers al-
ways learn if at least one publisher for their desired attribute is active
in the system, (iii) attribute overlays can be constructed such that the
hop-distance between publishers and subscribers is kept low.
AnonPubSub uses three methods for attribute localization: ﬂood-
ing, forest ﬁre with random walks, and double random walks. All
three methods come with respective advantages and disadvantages:
ﬂooding causes high signaling overhead for advertisements, but also
creates attribute overlays with low diameter, i.e., low signaling over-
head for notiﬁcations. Forest ﬁre and and the random walk reduce
the signaling overhead caused by advertisements, but may lead to at-
tribute overlays with higher diameter. While all three mechanisms
are well known in the domains of computer networks and graph
traversal, these mechanisms have been modiﬁed, incorporated into
protocols, and extensively evaluated to allow for the construction of
anonymous overlay networks. As a result, while ﬂooding spreads
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attribute knowledge to all nodes, forest ﬁre and the random walk
distributes attribute knowledge sparse among nodes. By adjusting
the sparseness, the signaling overhead is balanced between adver-
tisements and subscriptions as needed. This section ﬁrst introduces
attribute localization via ﬂooding in combination with hash chains as
a novel means of privacy-preserving TTL counter.
4.3.1 Flooding
Flooding of advertisement messages within the basic membership dis-
tributes attribute knowledge as introduced in [37]. The ﬂooded ad-
vertisement messages contain two elements: an attribute pseudonym
and a transaction pseudonym. The attribute pseudonym protects con-
ﬁdentiality while the transaction pseudonym helps to set up the over-
lay network.
A publisher p ∈ Pa derives an attribute pseudonym ta from at-
tribute a via the shared secret Ka: ta = {a}Ka where {x}y denotes
symmetric encryption of plaintext x under key y. The publisher then
attaches ta to the advertisement message madv, and spreads the mes-
sage to its neighbors N(p) in G.
hash chains Flooding depends on a method for every node to
identify already processed messages, e.g., identify duplicates due to
parallel paths and loops. The same challenge applies to forest ﬁre and
random walks as well. Sender IDs, transaction IDs and TTL counters as
common mechanisms cannot be used are as they would allow an at-
tacker to easily break anonymity. This thesis therefore proposes hash
chains as a method to overcome this challenge. First, a hash chain
does not reveal any information given just one element. However,
a hash chain allows to link two element to the same chain. Second,
a hash chain also allows to determine the distance between two ele-
ments of the hash chain. Finally, hash chains are efﬁcient to calculate.
Using the introduced notation, the challenge can be illustrated as
follows: ﬂooding an advertisement madv that only contains ta with-
out global node IDs (anonymity) may cause duplicate messages and
even routing loops. Figure 18 depicts these challenges in an unstruc-
tured P2P network without global node IDs. Therefore a transaction
pseudonym h is required.
Example 15. Figure 18 (left) shows three forwarders. Forwarder f1 sends
the advertisement to f2, the advertisement then gets forwarded to f3. Due
to limited neighborhood knowledge and the absence of global node IDs, f3
forwards to its neighbor f1 again. Thus f1 depends on the transaction
pseudonym / distance metric h and successor element h ′′ to detect loops.
Figure 18 (right): shows an example where f4 received the same advertise-
ment from f2 and f3. To detect duplicate advertisements, f4 requires a
transaction pseudonyms in this case as well.
This thesis combines a transaction pseudonym with distance met-
ric within hash chains. An element of a hash chain is attached to
every advertisement message. Relaying this message will cause this
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f1 f2 f3 f1 f2
f3
f4
(ta,h, f1) (ta,h ′, f2)
(ta,h ′′, f3)
(ta,h, f1)
(ta,h, f1)
(ta,h ′, f2)
(ta,h ′, f3)
Figure 18: Transactions pseudonyms for advertisements. Left: loop detec-
tion. Right: duplicate detection.
element to be incremented. Two advertisements then can be linked
to same origin by verifying if one hash chain element is an increment
of the other one.
A hash chain is initialized with a nonce—a transaction pseudonym—
and provides a distance metric in combination with the chain length.
Successive elements of the hash chain are derived by hashing the pre-
vious element. Furthermore, this mechanism does not leak the dis-
tance from the origin to any attacker, but rather the relative distance
between two elements.
The hash chain approach yields another signiﬁcant advantage over
TTL counters: malicious insiders cannot claim an “earlier” chain ele-
ment due to the one-way property of hash functions. That means, an
attacker cannot offer a path with shorter distance to an attribute than
the shortest one the attacker received itself. This impedes an attacker
in mounting greyhole and blackhole attacks, i.e., steal trafﬁc.
Given a cryptographic hash function H(h) = h ′ that takes h as in-
put and outputs h ′, a hash chain is deﬁned by all values h,h ′,h ′′, . . .
derived by repeatedly applying H to its output. The function inChain
tests if two hash values hi and hj belong to the same hash chain and
have a maximum distance dmax. In case both values belong to the
same hash chain, the function returns the distance, otherwise 0.
inChain(hi,hj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
k ∃k ∈ [0,dmax] : H(k)(hi) = hj
−k ∃k ∈ [0,dmax] : H(k)(hj) = hi
0 otherwise
The parameter dmax is equivalent to a time-to-live and has to be
set according to the estimated diameter of G, i.e., dmax should be set
higher than the estimated diameter. The following issues arise in case
dmax is set inappropriate:
dmax too low If dmax is set too low, duplicate advertisements are
not detected as duplicates. As a consequence, multiple routing
entries are stored by the node which failed to detect the du-
plicate, leading to potentially duplicate subscriptions and thus
signaling overhead.
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dmax too high If dmax is set too high, unnecessary processing over-
head arsis. Experiments on an Intel low power Core i5 CPU
(Sandy Bridge) with 1.6 GHz, 4 GB of RAM, and Python 2.7.10
show that 2 ∗ 500 = 1 , 000 iterations of the the secure hash al-
gorithm (SHA)-256 can be computed in 4 .93 milliseconds (σ2 =
1 .1 millisecond). Even a very high limit, such as dmax = 500,
therefore causes only mild computational overhead. An ex-
tremely high dmax in combination with short hash values may
also lead to hash collisions. In this case, two hash chains are
falsely considered as one, leading to an overlay separation for
the related attributes.
The following estimates can be used for dmax: Tor [44] uses three
guards plus sender and receiver for a circuit. Three guards are the
minimum to protect against a malicious insider threat. The topology
including guards, sender, and receiver contains 5 nodes and there-
fore 4 hops. The parameter dmax should be therefore greater than 4
to support basic overlays sufﬁciently large to protect anonymity. The
Internet protocol (IP) in version 4 speciﬁes 8 bit for the TTL header
ﬁeld–a maximum of 255 hops. To maintain compatibility with algo-
rithms and strategies for the IP, dmax should not be set higher than
255.
The publisher initializes a chain with a random h from the output
domain of H, e.g., H(N) given a nonce N, and attaches it together
with pseudonym ta to an advertisement message madv = (ta,h). For-
warders keep triples (ta,h, v) in routing tables, where v is the last
forwarder. The function inChain distinguishes multiple publishers,
duplicates, and loops. Furthermore, they choose the shortest path in
case of duplicates. When continuing to ﬂood, forwarders increment
the hash chain, i.e., derive h ′ from h and so on.
The Procedure processAdvertisement describes how forwarders pro-
cess advertisements: the procedure takes the triple (ta,h, v) from the
advertisement, where v denotes the last sender of the advertisement.
The tuple (w, T adv) denotes the state of the forwarder, the own node ID
w and the advertisement table T adv. The forwarder then searches for
an existing attribute record Rta given ta in line 1. Now two cases are
possible, the attribute pseudonym ta is new to the forwarder (lines
2–10) or ta is already known (lines 11–23).
If a forwarder w has not received pseudonym ta before, w stores it
in the routing table T adv as (h, v) within a new record Rta (lines 3–4)
and forwards (ta,h ′) with h ′ = H(h) to all neighbors except v (lines
5–8).
Otherwise, w already has a record Rta with one or more tuples
(h∗, v∗) (line 11). For every tuple, it checks if the output of inChain(h,h∗)
returns a non-zero result. This indicates that both advertisements be-
long to the same hash chain. Furthermore, in case h is a predecessor
of h∗ in the hash chain (line 12), a shorter path has been discovered
and w replaces (h∗, v∗) by (h, v) (lines 13–15). If h is a successor of h∗
(line 17), the forwarder discards the advertisement as duplicate (line
18). If inChain(h,h∗) returns 0 for all h∗ (line 21), h belongs to a yet
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Procedure processAdvertisement((ta, h, v), (w, T adv))
1 Rta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T adv);
2 if Rta = ∅ then
3 Rta ← {(h, v)};
4 updateRecord(ta, Rta , T
adv);
5 for (u ∈ N(w) \ v do
6 madv ← (ta,H(h));
7 message(u, madv);
8 end
9 return;
10 end
11 for (h∗, v∗) ∈ Rta do
12 if inChain(h∗,h) < 0 then
13 Rta ← Rta \ (h∗, v∗)∪ (h, v);
14 updateRecord(ta, Rta , T
adv);
15 return;
16 end
17 if inChain(h∗,h) > 0 then
18 return;
19 end
20 end
21 Rta ← Rta ∪ (h, v);
22 updateRecord(ta, Rta , T
adv);
23 return;
unknown hash chains. Another publisher for the same ta has been
found, and w stores (h, v) as another tuple in the record Rta (lines
21+22).
authentic advertisements Pseudonyms must be signed, so
that malicious insiders cannot create arbitrary advertisements and
overload the system. So far, an advertisement consists of an attribute
pseudonym and a hash chain element, e.g., (ta,h). As the hash chain
element h is incremented by every passing node, only the attribute
pseudonym ta is signed. For that, the publisher executes a function
sign(ta, ska) to obtain the signature taskasig .
madv = (ta, ta
ska
sig , certa,h) (44)
The advertisement is then extended to the message as shown in
Equation (44): the attribute pseudonym, a signature of the attribute
pseudonym, a certiﬁcate containing the public signature key together
with key signature of the TTP, and the hash chain element. The certiﬁ-
cate ensures that every node can verify the signature. Every verifying
node is only required to know the public signature key of the TTP.
The veriﬁcation can be therefore performed ofﬂine, i.e., without con-
tacting the TTP, and the system scales with the number of attributes,
i.e., no key storage per attribute is required.
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p f s
TTPcred
0) pkTTP
0) pkTTP
1) a
2) (ska ,pka ,certa)
3) (ta , ta
ska
sig , cert,h) 4) (ta , ta
ska
sig , cert,h
′)
Figure 19: Signatures for advertisements: Distribution of TTP public key (0),
request for and response for signature key (1,2) , forwarding and
message validation (3,4).
The key lifecycle is summarized in Figure 19. The key management
building block ensured that all participants possess the public key of
the TTP (step 0). Upon joining the system, the publisher obtained
signature key and certiﬁcate (steps 1, 2). Now every node can verify
that an attribute is valid upon reception of an advertisement (steps 3,
4).
Every participant veriﬁes advertisements by checking certa and taskasig .
Hence, participants can detect non-authentic advertisements as well
as duplicates. This check leaves a malicious insider with following
options:
replay An attacker can replay a message as it is. Every node re-
ceiving this message either ignores the advertisement if ta is
already known or adds a routing entry for the attacker, which
is in compliance with the protocol.
alter h An attacker can alter the hash chain when replaying the
advertisement. Picking a successive element of an existing hash
chain will cause receiving nodes to ignore the advertisement in
favour of advertisement with a preceding hash chain element.
Picking a nonce with cause the receiving nodes to consider that
the attacker has a path to another publisher. This will cause
subscription for a to be forwarder to the attacker in addition to
genuine publishers.
Example 16. Figure 20 explains the advertisement process with hash chains
and key management. Publishers obtain certa from the TTPred, and cre-
ate the advertisement as madv = (ta , ta
ska
sig , certa , h) containing the en-
crypted attribute, hash value, signature, and certiﬁcate. They then ﬂood the
advertisement to all their neighbors. Each time a node receives the advertise-
ment, it veriﬁes if the signature is valid, i.e., ta is an existing attribute and
originated from an authorized publisher. When the node forwards this adver-
tisement, it increments the hash chain (h → h ′ → h ′′ · · · dmax). Hence
nodes with existing advertisement table entries for ta can also verify if the
new advertisement is fresh or belongs to the existing transaction.
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Figure 20: Distribution of advertisements. Forwarder increment hash chain
elements (h → h ′ → h ′′) and merge advertisements when for-
warding.
summary This section explained how ﬂooding can be used as
a basis for anonymous attribute distribution. For that, transaction
pseudonyms and a distance metric were combined in the form of a
hash chain for the ﬁrst time.
anonymity The anonymity of publishers is preserved here as no
node IDs are transmitted. Moreover, not even the distance to
the publisher is transmitted due to the use of hash chain. Given
two advertisements, the hash chain merely reveals which adver-
tisement took the shorter path, as well as how much shorter the
path is.
confidentiality Attributes are kept conﬁdential as well as attribute-
speciﬁc key material is required to link an advertisement to an
attribute.
minimal overhead Flooding as the foundational mechanisms en-
sures functional correctness such that attribute knowledge is
distributed to all nodes. The hash chains in the sense of a trans-
action pseudonym allow nodes to detect and drop duplicates.
This ensures that the signaling overhead is kept low. The hash
chains in the sense of a distance metric allow nodes to always
pick the shortest path to a publisher. This ensures that the sig-
naling overhead for the content distribution building block is
kept low as well.
scalability The routing tables maintained by nodes grow linear
with the number of attributes. Digital signatures are used to
ensure the authenticity of advertisements, i.e., allow all nodes
V to verify maadv originated from a genuine publisher p ∈ Pa. As
a consequence, malicious insiders cannot create false attributes
to overload the system.
In summary, the presented approach fulﬁlls all requirements except
for minimal overhead. While the approach ensures that the signaling
overhead is kept low, the underlying concept may cause the trans-
mission of duplicates. That is, nodes may receive an advertisement
concerning the same attribute and publisher from two or more neigh-
bors. The following two sections therefore propose alternatives based
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on the concepts of forest ﬁre and random walks that do not rely on
ﬂooding.
4.3.2 Forest ﬁre
Forest ﬁre is a probabilistic graph traversal algorithm [88, 89]. This
thesis proposes a novel method that incorporates forest ﬁre to dis-
tribute attribute knowledge within an overlay network. This method
can be generalized to anonymous bootstrapping for further applications.
This method is used in two variations:
1. The attribute knowledge is distributed to all nodes V .
2. The attribute knowledge is distributed to a subset V∗ ⊆ V , i.e.,
it is distributed sparsely in G.
This section ﬁrst introduces the preliminaries of forest ﬁre. Second,
it elaborates on the ﬁrst variation, how forest ﬁre can be applied to
distribute attribute knowledge. Third, it shows the second variation,
how attribute knowledge can be distributed sparsely with privacy
preserving TTL counter.
As forest ﬁre is a probabilistic algorithm that may not traverse all
edges, unlike ﬂooding, which resembles a breadth-ﬁrst search (BFS)
from the graph traversal perspective. Transferred to the distribution
of attribute knowledge, forest ﬁre may therefore distribute this knowl-
edge sparse compared to ﬂooding. This thesis adds a TTL counter to
forest ﬁre to further enforce the spareness of the node coverage.
forest fire graph traversal The basic forest ﬁre algorithm
according to Leskovec et al. [89] works as follows: the system requires
two parameters, the forward burning probability p and the backward
burning ratio r. Assuming a graph G = (V ,A) with nodes V and arcs
A, a start node called ambassador node w ∈ V is selected. The ambas-
sador node picks x neighbors V ′ ⊆ N(w). For that, x is drawn from
a binomial distribution with mean (1− p)−1. The higher p, the more
neighbors will be selected. The node then draws x random neighbors
from N(w). The backward burning ratio r deﬁnes that x÷ r incoming
neighbors, i.e., neighbors from N+(w), are selected. Correspondingly,
1−(x÷ r) outgoing neighbors fromN−(w) are selected. The nodes V ′
are then visited, and the same algorithm is applied recursively with
every node v ∈ N ′ as with w. The traversed arcs (w, v) are marked
as burned—removed from A—and cannot be used again, effectively
reducing N(w). Nodes terminate the graph traversal when no more
arcs can be burned.
To use forest ﬁre for attribute distribution, the following modiﬁ-
cations to the previously described attribute distribution have to be
made:
1. Upon receiving an advertisement by a node v, the node does
not forward the advertisement to all neighbors N(v). The node
rather draws x random neighbors from N(v).
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2. Every publisher p initializes the attribute distribution by select-
ing itself as “ambassador node w” and follows the instruction
as above.
3. Compared to the forest ﬁre graph traversal, the backward burn-
ing ratio r is not used as the basic overlay G is undirected.
4. All other mechanisms, such as the hash chain, are used as be-
fore.
In comparison with the attribute distribution based on ﬂooding,
the attribute distribution based on forest forest should cause less sig-
naling overhead. The next chapter analyzes the arising signaling over-
head of both approaches in detail.
sparse variation While the introduced approach with forest
ﬁre distributes attribute knowledge for a among all nodes V in the
basic overlay G, it still causes signaling overhead. In particular in case
no (Sa = ∅) or only few subscribers (Sa  V) interested in a exist,
the signaling overhead can be further reduced. For that, the attribute
knowledge is only distributed to a subset V∗a ⊆ V . This reduces the
signaling overhead as well as the storage overhead–nodes V \V∗a do
not have to store any information about a. However, this may cause
subscribers to have to “search” for this attribute knowledge. The fol-
lowing Section 4.3.3 will answer the question “How can subscribers
search for attribute knowledge?” while the publisher perspective is
here covered ﬁrst.
In order to distribute the attribute knowledge only to V∗a a ter-
mination criteria for the attribute distribution is required. A time to
live (TTL) for advertisements can be used for that. It is important
to note the previously introduced hash chains cannot replace a TTL
as with hash chains two advertisements are required to calculate the
distance.
p
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Figure 21: Attribute localization with forest ﬁre.
Example 17. Figure 21 shows an example of the attribute distribution based
on forest ﬁre and TTLs. The publisher p initiates the attribute distribution
with TTL = 2 and burns the black nodes. This causes signaling costs of 3
messages. However, 3 subscribers s marked in gray do not receive the adver-
tisement and therefore have to search for it. This causes additional signaling
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costs of 5 messages. Attribute knowledge based on ﬂooding would have
caused signaling costs of 9 messages, an overhead of 1 message compared to
variation with forest ﬁre and TTL.
TTLs are a suitable for a probabilistic attribute distribution, but TTLs
would not sufﬁciently protect the anonymity in case of a deterministic
attribute distribution as in the case of the method based on ﬂooding.
If a TTL was used with ﬂooding, malicious insiders could trivially use
the TTL as distance to the publisher and triangulate the position of
the publisher.
privacy-preserving ttl While a TTL in combination with a prob-
abilistic attribute distribution does not immediately allow a malicious
insider to break anonymity, further measures should be taken to pre-
vent such attackers from inferring small publisher candidate sets. If
the TTL was initialized by a publisher p with a system parameter, e.g.,
dmax, and strictly decremented by 1 with every hop, the malicious
insider could trivially infer the distance to p as (dmax − TTL). That
would, in particular for short distances, leave only few nodes as po-
tential publishers.
Random noise in combination with local information overcomes
this issue. The initialization is performed as follows:
Every publisher p ∈ Pa draws a random number Xap from the
Weibull distribution [166]. A parameter setting of λ  1 and k > 1
ensures a preference of small values according to the probability den-
sity function of the Weibull distribution as given in Equation (45).
The selection of the Weibull distribution in combination with this pa-
rameter range causes the density mean of the random variables to
be lower than the median—preference of small values—while all ran-
dom variables are positive (cf. Equation (45)) and a long tail in the
distribution is avoided. For the TTL, drawing small random numbers,
i.e., Xap  dmax  255, is sufﬁcient as no beneﬁt arises from drawing
numbers exceeding the graph diameter—Xap = dmax would already
guarantee a TTL high enough to render every node in V a potential
publisher under all condition. To enforce the preference of the ran-
dom variable Xap to be within interval X ∈ [0,dmax], dmax ÷ 2 can be
used as desired median (E(X) = λΓ(1+ 1÷ k)) for the distribution.
f(x; λ,k) =
k
λ
×
(x
λ
)k−1
× e−(x/λ)k , x  0 (45)
TTLap = Xap+ |N(p)| (46)
As an example, Figure 22 depicts the density function of Weibull
distribution for the interval [0, 5] with the parameters λ = 2.0 and
k = 2.0. Increasing the scale λ will increase the expectation values,
whereas increasing k will reduce the variance.
The malicious insider may still guess the assignment of Xap, e.g.,
with a statistical disclosure attack [33]. The addition of local infor-
mation prevents the malicious insider from such guessing. By intu-
ition, having a large neighborhood, i.e., a large set N(p), increases
the chances of having received the advertisement from one of these
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Figure 22: Density plot of the Weibull distribution, λ = 2,k = 2
neighbors. Incrementing Xap by the neighborhood size therefore re-
ﬂects these chances. In summary, the publisher initializes the TTL as
given in Equation (46).
madv = (ta, ta
ska
sig , certa,h, TTL) (47)
Together with attribute pseudonyms, signature, hash chain, and
TTL the advertisement message madv becomes a 5-tuple as given in
Equation (47).
summary This section proposed a method based upon forest ﬁre
to distribute attribute knowledge with potentially less signaling over-
head than the ﬂooding-based mechanism. The behaviour of the for-
est ﬁre method can be controlled with the forward burning prob-
ability p. In addition, a TTL can be set to distribute the attribute
sparsely. With sparse distribution, the signaling overhead is reduced,
but subscribers may have to search for nodes with the desired at-
tribute knowledge. To prevent anonymity attackers from reasoning
about the distance to the publisher given the TTL, a privacy-preserving
TTL variation was introduced that uses noise and local properties of
nodes to hide their distance. The following section proposed a third
method to distribute attribute knowledge and introduced the search
method for subscribers.
4.3.3 Double random walk
Like forest ﬁre, the random walk is a probabilistic graph traversal
algorithm. While ﬂooding resembles a breadth-ﬁrst search (BFS), the
random walk resembles a depth-ﬁrst search (DFS). The forest ﬁre can
be classiﬁed in-between both categories. Like forest ﬁre, a random
walk can be used to distribute attribute knowledge within the basic
overlay. In order for subscribers to discover this attribute knowledge,
they might be required to perform another random walk by them-
selves. This thesis proposes this approach as a double random walk.
random walk graph traversal A random walk [3] works as
follows: assuming a graph G = (V ,E) with nodes V and edges E, a
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start node w ∈ V is selected. This node picks a random neighbor v ∈
N(w) uniformly at random. The node v is then visited and continues
recursively by picking another neighbor v ′ ∈ N(v) \w. The traversed
edges (w, v) are marked as visited—removed from E—and cannot be
used again. In case of N(v) \w = ∅, the random walk terminates. A
random walk may employ backtracking to overcome the algorithm
termination by empty neighborhood sets. In case of N(v) \w = ∅,
the random walk would backtrack to a previous node w with a non-
empty set of not selected neighbors, and select another neighbor v ′ ∈
N(w) \ v.
This mechanism can be applied to the distribution of attribute
knowledge—similar to the forest ﬁre-based method—as well as for
the discovery of attribute knowledge by subscribers.
distribution of attribute knowledge via random walks
A random walk with backtracking eventually traverses the complete
basic overlay. This may cause higher signaling costs than ﬂooding
due to the backtracking. However, with a privacy-preserving TTL as
introduced in the previous section, the random walk can be used as
a basis to spread attribute knowledge sparsely as well. For that, the
publisher sets the TTL of the advertisement as given in Equation (46)
as well. Compared to the attribute distribution via forest ﬁre, the
constant assignment of x = 1 replaces the stochastic assignment of
x. Furthermore every node v performs backtracking if there are no
remaining unburnt neighbors. For that, v send the advertisement
back to the originator with the hash chain and TTL the message was
received.
A node v detects that an advertisement backtracked if all of the
following conditions hold:
1. v receives an advertisement (ta,h,TTL) with TTL > 0 from node
w.
2. The hash value has been sent out before, i.e., an advertisement
record with (h∗,u) exists, and H(h∗) = h.
In this case, the advertisement is not a duplicate and cannot be
discarded.
discovery of attribute knowledge via random walks If
the TTLs of all circulating advertisements for an attribute reach 0 dur-
ing the distribution of attribute knowledge via forest ﬁre or a random
walk, not all subscribers might be reached as shown by Figure 23. In
this example, p initiated a random walk with an advertisement and
TTL = 3. In this case, the left unreached subscribers attempt to dis-
cover attribute knowledge. For that they initiate a random walk with
a subscription message. This subscription must not contain a TTL
limit, i.e., TTLas = ∞. That means the random walk will only termi-
nate under the conditions of either a successful discovery of attribute
knowledge or a backtrack to the subscriber without unburnt neigh-
bors.
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connecting the overlay In case the attribute overlay Ma con-
tains multiple publishers, every publisher is required to initiate a ran-
dom walk like a subscriber; the publishers therefore subscribe to each
other. This ensures Ma is connected, in particular that Constraint (48)
is fulﬁlled. Note that Constraint (48) implies Constraint (49) by con-
necting two paths path(p1, s), path(s,p2) each.
∀s ∈ Sa, ∀p ∈ Pa : ∃path(p, s) (48)
∀p1,p2 ∈ Pa : ∃path(p1,p2) (49)
p
f
f
f
s
f
f
s
s
adv
adv
adv
sub
sub
sub
sub
Figure 23: Attribute localization with double random walks. TTLap = 3.
Example 18. Figure 23 shows an example where publisher p distributes the
attribute knowledge via a random walk of length 3, i.e., causing signaling
costs of 3 messages. To discover this attribute knowledge, the subscribers
s marked in gray have to perform random walks with signaling costs of 4
messages. The total signaling costs are therefore 7 messages.
summary This section presented three mechanisms for distribut-
ing and discovering attribute knowledge within unstructured P2P over-
lays based upon three graph traversal methods. Furthermore, the con-
cept of hash chains was applied to the distribution of attribute knowl-
edge to preserve participant anonymity. A privacy-preserving TTL
can be used in addition to spread the attribute knowledge sparsely in
the basic overlay.
Flooding as a basis to distribute attribute knowledge works deter-
ministically and reaches all nodes of the basic overlay. This ensures
that the resulting attribute overlays are hop-minimal. This causes the
signaling overhead for the content distribution to be low. However,
during the attribute distribution, every edge is traversed at least once
and up to twice, potentially causing signaling overhead. Furthermore,
every node must store information about every attribute.
Forest ﬁre as a basis for attribute distribution burns edges to neigh-
boring nodes like a ﬁre, causing each edge to be used a most once.
That may cause potentially less signaling overhead. However, the at-
tribute overlays are not guaranteed to be hop-minimal anymore. This
approach is also stochastic in nature as not all adjacent edges of a
node are burned, but only a random subset. The size of this subset
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can be controlled with a system parameter. As a second variation,
this mechanism can be equipped with a TTL, resulting in a termina-
tion of the mechanism before all nodes are reached—given the TTL is
sufﬁciently low. Consequently, the attribute knowledge is distributed
sparsely in the basic overlay. This potentially reduces the signaling
overhead due to the not-traversed edges. Furthermore, the storage
space per node is reduced in case the node does not receive the at-
tribute knowledge.
For subscribers to obtain the attribute knowledge in the latter case,
an active discovery is required. For that, a random walk with a sub-
scription message was proposed. Such a random walk can be also
used for the distribution of attribute knowledge instead of the forest
ﬁre. In this case, the random walk is performed with a TTL attached
to the advertisement such that the relaying of the message terminates
before all nodes are traversed. In summary, the following combina-
tion to distribute attribute knowledge can be performed based upon
the graph traversal method:
1. Flooding + subscriptions
2. Forest ﬁre + subscription
3. Forest ﬁre with TTL + random walk
4. Random walk with TTL + random walk (double random walk)
These variations are expected to differ in signaling overhead given
the topology of the basic overlay and the number of subscribers per
attribute. The ﬁrst two variations cause the signaling overhead to
arise due to advertisement messages. The latter two variations shift
over more signaling overhead to subscription messages.
For all variations, hash chains were proposed as a privacy-preserving
combination of transaction pseudonym and distance metric. Adver-
tisement messages require a transaction pseudonym to distinguish
multiple publishers from duplicate message. A distance metric helps
to select the shortest path to a publisher. A hash chain incorporates
both, but does not reveal the absolute distance to a publisher; the hash
chain only reveals the distance difference between two messages.
In case an early termination for the distribution of attribute knowl-
edge is desired, a TTL for messages is required. To prevent such a TTL
to reveal the distance to the publisher, and thus possibly the position
and node ID of the publisher, noise is required. This section proposed
to use local properties as well as noise for that. The local knowledge
is constituted by the size of neighborhood—more neighbors increase
the likelyhood of a message having originated via a longer path via
one of the neighbors. A random sample in addition to the neigh-
borhood size prevents anonymity attackers from linking a message
based upon the TTL and neighborhood size to the publisher.
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4.4 matching
AnonPubSub uses binary comparison of pseudonyms for matching
as introduced in [37]. For that, subscribers prepare the attribute
pseudonyms for their topics once they obtained key material, and
compare the pseudonyms of received advertisements with the pre-
pared pseudonyms. In case of a successful match, subscribers send a
subscription message along the reverse path of the advertisement. All
nodes merge subscriptions whenever possible. For that, they main-
tain a subscription table T sub to keep track of subscribed attribute
pseudonyms. In case a subscription is received—or the node in-
tends to subscribe itself—it adds the subscribing node ID the attribute
pseudonym record in the table. If the record does not exist, subscrip-
tion messages are sent out towards all publishers. Otherwise, no
further actions are necessary, i.e., subscriptions have been merged.
As exempliﬁed in Figure 24 , subscribers Sa obtain attribute pseu-
donym ta via Ka for a as publishers do. When a subscriber s receives
advertisement triples (tx,h ′, v) (attribute localization), it compares tx
to ta (step 1) and subscribes with the shortened tuple (ta, s) back-
wards the advertisement path (steps 2, 3).
attribute localization
p
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(ta,h,p)
(ta,h ′, f)
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Figure 24: Messages from attribute localization to the left as reference. Step
1: a subscriber compares interest tx with advertised attribute ta.
Step 2: the subscriber subscribes towards f. Step 3: f forwards
the subscription to p.
Once the tx from the triple is conﬁrmed to match ta, the sub-
scriber s joins the mesh Ma via a subscription (Figure 24 steps 2,
3).
subscriptions Subscriptions are sent back the reverse path of
the advertisements. A subscriber adds tuple (ta, s) to the subscrip-
tion table, where s is the subscribing node itself. Moreover, it sends a
subscription message msub = (ta) towards the origin of the advertise-
ment.
Procedure processSubscription lists the subscription process: when-
ever a forwarder w receives a subscription (ta) from neighbor v, w
updates its subscription table T sub appending v to the record Rsubta
(lines 10+11). If there is no subscription record yet (line 2), w obtains
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the corresponding advertisement record Radvta (line 3) and forwards
the subscription to advertising node v∗, i.e., towards every publisher.
This approach integrates well with attribute localization via ﬂooding,
forest ﬁre, and random walks.
Procedure processSubscription((ta, v), (w, T adv, T sub))
1 Rsubta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T sub);
2 if Rsubta = ∅ then
3 Radvta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T adv);
4 for (h∗, v∗) ∈ Radvta do
5 msub ← (ta);
6 message(v∗, msub);
7 end
8 return;
9 end
10 Rsubta ← Rsubta ∪ v;
11 updateRecord(ta, Rsubta , T
sub);
12 return;
4.5 community management
Community management maintains an established attribute overlay,
e.g., compensates node churn and distributes the processing and sig-
naling overhead fairly among nodes. Like other building blocks, com-
munity management also has to ensure conﬁdential communication
as well as preventing a malicious insider IA from abusing community
management, e.g., from stealing messages.
This section ﬁrst introduces how an attribute overlay is maintained
under churn—nodes entering/leaving the overlay as well as nodes
failing. Next, it is explained how community management ensures
that an attribute overlay always remains connected and how mes-
sages exchanged within the attribute community can be protected to
prevent information leakage, e.g., to the global observer threat GA.
This section then introduces a novel mechanism for anonymous inter-
overlay optimization that distributes the forwarder role fairly among
nodes.
4.5.1 Node churn and overlay connectivity
Whenever a publisher leaves the system, it un-advertises its attributes.
Similarly, a subscriber sends an un-subscription message the same
path as the subscription to leave the system. The same applies to
overlay forwarders, which subscribed or advertised on behalf of other
nodes. For that, advertise and subscribe messages are extended with
un-advertise and un-subscribe. Both messages are forwarded the
same path as the preceding subscribe and advertise messages. This is
possible as forwarders can lookup the next hop in their advertisement
/ subscription tables before deleting the entry.
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Process processUnadvertisement lists the un-advertisement proce-
dure. First the node w obtains the advertisement record for Radvta (line
1). Then it removes the tuple (h, v) of the un-advertising node v (lines
2+3). Afterwards, if the advertisement record is empty (line 4), v
forwards the un-advertisement to all neighbors (lines 5–8).
Procedure processUnadvertisement((ta, h, v), (w, T adv))
1 Radvta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T adv);
2 Radvta ← Radvta \ {(h, v)};
3 updateRecord(ta, Radvta , T
adv);
4 if Radvta = ∅ then
5 for (u ∈ N(w) \ v do
6 munadv ← (ta,H(h));
7 message(u, munadv);
8 end
9 end
10 return;
Process processUnsubscription lists the un-subscription procedure.
The node w obtains the subscription record for Rsubta (line 1). Then it
removes the un-subscribing node v from the record (lines 2+3). Af-
terwards, if the subscription record is empty (line 4), v forwards the
un-subscription to advertising nodes v∗ (lines 6-9) found in the corre-
sponding advertisement record Radvta (line 5).
Procedure processUnsubscription((ta, v), (w, T adv, T sub))
1 Rsubta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T sub);
2 Rsubta ← Rsubta \ v;
3 updateRecord(ta, Rsubta , T
sub);
4 if Rsubta = ∅ then
5 Radvta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T adv);
6 for (h∗, v∗) ∈ Rta do
7 munsub ← (ta);
8 message(v∗, munsub);
9 end
10 end
11 return;
This processing of un-advertisement and un-subscriptions may lead
to situations, where a forwarder leaves the basic overlay, but publish-
ers and subscribers are still present. These remaining nodes may no
be disconnected from the attribute overlay. In this situations these
nodes either have to wait for advertisements to be re-distributed, e.g.,
assuming an epoch-based advertisement cycle, or rely on gossiping.
With gossiping [61], remaining nodes inquire their neighbors after
the un-advertisement for ta has been processed, if the neighbor is
still in possession of an advertisement for ta. Then, the inquiring
node can act as it received the advertisement from the neighbor. The
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attribute overlay can then be reconnected using the procedures from
the previous sections.
attack based on churn Churn also poses a threat to subscriber
anonymity due to the global observer threat GA. It is vital to consider
this threat as it has been used manyfold times to break anonymization
services. Section 2.3.6.2, page 23, lists such attacks.
Churn is observable in particular when a node joins or leaves the
basic overlay G and the attribute overlay Ma simultaneously. The at-
tacker can use these observations to tell forwarders from subscribers,
and therefore de-anonymize subscribers. Similar attacks on other
anonymization services have been reported as intersection attack [119].
The following illustrates such attacks with an example: Figure 25a
depicts the case of the shaded node s2 joining at time t + 1. Ini-
tially, only s1 is connected to p. Thus, Sta = {s1}, Fta = {f1, f2}, and
pathta(p, s1) = (p, f1, f2, s1) as s2 has not joined at time t yet. Once s2
joins, it directly connects with p as patht+1a (p, s2) = (p, s2). However,
patht+1a (p, s1) should now become (p, s2, s1) rather than (p, f1, f2, s1).
As a result, both subscribers s1, s2 are exposed as leaf nodes at t+ 1,
whereas ideally only s1 should be exposed.
While advertisement and subscription process causes this situation
to be repaired, i.e., s1 reconnects via s2, a notiﬁcation may still ﬂow
from p to s1 right after s2 connected, but before s1 reconnected via s2.
If the global observer threat witnesses this, it becomes evident that s2
is a subscriber.
pf1
f2
s2
s1
(a) s2 joins late, ideally s1 would be con-
nected via dotted arc
f1 p s2
s1 s3
(b) s1 and s3 leave, dotted edges disap-
pear
Figure 25: Effects of churn.
Figure 25b depicts the case of the shaded nodes s1, s3 leaving at t+
1. As s1 leaves Ma, f1 may also leave Ma as it is no longer required to
relay message at t+ 1. This “ripple effect” allows the global observer
to reason that f1 ∈ Fa and f1 /∈ Sa. Likewise, when s3 leaves Ma at
t+ 1, s2 will remain in Ma as it is interested in the notiﬁcations for a.
The GA reasons that s2 ∈ Sa and s2 /∈ Fa.
In summary, node churn exposes subscribers over time. Further-
more, churn affects the overlay topology, which in consequence has
impacts on the overlay optimization that might lead to further expo-
sure. Thus, the effects of churn must be carefully considered when
introducing new anonymity-enhancing overlay modiﬁcations.
multiple publisher In case there are multiple publishers for
the same attribute, additional measures are required to ensure meshMa
remains connected in case publishers are joining and leaving. Assum-
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ing two publishers p1 (transaction pseudonym h1), and p2 (pseu-
donym h2), and further assuming p2 joins after p1, then p2 or a
node v between both publishers recognizes the distinct transaction
pseudonyms h1 and h2. Hence, this node forwards the advertisement
with h2 towards p1 and advertisement with h1 towards p2. Therefore
both publishers learn that at least one other publisher exists and thus
also act as forwarders by forwarding subscriptions towards the other
publisher.
heartbeats and padding The attacker global observer threat
may infer the overlay topology through message content and message
ﬂow. Conﬁdential links for the basic membership as well as mes-
sage padding to render message types indistinguishable overcome
this issue. As an estimation, 73 bytes + underlay headers sufﬁce for
message type, pseudonym, hash chain, and signature. Finally, reoc-
curring messages, e.g., heartbeats, piggy-back these 73 bytes padded
management messages to prevent the leakage of message ﬂow. In
comparison, IPv4 and UDP headers add up to 28 bytes. An Ethernet
frame can take 1, 550 bytes of such payload, with a minimum pay-
load of 46 bytes. The padded heartbeat via UDP over IPv4 therefore
exceeds the minimum frame size by mere 55 bytes.
In summary, this section has addressed challenges and solutions
regarding the anonymity and availability requirements of the com-
munity management building block. Nevertheless, attribute overlays
may still degenerate over time in the sense that churn may cause
overlay paths to increase in length. Moreover, long-living nodes may
take the majority of the forwarding workload over time. The follow-
ing section proposes a solution for this challenge by distributing the
workload among nodes.
4.5.2 Inter-overlay optimization with Bloom ﬁlters
The construction of attribute overlays presented in the previous sec-
tion includes nodes as pure forwarders, which neither take the pub-
lisher nor the subscriber role. Such forwarders may get overloaded
with processing overhead as well as signaling overhead for two rea-
sons: ﬁrst, such nodes may become forwarders frequently due to
high connectivity. Second, nodes being part of the overlay may main-
tain forwarder roles more often, whereas recently joined nodes may
hardly become involved.
To reduce the overhead, the overloaded forwarder has to hand over
the forwarder role for one or more attributes to another node. This
thesis proposes such an inter-overlay optimization approach while
protecting the anonymity of nodes. The proposed approach estab-
lishes random ad-hoc communities that exchange load information
via Bloom ﬁlters. Overloaded nodes then attempt to identify other
nodes acting as forwarder for one of their attributes via a Bloom ﬁl-
ter, and hand over their forwarder role.
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Figure 26: Example with 3 attributes: a1 in white/solid, a2 in light gray/-
dotted, and a3 in dark gray/dashed. Node 4 is overloaded.
Example 19. Figure 26 depicts an example with 8 nodes and 3 attributes.
The ﬁgure shows a section of the basic overlay, given the local knowledge
of node 4, with different line types representing the 3 attribute overlays.
Attribute a1 uses white nodes with solid arcs. Attribute a2 uses light gray
nodes with dotted arcs. Attribute a3 uses dark gray nodes with dashed arcs.
Node 4 is forwarder for all 3 attributes, but neither publisher nor subscriber
for any of these attributes.
community formation To perform inter-overlay optimization,
ﬁrst a community must be established. A random initiator establishes
a community greedily. The community formation consists of two
steps: ﬁrst the establishment of a set of nodes participating in the
community. Second, establishment of an overlay structure among
this set of nodes.
To become an initiator, every node v waits for random period X
after the last community it participated in has been dissolved. If the
node never participated in a community, e.g., because the node just
joined the basic overlay G, the node immediately waits for a random
period X. Then the node inquires all basic overlay neighbors N(v) to
join the community. If as subset N ′(v) of sufﬁcient size |N ′(v)|  3
accept, v is the leader of this community. Otherwise, v dissolves the
partial community N ′(v). Every node is at most part of one commu-
nity.
Figure 27 shows an example where node 4 acts as an initiator. The
nodes 1− 3, 5− 8 are members of the same optimization community
but members of different attribute overlays (Figure 26).
When the overlay optimization is complete, node 4 dissolves the
community. All nodes independently start the process over again—
they are invited into a community or attempt to initiate a community
after a random time interval has passed.
After the set V ′ of nodes participating in the community has been
established, an appropriate topology has to be established to allow
communication within the group. While all nodes v ′ ∈ V ′ are con-
nected to the initiator, such a star topology would enable the initia-
tor to learn each community member’s load status (malicious insider
4.5 community management 101
1 2 3
4
56 7 8
community
Figure 27: Inter-overlay optimization community: initiator is node 4, nodes
1, . . . , 8 participate.
threat). The initiator v therefore connects all nodes in a directed ring.
A set of arcs A deﬁnes this topology. An arc is a directed connection
between two nodes. The initiator informs each community member
about the outgoing arc of this member according to the rules stated
in Equations (50), (51), and (52). It remains up to initiator to deﬁne
the order of nodes, e.g., by the sequence in which nodes joined V ′.
A0 = {} (50)
∀v ′i ∈ V ′, 1  i < |V ′| : Ai = Ai−1 ∪ (v ′i, v ′i+1) (51)
A = A|V ′|−1 ∪ {(v, v ′1), v ′|V ′|, v} (52)
Figure 28 depicts the community ring given the example from Fig-
ure 26.
1 2 3
4
56 7 8
Figure 28: Inter-overlay optimization community connected as a ring with
initiator 4.
community optimization The community optimization is the
second phase of inter-overlay optimization. After the community has
been established, a joint load status for the community is formed and
distributed among all members. This status provides every node with
an indicator if underloaded nodes are present, and if another node
may already forward one of the own attributes. Nodes may then
circulate attribute handover request, which may then be answered
by handover responses. In case of a response, both, requester and
responder, establish a direct community to handover the attribute.
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Establishing the joint load status requires all nodes to reveal the at-
tribute pseudonyms they forward. To prevent malicious insiders from
learning this information, a privacy-preserving aggregation scheme is
used: ﬁrst, a counting Bloom ﬁlter is used as data structure. Second,
the initiator initializes this ﬁlter with random noise, which is removed
after all community members added their load status. The counting
Bloom ﬁlter as a probabilistic data structure only stores hashes of
the attribute pseudonyms such that the ﬁlter cannot be reversed to
an attribute pseudonym unless the pseudonym is known. The ﬁlter
also only reveals if an attribute pseudonym is likely to be present. A
counting Bloom ﬁlter also gives an indication how often an attribute
pseudonym might be present. Finally, the counting Bloom ﬁlter also
allows to remove entries again. This allows nodes to use one ﬁlter as
continuous data structure—nodes that take over an attribute add an
entry to the ﬁlter; nodes that hand over an attribute remove the entry
from the ﬁlter.
The circular communication within the community is performed
according to the following steps:
1. The initiator vi=0 creates a counting Bloom ﬁlter bf, adds ran-
dom noise r, and forwards the ﬁlter as a message to its commu-
nity neighbor vi+1. This is message acts as a token on the ring.
Only the initiator creates the token, all nodes wait, modify, and
pass on the token.
2. Every community node adds its own load status to the counting
Bloom ﬁlter. For that, the node adds all its attribute pseudonyms
to the Bloom ﬁlter.
3. After every node added its load status, i.e., the counting Bloom
ﬁlter circled once through the community, v0 adds its own load
status and removes the noise r. The noise ensured that every
node, including v0 never had access to the load status of few or
even only one node. The anonymity set regarding linking the
information of the counting Bloom to a node are therefore all
community members.
4. The initiator v0 complements the counting Bloom ﬁlter with an
empty handover request and an empty handover response, and
circles the new message through the community.
5. Every node receiving the message with empty handover request
may replace the empty handover request with an attribute it
wishes to handover. This node is called overloaded node vover.
The overloaded node then continues to circulate the message to
the next neighbor.
6. Every node receiving the message with a handover request and
empty handover response may accept the request and set the
handover response. This node is called underloaded node vunder.
The underloaded node then continues to circulate the message
to the next neighbor.
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7. Once vover receives the message with its own handover request,
it sets the handover request to empty again. If the handover
is non-empty, it establishes direct communication with vunder. I
then sets the response to empty. In any case, it continues to
circulate the message.
8. The steps 5–7 are repeated until the initiator observes two empty
handover requests in sequence.
9. The initiator dissolves the community.
If a node v wants to leave the community prematurely, the v re-
moves its attribute pseudonyms from the counting Bloom ﬁlter and
informs the initiator v0. The initiator then either dissolves the com-
munity immediately (community becomes too small), or holds the
token during the next pass, reconnects the overlay without v, releases
the token, and informs v. If a node v fails, v0 dissolves the community
after not receiving the token within a given timeout again.
With step 1, the initiator v0 creates the message structure to be
circled within the community. The message consists of a counting
Bloom ﬁlter, a handover request block, and a handover response
block.
Counting Bloom ﬁlters [53] (cf. Section 3.6.4, page 64) allow for the
removal of entries as opposed to normal Bloom ﬁlters. This enables
nodes to adjust their load status in the Bloom ﬁlter, e.g., remove an
attribute they no longer forward for. As a result, a counting Bloom
ﬁlter also allows to count how often a certain entry is present in the
Bloom ﬁlter at most.
To test how often an attribute is present, the following test is per-
formed: ﬁrst, a node calculates a new Bloom ﬁlter solely for the at-
tribute a to be tested (Equation (53)). Next, the node compares all 1-
positions of the new Bloom ﬁlter with the counting Bloom ﬁlter, and
identiﬁes the position i with lowest number in the counting Bloom
ﬁlters (cf. Equation (54)). Then bfload[i] is the upper boundary for the
occurrence of attribute a.
bfa = ∀i ∈ [1,m] : bf[i] = maxmj=1Hj(a) (53)
min
i∈[1,m]
bfload[i] : bfa[i] = 1 (54)
To prevent nodes in the community from linking attributes to nodes
via the Bloom ﬁlter, the initiator v0 initializes a the Bloom ﬁlter with
random noise. Otherwise, node v1 might assume that bfload only con-
tains attributes from v0 and attempt to determine the attribute combi-
nation with a brute force approach. For the randomization, v0 takes
its own number of attributes |Av0 | and multiplies it with |V
′| to obtain
an estimate of the expect total number of entries in the Bloom ﬁlter.
Then v0 adds |Av0 |× |V ′| nonces to bfload: draw a random nonce N
from the domain of possible attribute pseudonyms, generate a Bloom
ﬁlter bfN for the nonce, and adds bfN to the Bloom ﬁlter containing
the load status, i.e., bf
′
load = bfload + bfN.
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mload = (
Bloom ﬁlter︷ ︸︸ ︷
bfload ,
request︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ta,pkvover),
response︷ ︸︸ ︷
{vunder,pkvunder}pkvover ) (55)
mload = ( bfload, (0, 0), 0) (56)
mload = ( bfload, (ta,pkvover), 0) (57)
The circulated message consist of three elements a given in Equa-
tion (55). The ﬁrst component of the message is the counting Bloom
ﬁlter itself with mload = ( bfload). In addition, the message is ap-
pended with a handover request block. Within that block, the ﬁrst
overloaded node vover speciﬁes the attribute to be handed over via the
attribute pseudonym ta. The empty handover block is denoted by
the 0-pseudonym t0. Note that the vover does not reveal its ID. How-
ever, as vover and the potential underloaded node vunder might not be
neighbors in the basic overlay G, i.e., (vover, vunder) /∈ E, no secure
communication channel between both nodes exists. To overcome this
issue, vover generates a new asymmetric key pair (skvover ,pkvover) and
attaches pkvover to the message as well. Combined, the message be-
comes mload = ( bfload, (ta,pkvover)). In order for an underloaded node
vunder to respond, the message requires a handover response block.
This block consists of the ID of vunder encrypted with pkvover as well
as its own public key pkvunder . With the response block, the message
becomes Equation (55).
When the overloaded node receives a message as given in Equa-
tion (55), it can decrypt the handover response with skvover , obtain
(vunder,pkvunder), and establish direct communication with vunder. Be-
fore continuing to circulate the message, it sets the handover request
and response to 0. A message without handover request is given
in Equation (56). A message with handover request but without re-
sponse is given in Equation (57).
The system parameter lfover > 1 enables nodes to determine if they
are overloaded. This parameter is a factor relative to the average
load factor lfavg of the community. Equation (58) shows how the
average load factor can be estimated based upon the counting Bloom
ﬁlter the the community size. The constant B determines the average
number of 1 bits in a Bloom ﬁlter holding one attribute pseudonym.
This constant has to be determined given the particularly chosen hash
functions for the Bloom ﬁlter.
lfavg =
∑
i∈[1,m] bfload[i]
B× |V ′| (58)
The following function overloaded determines if a node v is over-
loaded or not. An overloaded node forwards more than lfover times
the attributes than the expected
overloaded(v, bfload, |V ′|) =
{
true |Av|× lfover > lfavg
false otherwise
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A node with |Av| < lfavg is an underloaded node.
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2 1
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (59)
H1(a) : bf[1] = a[1] (60)
H2(a) : bf[2] = a[1] (61)
H3(a) : bf[2] = a[2] (62)
H4(a) : bf[3] = a[1] (63)
H5(a) : bf[4] = a[2] (64)
Example 20. The matrix (59) shows an example with 3 attributes (rows),
and the corresponding bits (columns), which can be used by the Bloom ﬁlter
hash functions. The lowest bit takes the right most position each. These
hash functions are given in a simpliﬁed version in Equation (60)-(64) and
generate a Bloom ﬁlter with m = 4 positions. Using these hash functions,
the Bloom ﬁlters per attribute are the following:
bfa1 = 0111 (65)
bfa2 = 1010 (66)
bfa3 = 1111 (67)
A counting Bloom ﬁlter containing each attributes once therefore becomes
2232. If the attribute a1 is present another time, the counting Bloom ﬁlter
becomes 2343. With Equation (54) an overloaded node with attribute a1
would identify positions 1, 3 (right most bit position is 1) as lowest given the
Bloom ﬁlter bfa1 . Correspondingly, attribute a1 is at most present 3 times
in the counting Bloom ﬁlter. The overloaded node could therefore assume up
to two candidate nodes willing to take over attribute a1.
To complete the handover of the forwarder role of an attribute, the
node vover has to handover neighbors to vunder. The neighbors of vover
also have to be informed. Equations (68), (69) remove all overlay
neighbors for a from vover. The “prime” versions of the set indicates
the status after the handover. Then vunder takes over all overlay succes-
sors of vover (Equation (70)). Note that vunder keeps it existing neigh-
bors, and that vunder might be successor of vover and therefore must
be removed to avoid cycles. In case vunder is successor of vover, it also
takes over all predecessors from vover as given in Equation (71). In
any case, all predecessors and successors of vover have to be informed
as given in Equations (72), (73).
N−a (vover)
′ = ∅ (68)
N+a (vover)
′ = ∅ (69)
N−a (vunder)
′ = (N−a (vunder)∪N−a (vover)) \ {vunder, vover} (70)
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N+a (vunder)
′ = N+a (vover) \ vover (71)
∀v ∈ N+a (vover) : N−a (v) ′ = (N−a (v) \ vover)∪ vunder (72)
∀w ∈ N−a (vover) : N+a (w) ′ = (N+a (w) \ vover)∪ vunder (73)
The optimization ends when the initiator v0 observes two empty
handover requests in sequence. Any overloaded node, which for-
wards at least one attribute pseudonym the node has not yet at-
tempted to hand over, would use the empty handover request. If the
request is empty when it reaches the initiator again, there must be
no such node. The initiator therefore informs all nodes V ′ to dissolve
the community.
The overall overlay optimization, i.e., community formation and op-
timization process, never terminates. The signaling overhead of the
communication via the cyclic community may be considered high—
|V ′| messages are required from every request to response—, but the
cycle also protects the anonymity of all nodes, as attribute pseudonyms
cannot be linked to a particular node by the malicious insiders. Two
exceptions apply:
1. A malicious insiders claims to be underloaded by responding
to every handover request. Then this node can claim trafﬁc
by taking over attributes. Furthermore, this node learns which
attributes overloaded nodes forwarded before. However, the
malicious insider may quickly become overloaded. Moreover,
the insider only learns until the other nodes become not over-
loaded anymore, i.e., only a limited number of attributes can
be learned. Furthermore, another node may become suspicious
once the same underloaded node answers more than one re-
quest.
2. Each underloaded node that takes over an attribute pseudonym
learns about this pseudonym and the other node as well.
This section presented an inter-overlay optimization approach based
upon a greedy community formation, a ring topology, and counting
Bloom ﬁlters. Nodes join or create communities repeatedly. Over-
loaded nodes attempt to ﬁnd an underloaded nodes within such a
community and handover the forwarding role for an attribute pseu-
donym.
The ring topology in the community works as an anonymization
service as no message can be linked to a particular participant—
except when an attribute handover request is accepted. The counting
Bloom ﬁlter ensures that no attribute can be linked to a node. This
is particularly relevant as a subscriber will never handover a desired
attribute. But the subscriber can still indicate to the community that
it is a viable candidate to handover a forwarder role for this attribute
to. The random noise added to the Bloom ﬁlter ensures that this
protection is also achieved during the initial population of the Bloom
ﬁlter.
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The conﬁdentiality remains protected as only attribute pseudonyms
and hashes of the same are exchanged.
This overlay optimization scales linear with the number of attributes,
like the proposed solutions for the attribute distribution building
block. Every node is at most part of one community, and therefore
stores at most a list of all its own attributes it attempted to handover
(linear). The size of the counting Bloom ﬁlter can be also linearly
increased with the total number of attributes in the system. The max-
imum number of nodes in a community remains constant given the
neighbor list of al nodes is maintained at constant size by the basic
membership management.
This optimization is performed within an optimization community.
Such communities are established in a randomized fashion by nodes
deciding at a random time to become initiator. The initiator then adds
nodes in a greedy manner to the community. These nodes are picked
from the neighborhood sets of the initiator, i.e., neighbors within the
initiators attribute overlays. This selection is biased towards having
multiple nodes per attribute in the community. These communities
therefore increase the chances of successful handovers compared to a
purely random selection. The initiator connects the community in a
ring that communicates via a token.
After the community ring is established, the nodes ﬁrst establish
their joint load status. A token with a counting Bloom ﬁlter is circled
within the community, and nodes add their attributes to the count-
ing Bloom ﬁlter. The counting Bloom ﬁlter protects unlinkability as it
does not reveal which node contributed which attributes to the count-
ing Bloom ﬁlter. Noise is added to the counting Bloom ﬁlter before
adding the load status to protect malicious insiders from linking at-
tributes to nodes. Nodes within the community can then reason if
other nodes handle an undesired attribute as well, add a handover
request to the token, and wait for a handover response. In case of
a successful response, both nodes establish direct communication to
hand over the forwarder role.
4.6 content distribution
The content distribution delivers publications, or notiﬁcations respec-
tively, from publishers to subscribers. These notiﬁcation messages
contain actual content—in contrast to the advertisement, subscrip-
tion, and overlay optimization messages, which contained at most
an attribute pseudonym. Conﬁdentiality is therefore a crucial require-
ment besides scalability and minimal overhead for this building block.
Moreover, authenticity of notiﬁcations is required to ensure that these
messages have originated by a publisher holding the respective at-
tribute keys.
The system distributes notiﬁcations for an attribute a by sending
the notiﬁcation through the respective and pre-established attribute
overlay Ma. To ensure conﬁdentiality, publishers use the shared se-
cret Ka to encrypt the notiﬁcation content. The resulting notiﬁcation
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is given in Equation (76). Such a notiﬁcation does not leak more
information than the preceding advertisement. Together with the sig-
nature scheme from attribute localization the notiﬁcation becomes
the message as given in Equation (77) with sig = sign(ta||{m}Ka , ska)
where x||y denotes the concatenation of elements x,y.
mnotif = (ta, {m}Ka) (74)
mnotif = (ta, {m}Ka , sig) (75)
A notiﬁcation for attribute a originated by a publisher p contains
pseudonym ta as routing identiﬁer and some content m. To dis-
tribute a notiﬁcation from a publisher p ∈ Pa to all subscribers Sa,
the publisher ﬂoods pre-established mesh Ma. For that, p as well
as nodes in Ma follow Procedure processNotiﬁcation: ﬁrst, the node
veriﬁes that the signature is valid (lines 1–3). Next, the node obtains
the subscription table (line 4) and iterates over all subscription en-
tries (lines 6–13). In case sending node v matches the subscription
entry (line 7), the entry is skipped. Otherwise, the node forwards
the notiﬁcation to the node v∗ (lines 10–11). The notiﬁcation is also
sent out towards all publishers (lines 14–21), except the direction the
notiﬁcation was received from (lines 16–18). The set complete (line 5)
maintains a set of nodes the notiﬁcation has been sent to or received
from, such that no duplicates are sent out (lines 11, 20).
Procedure processNotiﬁcation((ta, {m}Ka , sig, v), (w, T
sub, T adv))
1 if not verify(ta, {m}Ka , sig) then
2 return;
3 end
4 Rsubta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T sub);
5 complete ← {v} ;
6 for v∗ ∈ Rsubta do
7 if v∗ ∈ complete then
8 continue;
9 end
10 mnotif = (ta, {m}Ka , sig);
11 message(v∗, mnotif );
12 complete ← complete∪ v∗ ;
13 end
14 Radvta ← ﬁndRecord(ta, T adv);
15 for (h∗, v∗) ∈ Radvta do
16 if v∗ ∈ complete then
17 continue;
18 end
19 mnotif = (ta, {m}Ka , sig);
20 message(v∗, mnotif );
21 end
22 return;
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While the pseudonym ta used in advertisements and notiﬁcations
does not leak plaintext information. For notiﬁcations however, the
message conﬁdentiality of content m has to be protected as well.
p f s
TTPcred
1) a1) a
2) Ka
2) Ka
3) c = {m}Ka
4) m = (c, ta) 5) m = (c, ta)
6) p = {c}Ka
Figure 29: Key exchange and message ﬂow for conﬁdential notiﬁcations.
Both participant sets, Pa and Sa, share a symmetric key Ka. Pub-
lisher p encrypts m using Ka and obtains {m}Ka . Figure 29 illustrates
process to obtain the key: both, p, s request the key Ka for a from the
TTP (step 1, 2). The publisher then encrypts the plaintext message m
with Ka (set 3), creates a new message m ′ = (c, ta), and sends it to
f (step 4). The forwarder looks up its routing entry for ta and for-
wards m ′ to s (step 5). The subscriber then decrypts m ′ and obtains
the plaintext message m (step 6). The same signature scheme as for
advertisements is applied to obtain an authentic notiﬁcation as given
in Equation (76), with the signature provided in Equation (77).
mnotif = (ta, {m}Ka , sig) (76)
sig = sign(ta||{m}Ka , ska) (77)
The content distribution approach presented in this section pro-
tects the anonymity of participants by the same means as presented
with attribute localization—attribute pseudonyms and the avoidance
of global node IDs. Regarding conﬁdentiality, a notiﬁcation mnotif =
(ta, {m}Ka) does not contain any more plaintext information than an
advertisement. A notiﬁcation does however leak metadata, such as
the message length and the message frequency. This metadata can be
exploited by the global observing threat. The following two sections
introduce mechanisms to prevent such exploitation. The authentic-
ity of notiﬁcations is protected as all nodes, including subscribers,
verify the signature of notiﬁcations. The scalability of the content
distribution depends upon the overlay established by the attribute
distribution building block. The overhead arising from forwarding
notiﬁcation is low. No additional storage overhead arises. The pro-
cessing overhead is limited to a signature veriﬁcation and a routing
table lookup.
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4.7 cover traffic in anonymous pub-sub
A global observer threat arises from topological properties—similar
to the statistical disclosure attack [33]—of the overlay to identify sub-
scribers and thus breaks subscriber anonymity. This section intro-
duces a novel mechanism called probabilistic forwarding (PF) to miti-
gate such attacks. Probabilistic forwarding PF does not only introduce
cover trafﬁc as the related cover trafﬁc / mimic trafﬁc approaches [11,
57], but increases the size and thus the statistical properties of at-
tribute overlays.
This section is structured as follows: ﬁrst, the statistical disclosure
attack [33] is transferred to anonymous Pub/Sub following the formal-
ization given in Section 3.1 (page 35). Then, probabilistic forwarding
is introduced as a countermeasure to mitigate this attack.
statistical disclosure attack on anonymous Pub/Sub For
this attack, the global observer isolates Ma from the basic overlay G
with information obtained from timing or node churn. Given back-
ground information in terms of the amount of publishers |Pa| and
subscribers |Sa|, the global observer threat GA can set up a probability
distribution of all nodes Va. In case publishers and subscribers dom-
inate the overlay, i.e., |Pa ∪ Sa|÷ |Va| > 0.5, the attacker immediately
breaks publisher and subscriber anonymity. That means, the attacker
can simply pick all overlay nodes as publishers and subscribers for a
and is correct in most cases.
The attackers success can be measured via anonymity set sizes (cf.
Section 2.2.3, page 18) as classiﬁcation accuracy that is deﬁned as the
ratio of correct classiﬁcations (true positives TP and true negatives
TN) among all classiﬁcations (TP, false positives FP, TN, and false
negatives FN), Equation 78. Thus, the global attacker succeeds for
accuracy > 0.5, i.e., it guesses publishers and subscribers better than
a coin ﬂip.
accuracy =
TP+ TN
TP+ FP+ TN+ FN
(78)
de-anonymizing leaf nodes The attacker can extend the in-
troduced attack with timing information. With timing information,
the attacker isolates so called leaf nodes via message ﬂow from Ma,
i.e., nodes with N−a (v) = {} that do not forward notiﬁcations any fur-
ther. Hence the attacker may consider such nodes v as subscribers in
accordance with the overlay construction.
To analyze overlay meshes, the set speciﬁed in Equation (79) de-
notes nodes that do not send notiﬁcations in Ma. Hence those nodes
represent “leafs” in Ma. The attacker analyzes message ﬂow and iso-
lates L(Ma), and thus reduces the remaining problem size to Va \
L(Ma). In case the ratio of publishers and subscribers among those
remaining non-leaf nodes is larger than 0.5, i.e, |(Pa ∪ Sa) \ L(Ma)|÷
|Va| > 0.5, even the entropy of the probability distribution of the re-
maining problem is too low to protect participant anonymity. There-
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fore, Ma is insufﬁcient to protect against the GA threat as it does not
contain enough cover nodes.
L(Ma) = {v : v ∈ Va,N−a (v) = ∅} (79)
probabilistic forwarding To mitigate the statistical disclosure
attack, this thesis adapts the concepts of cover trafﬁc as introduced by
[11] and the so called “mimic trafﬁc” [57] (cf. Section 2.3, page 21) to
notiﬁcations in a Pub/Sub system. This extension increases the over-
all number of nodes in Ma. Moreover, leaf nodes do not indicate
subscribers any more and thus mitigate the attacker’s advantage.
Probabilistic forwarding works as follows: upon sending a sub-
scription message, every forwarder and subscriber decides for every
neighbor at random if to forward notiﬁcations to this neighbor or
not. The system parameter μ ∈ [0, 1] models a threshold for this deci-
sion and therefore expresses the “strength” of probabilistic forward-
ing (PF). With this process, nodes v pull additional neighbors from
N(v) \ {N−a (v) ∪N+a (v)} into N−a (v). Hence, Ma grows and thus the
chances of randomly picking subscribers decreases. The likelihood of
leaf nodes being subscriber decreases as well.
Example 21. Figure 30 exempliﬁes this concept. Left: subscribers s1, s2,
and s4 are exposed as leaf nodes. By picking leafs as subscribers the attack
accuracy evaluates to (3+ 1)÷ (3+ 0+ 1+ 1) = 0.8. Middle: subscribers
s1 and s3 conceal themselves by adding cover neighbors. Thus, the accuracy
drops to ≈ 0.43. Right: cover neighbors may pick additional cover neighbors
by themselves—cover node f3 pulls in another cover node, f4 (accuracy 0.5).
without probabilistic forw.
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f1
s1 s2
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s4
probabilistic forw. (1)
p
f1
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probabilistic forw. (2)
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f4
Figure 30: Hiding nodes dashed, receivers of cover messages gray. Middle:
probabilistic forwarding with one hop of neighbors. Right: two
hops of neighbors.
Formally, subscribers and forwarders v ∈ Va determine uniformly
at random for every neighbor n as deﬁned in Equation (80) if to for-
ward to this “cover node” or not. The mesh M ′a is constructed based
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upon local knowledge of all participants. Thus, if v selects at least one
neighbor, N−a (v) 
= ∅, and v can expect not to be in L(Ma) anymore.
n ∈ N(v) \N(+a (v) \N−a (v) (80)
PF can also be used for multi-hop PF such that PF nodes select addi-
tional PF nodes. This behavior is beneﬁcial in cases where less pure
forwarders than subscribers are present in the attribute overlay. This
behavior prevents malicious insider nodes, which is asked to become
a PF node, to distinguish if the requester is another PF node, sub-
scriber, or pure forwarder. Furthermore, PF can be combined with
other mechanisms, such as the previously introduced community op-
timization, and the shell game (SG) which will be introduced in the
following section.
summary In summary, cover messages via probabilistic forward-
ing (PF) protect leaf subscribers from the global attacker by increasing
the size of anonSetadv. However, this method depends on the num-
ber of cover messages and thus can result in high signaling overhead.
Furthermore, this method does change the inner structure of the over-
lay. The global attacker can therefore still infer information from this
structure.
To overcome these drawbacks, this thesis proposes the SG in the fol-
lowing section. The shell game is intended to be used in conjunction
with probabilistic forwarding (PF), i.e., with PF nodes, but can also
be used independently. In particular, the possibility to combine prob-
abilistic forwarding (PF) with other anonymity protection schemes
highlights the advantage of probabilistic forwarding (PF) compared
to other cover trafﬁc approaches.
4.8 overlay randomization in anonymous pub-sub
This section introduces an overlay randomization algorithm called
the shell game (SG). The SG restructures the overlay network without
exposing to the global observer threat how it is restructured. This is
an analogy to the real-world shell game where a conjurer hides a ball
under a shell. Then three shells swap their positions. The player wins,
if he picks the shell with the ball. However, conjurers cheat the game
by placing the ball under another shell, which is hard to observe by
the player.
This section is structured as follows: ﬁrst, the concept of the SG
is introduced. Second, the evaluation baseline as well as the formal
model for the SG are presented. Third, a formal model for the shell
game is introduced. Fourth, the challenge start / strop triggers for the
SG is discussed followed by the SG algorithm. Finally, implementation
challenges are discussed and a potential anonymity attack is outlined.
shell game concept During the content distribution, publish-
ers can send notiﬁcations with any message size and at any rate. Con-
sidering the global observer threat, such notiﬁcation ﬂows may be
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traceable from the source to the receivers, for instance by linking all
notiﬁcations of equal size. With such a ﬂow trace, it becomes evident
how the overlay was constructed—from the publisher via possible
pure forwarders to subscribers. The SG follows the goal to random-
ize the overlay topologies, and therefore the meaning of ﬂow traces
of notiﬁcations as well. This randomization must be performed af-
ter the attribute localization, but before a publisher sends the ﬁrst
notiﬁcation via the content distribution. Relying on the previously in-
troduced overlay optimization is consequently insufﬁcient. PF tackles
the same goal, but causes signaling overhead, and most importantly
does not randomize the “inner topology” of the overlay. With PF only
additional nodes are added.
With the SG, nodes swap overlay positions by exchanging neigh-
borhood sets. These exchange messages are hidden within heartbeat
messages (cf. Section 4.1) and thus prevent the attacker from observ-
ing position changes.
Every node starts the SG as soon as it has at least one overlay neigh-
bor. As the overlay Ma starts to form from subscribers towards pub-
lishers, Ma is shufﬂed before the ﬁrst notiﬁcation reaches subscribers.
Hence, the global attacker cannot observe Ma “before” the SG. The
subscriber anonymity set for the global attacker becomes the size of
the whole overlay: |anonSetadv(a)| = |Va|. Furthermore, the attacker
accuracy for classifying subscribers remains as low as random guess-
ing accuracy = |Sa|÷ |Va|.
evaluation baseline The effectiveness of the SG in protecting
subscriber anonymity depends on the attack approach as well as the
SG parametrization. The following approach serves as evaluation
baseline: the global observer GA attempts to separate subscribers
from pure forwarders. This attacker is capable of identifying the at-
tribute mesh Ma by observing the ﬂow of notiﬁcations. Furthermore,
the attacker has background knowledge about the number of sub-
scribers |Sa|. Given that knowledge, probability of any node v ∈ Va
being a subscriber is deﬁned as P(v ∈ Sa) = |Sa|÷ |Va|. If the attacker
cannot infer any information from the overlay topology, the chances
of the attacker in an optimal SG should not signiﬁcantly deviate from
P(v ∈ Va), a random pick.
formalization To perform a SG, any node v ∈ Va chooses a
neighbor w ∈ {N−a (v) ∪N+a (v)}, and sends a message to w asking to
swap positions in the overlay. As a result, w hands over {N−a (w) ∪
N+a (w)} to v, and notiﬁes these neighbors. Then v completes the SG
by handing over {N−a (v) ∪N+a (v)} to w and notiﬁes these neighbors
as well. Assuming that the basic overlay provides end-to-end connec-
tivity and contains non-subscribing forwarders, this algorithm may
result in the positioning of non-subscribers in leaf positions. An at-
tacker should therefore not be able to infer any information from the
fact that a node is in a leaf position.
The SG is illustrated in Figure 31. This example shows an overlay
with one publisher, four subscribers, and three forwarders (left). The
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SG is performed two times; the outcomes are shown at the center/-
right of Figure 31. The overlay changes in between subsequent SGs
are marked in gray; the node that executes the algorithm is dashed.
initial overlay
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Figure 31: Initial state and two steps of the shell game. The active node
is marked with a dashed outline, swapped nodes are marked in
gray.
In Figure 31, subscribers s4 initially joins the overlay, and its parent
node f runs the algorithm to swap with s4 as depicted in the center
(SG #1). After that, the nodes p and f3 obtain new neighbors and also
run the algorithm. In step 2, f3 swaps with child s3 while p does
not swap. Then, s4 detects another change, new neighbor s3, and
executes the SG algorithm.
After the start and the termination of the SG have been clariﬁed, the
paragraph Algorithm will explain the complete SG using pseudocode.
trigger for start and termination As each node executes
the SG independently, a condition is necessary to trigger the start of
a SG. Likewise a trigger is required to terminate further SGs. These
triggers should prevent unnecessary SG and thus prevent signaling
overhead. This thesis uses a subscribing neighbor as start trigger,
and exponential decay to slow down the rate of SGs.
Whenever a new subscribing neighbor connects to a node v, i.e.,
N−a (v) grows, v may initiate a SG. That is, whenever Sa grows by a
new subscriber, as well as whenever the neighborhood changes due
to SGs. Thus, the SG ripples through Ma permanently. This trigger al-
lows to perform a SG as soon as a neighbor is available. Furthermore,
it stimulates the SG when new neighbors become available, e.g., as a
result of SGs.
Whenever a new publishing neighbor connects, the very same ac-
tions are set in motion. By the procedure of the content distribution,
both, the new publisher and the node it connects with, take the role of
a subscriber. This ensures that all subscribers receive all notiﬁcations
from all publishers. Both nodes can therefore immediately attempt to
initiate a new SG.
To prevent unnecessary SG, every node that triggered itself for a
SG evaluates the exponential decay function (81), randomly draws a
number r from the uniform distribution [0, 1], and decides to play the
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SG if the result of the functions exceed the random number r. Other-
wise, the node waits. The function (81) takes the node’s overlay mem-
bership time t(v) as parameter. Hence, the probability of this node to
play the SG decreases over time. The system parameter λ controls how
fast function (81) converges towards 0 and thus the probability of SGs.
This approach causes nodes that recently joined the attribute overlay
to perform many SGs, i.e., “move quickly” through the overlay, and
then become less “lively”
Pswap(t) = e−λ∗t (81)
algorithm The pseudocode for the SG is given by Procedure shell-
Game.
Procedure shellGame(N+a (v), N−a (v), t(v))
1 Pswap ← e−λ∗t(v);
2 r ← randomUniform(0,1);
3 if r > Pswap then
4 tw ← randomExponential();
5 wait(tw);
6 shellGame(N+a (v), N−a (v), t(v)+tw);
7 return;
8 swapee ← pickUniform(N−a (v));
9 for n ∈ N−a (v) \ swapee do
10 message(n, new parent: swapee);
11 for n ∈ N+a (v) do
12 message(n, swap child: n by swapee);
13 N−a (v) ← message(swapee, new children: N−a (v) \ swapee);
14 return;
Each node vmaintains its own membership time time in the overlay
t(v) in addition to neighborhood sets. Upon invocation of this pro-
cedure, v rolls a dice with outcome r, compares r with equation (81)
and thus either continues with the SG for r  Pswap(t). Otherwise, the
node draws a waiting time tw uniformly at random and initiates the
SG afterwards again. Then v picks a swapee n from its subscribed
neighbors N−a (v) and notiﬁes the other neighbors about the swap.
That is, all subscribing neighbors, except the swapee, replace their
parent v with the swapee, all publishing neighbors replace child v
with the swapee, and v exchanges subscribing neighbors with the
swapee. Swapper and swapee act as proxies to establish the new con-
ﬁdential and authentic connections to their new overlay neighbors.
Thus, nodes must send control messages over authentic and conﬁ-
dential connections.
collisions & message padding Concurrent executing of sev-
eral SGs in the same overlay may affect intersecting sets of nodes and
could result in a partitioned overlay. The two-phase commit protocol
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[10, 64] resolves this issue by locking adjacent nodes before starting
the SG. Multiple SG initiators may attempt to lock the same swapee or
adjacent node simultaneously. To overcome this conﬂict, a node may
decline a lock. A timeout tw forces the initiator to always release a
lock.
The size of the messages exchanged during the SG may leak details
to the global observer. E.g., a large message could indicate the trans-
port of a neighbor list. To prevent such information leakage, every
SG message must be encrypted to ensure the conﬁdentiality of the SG.
Moreover, SG messages must be padded to a ﬁxed length; opposed to
for instance advertisements, SG messages contain neighborhood sets
of variable length. For this, the method of using heartbeat messages
has been introduced in the basic membership building block. The SG
now dominates the length requirement for these messages.
In detail, assuming 73 bytes size of an advertisement, the SG can
hand over (73− 20− 1)/4 = 13 IPv4 neighbors at once assuming 20
bytes for the hash chain element, 1 byte for the message type, and 4
bytes per IPv4 address. Thus, SG messages can be indeed embedded
the same way as messages for community management under the
assumption of a bounded neighborhood size. In dependence of the
basic membership, the boundary for the neighborhood is known up-
front. A message fragmentation is possible as well, but slows down
the SG given the ﬁxed message rate of heartbeats.
As mentioned in the motivation, the SG should be performed be-
fore the ﬁrst notiﬁcations are sent out. Likewise, the SG should be
performed after new nodes joined but before another notiﬁcation is
sent. Otherwise, the newly joined node(s) and their potential role(s)
would be leaked to the global observer threat. To overcome this is-
sue, publishers may indicate pauses in their last notiﬁcation, allowing
overlay nodes to perform SGs before the next notiﬁcation is sent.
4.8.1 Cornering nodes with the shell game
The SG also introduces an additional attack surface for malicious in-
siders. The IA could use the SG to corner a node in a leaf position,
then disconnect this node, and let the global observer monitor the fol-
lowing behavior of the disconnected node: a subscriber has an inter-
est in re-connecting to obtain notiﬁcations, a forwarder may remain
disconnected.
To perform this attack, the malicious insider ﬁrst has to “corner”
the target node, then disconnect it from the overlay. Figure 32 illus-
trates this approach. Figure 32a shows the initial setup. To analyze
s, the malicious insider IA ﬁrst has to get close to s. For that, IA
uses the SG. Figure 32b shows that IA has trapped s in a corner and
interrupts the overlay connection. Figure 32c shows now the GA just
need to observe the connection between f and s. If f starts to relay
notiﬁcations to s, it can be sure that s is a subscriber.
In summary, de-anonymizing subscribers with cornering and dis-
connecting them is a time consuming approach and might even be
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Figure 32: Corner attack: A changes into a position close to s, disconnects s,
and then observes s.
detected by genuine nodes. To overcome this attack, all nodes of an
attribute overlays should attempt to re-connect after connection fail-
ures, even forwarders. In any case, while this attack appears to be
a major threat to anonymity, a detailed analysis in the next chapter
indicates severe limitations for this attack.
summary The SG uses the basic overlay to create a shufﬂed un-
structured overlay. This works by successively switching the posi-
tions of two adjacent nodes. The algorithm does not require a priori
knowledge about publishers and subscribers. Compared to proba-
bilistic forwarding, this approach does not depend on additional for-
warders. Furthermore, the SG already randomizes the overlay during
its creation, making it harder to for GA to perform timing-based at-
tacks.
4.9 summary
This chapter introduced a novel anonymous Pub/Sub system called
AnonPubSub realized via P2P overlays. The system is structured ac-
cording to the building blocks introduced in the previous chapter.
Serveral contributions were made throughout these building blocks,
namely: anonymous distribution of attribute knowledge, anonymous
inter-overlay optimization, probabilistic forwarding, and the shell game.
key management The presented system uses ofﬂine TTPs for key
management. The TTPs are ofﬂine as they are only required initially
by participants to obtain key material. The ﬁrst TTP is the anonymiza-
tion TTP and authenticates participants. Participants then connect to
the second TTP to obtain attribute key material. With the keys, pub-
lishers can sign and encrypt messages: subscribers can decrypt mes-
sages, and all nodes can verify the authenticity / integrity of mes-
sages.
attribute localization For attribute localization, this thesis
proposed three variations: ﬂooding, forest ﬁre with random walks,
and double random walks. These three variations are suited to dis-
tribute attribute knowledge with variable node density. All three ap-
proaches use hash chains as a combination of transaction pseudonym
and distance metric. Nodes can distinguish multiple publishers for
the same attribute, and select the shortest path in case of duplicate
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messages. Furthermore, hash chains prevent malicious insiders from
lying to be closer to the publisher than their predecessors. A novel
TTL counter for forest ﬁre and random walks was introduced that
prevents long paths while also preventing anonymity attackers from
inferring the precise distance to the publisher or subscriber.
community management The presented attribute localization
mechanisms do not guarantee an equal distribution of load among
nodes. Furthermore, node churn may also cause unequal load dis-
tribution. To overcome this issue, a novel mechanism for anony-
mous inter-overlay optimization was presented for community man-
agement. The mechanism establishes random ad-hoc optimization
communities in greedy manner. The communities exchange load in-
formation via counting Bloom ﬁlters in such a way that attributes
cannot be linked to nodes. According to the load information, over-
loaded nodes hand over attributes to underloaded nodes in a privacy-
preserving manner.
content distribution For content distribution, two novel mech-
anisms to protect anonymity were presented. The ﬁrst mechanism,
probabilistic forwarding, is inspired by mimic trafﬁc and prevents
global observers from linking nodes and de-anonymizing subscribers.
The second mechanism, the shell game, shufﬂes attribute overlays
in such a way that the global observer cannot observe the shufﬂing.
The shell game only causes low signaling overhead and prevents the
global observer as well as the malicious insider from inferring infor-
mation from the overlay topology, e.g., to de-anonymize nodes.
In summary, AnonPubSub constructs and optimizes attribute over-
lays. Several constructions allow to minimize the signaling overhead
given a speciﬁc scenario. The inter-overlay optimization compensates
negative effects of node churn and distribute load equally. The over-
lay construction in combination with probabilistic forwarding and the
shell game ensures that the subscriber anonymity is protected against
the malicious insider threat as well as the global observer threat.
5
EVALUAT ION
This chapter evaluates AnonPubSub with respect to both, the anony-
mity requirements and the signaling overhead. The evaluation ex-
poses the system to the global observer threat GA and malicious in-
sider threat IA. For that, this chapters uses three types of evaluation:
ﬁrst, a qualitative discussion is performed in Section 5.2. Second, an
extensive quantitative simulation is performed with the OMNeT++
discrete event simulator in Section 5.3. Third, a prototype is pre-
sented as an empirical evaluation in Section 5.4.
Attack approaches used by global observers haven been studied
extensively [21, 44, 45, 151], while literature approaches that use ma-
licious insiders are more scarce (cf. Section 2.3.6.2, page 23). This
chapter therefore ﬁrst introduces a novel request / response-based
attack for malicious insiders in Section 5.1, which will be included in
the evaluation in the consecutive sections as well.
5.1 request / response-based internal attack
This thesis introduces a novel attack on anonymous communication
systems in Section 3.4.1, page 45. This attack uses timing information
as well as request / response protocol semantics found in (anony-
mous) P2P as well as Pub/Sub systems. This attack can be also applied
to AnonPubSub and should be therefore considered for this evalua-
tion. The following paragraphs explain how the attack can be per-
formed to break subscriber anonymity followed by an algorithmic
implementation of the attack as published in [38].
attack sketch for Pub/Sub The attack procedure assumes that
the attacker, the combination of GA and IA, has obtained background
knowledge of the network topology and the average delay δavg per
hop, and can exploit protocol features to perform a timing attack. For
that, the nodes v ∈ Ca then use a subset N(v) ′ ⊆ N(v) of their neigh-
borhood for this attack. For every neighbor in N(v) ′, the attacker
ﬁrst un-advertises the target attribute a and then sends a new adver-
tisement madv to a selected neighbor. The attacker waits for possible
responses in form of subscriptions. The received subscription mes-
sages msub are then used to calculate the distance to the subscriber.
Using this distance, the attacker is able to compute three subsets of
nodes:
1. First, the subset of nodes closer than the distance of the respond-
ing subscriber. These nodes are excludable since they can not
be subscribers.
2. Second, the set containing the nodes in the recognized distance.
These nodes have an equal probability of being subscribers.
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3. The third set computed by the attacker contains all nodes fur-
ther away than the recognized subscriber. As these nodes are
located “behind” subscribers, the attacker can not make any
strict assessments regarding their membership in Sa.
Using these information, the attacker updates its probability map
v in every step (cf. Section 3.4.1). This map associates every node
v with its probability of being a subscriber. The attacker considers
every node that exceeds the threshold as subscriber, i.e., vx ∈ S ′a :
vs[vx] > v0[vx]. The following paragraph elaborates on how this can
be realized algorithmically.
attack algorithm The Algorithm 7 formalizes the attack sketch.
In line 2, the attacker iterates over its neighbors to perform the at-
tack. More neighbors should result in higher attack chances. Like-
wise, with multiple malicious insiders, the pseudocode is executed
sequentially for each insider but with one shared probability distri-
bution. Line 3 dissolves the attribute overlay Ma in the neighbor-
hood of the attacker. In line 4 an advertisement is sent. If a response,
msub is received in line 6, the attacker estimates the distance [hops] to
the subscriber in line 7. The variables k and l in lines 8, 9 indicate
the number of potential nodes at or further than distance d. To es-
timate that, background knowledge of G from the global observer is
required. For every malicious insider, the attacker uses a tree view
upon G with the malicious insider (c) as root. This tree is constructed
via a pairwise shortest path search from c to every node G and the
hop count as distance metric.
Procedure attack(G, c)
1 // Initialization
2 foreach v ∈ N(c) do
3 send(munadv, c, v)
4 send(madv, c, v)
5 d ←∞
6 if response_received then
7 d ← δ(madv,msub)2·δavg
8 k ← candidatesAt(d)
9 l ← candidatesFurther(d)
10 foreach u ∈ branch(v) do
11 d ′ ← |path(c,u)|
12 if d ′ < d then
13 v[u] ← 0
14 else if d ′ = d then
15 v[u] ← λ · |S ′a|(k+l)
16 else if d ′ > d then
17 v[u] ← φ · |S ′a|(k+l)
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example Figure 33a provides an example with malicious node v0
in the center and all other nodes position by distance in concentric
circles. The network without attacker has |V | = 9 nodes and |Sa| = 2
subscribers.
1
2
3
v0v1v4
v2
v3
v5
v6
v7
v8
v9
2/92/9
2/9
2/9 2/9
2/9
2/9 2/9
2/9
(a) Initial probability distribution as-
suming |Sa| = 2 and |V | = 9.
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(b) First attack step via neighbor v1.
No response, hence probabilities be-
come 0.
Figure 33: Frist two attack steps.
The attacker ﬁrst sends m0adv via v0 to neighbor v1, but does not
receive any response (Algorithm 7, lines 1-4). Thus, the attacker sets
the values of v1 and v4 in v0 to zero (lines 11-12) and builds a more
precise probability distribution v1 as shown in Figure 33b, i.e., j = 2,
k = 0, l = 7. In the second step, the attacker sends m0adv from v0 to
neighbor v2 and observes δ(m0adv,m
0
sub) = 4× δavg (lines 4-5). Hence,
the closest subscriber must be two hops away and the attacker adjusts
v1 to v2 as shown in Figure 34a, i.e., j = 3, k = 2, l = 4.
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(a) Second attack step via neighbor v2.
Response from distance 2.
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(b) Third attack step via neighbor v3.
Response from distance 2. Node v7
as well as either v5 or v6 are sub-
scribers. Hence v8 and v9 are out.
Figure 34: Third and fourth attack step.
In this third and last step the attacker performs two operations:
ﬁrst, he sends m0unad to v2 as he received his m
0
adv via v3 again—hence
both nodes are connected and therefore v3 already knows the adver-
tised topic and would discard the new advertisement for this topic.
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Second, the attacker sends m0adv to neighbor v3 and again observes
δ(m0adv,m
0
sub) = 4× δavg. The only node within the range of 2 hops
must be v7 and is therefore a subscriber. Hence the attacker adjusts
the values of v3, v7, and v9 in v2 to 0 and 1, respectively, as shown in
Figure 34b, i.e., j = 3, k = 3, and l = 2.
In summary, this example illustrates an easy case for the attacker.
The attacker successfully breaks the anonymity of subscriber v7, rules
out many non-subscribers (TN!s (TN!s)), and suspects v5 with a high
probability—1/2 compared to the a priori guess of 2/9. The following
section will evaluate this attack as well as PF and SG in detail via
simulation.
5.2 qualitative properties
This section discusses if and how AnonPubSub fulﬁlls the Pub/Sub
security requirements as introduced in Section 2.1.2 (page 11) and
the anonymity requirements as speciﬁed in Section 3.2, page 39.
confidentiality AnonPubSub provides notiﬁcation conﬁdential-
ity and subscription conﬁdentiality as those messages only contain en-
crypted and pseudonymous information. The function to derive at-
tribute pseudonyms also depends upon knowledge of a secret key.
The pseudonyms contained in advertisements and subscriptions there-
fore do not reveal the attribute to the GA and forwarders. The se-
cret key is shared among publishers and subscribers related to an
attribute. Furthermore, the TTP has access to this key. The security of
the key therefore depends upon the safekeeping of these participants.
integrity The system enforces integrity and authenticity via sig-
natures of advertisement and notiﬁcation messages to prevent lo-
cal attackers from spamming attributes and notiﬁcations. Subscrip-
tions however do not require authenticity as they do not threaten
scalability—duplicates subscriptions can be dropped immediately.
availability (resilience) AnonPubSub can detect node fail-
ure via heartbeats and recover via the repair mechanism introduced
as part of community management. The next section will analyze
the effect of churn in detail. In any case, the system only maintains
only one connection towards publishers each, i.e., it does not provide
redundancy.
authentication Authentication applies to sender authenticity
in order to obtain key material as well as to message authenticity.
Nodes initially connect with the anonymization TTP. The TTP can
enforce authentication before establishing a connection to the creden-
tial TTP. Message authentication is provided for advertisements and
notiﬁcations. Every forwarder can verify the authenticity of such a
message, but cannot identify a particular publisher. Malicious insid-
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ers without key material therefore cannot create false advertisements
and overload the system (processing overhead and storage overhead).
accountability Accountability of participants to particular mes-
sages is not considered here in favour of anonymity. That means,
messages cannot be linked with individual nodes.
anonymity AnonPubSub ensures subscriber anonymity against
the non-colluding IA with anonymity sets anonSetadv  |N−a (v)| + 1.
For publisher anonymity, the malicious insider possesses key mate-
rial and imposes a subscriber. The attacker constructs a tree in G,
rooted by himself, which contains the shortest paths to all nodes. The
attacker then removes branches from which he does not receive adver-
tisements on the shortest path. Thus, the remaining branches contain
at least one publisher each, and the size of each branch forms the
anonymity set anonSetadv for the contained publisher. The publisher
can estimate anonSetadv to be at least of size |N+a (v)|+ 1—his predeces-
sors in the mesh plus himself.
Likewise for subscriber anonymity, the malicious insider imposes
a publisher. The attacker constructs a shortest path tree in G as well,
advertises an attribute, and then removes all branches that do not
respond with a subscription. Subscribers can estimate their minimal
anonymity sets with |N−a (v)|+ 1.
PF and the SG extend this anonymity protection to the GA as well.
Both mechanisms obfuscate attribute overlay in such a way that attack
schemes performed by the GA become ineffective. In combination,
the anonymity is protected against the combination of IA and GA.
The next sections elaborates on this attacker models in detail with the
help of a quantitative evaluation.
The six building blocks are speciﬁcally designed to minimize the
surface for anonymity attacks. Attribute localization omits global
node IDs and therefore maximizes anonymity sets. Attribute localiza-
tion only depends on pseudonyms and the direct neighborhood of
a node to prevent the exposure of participants. Likewise, the mech-
anisms presented for community management also only depend on
the local neighborhood and pseudonyms as well as probabilistic data
structures. That limits the information an IA can obtain and also
suppressed accurate reasoning over the few obtained information.
The content distribution is limited to the same data structures and
information as attribute localization. Moreover, the overlay obfusca-
tion achieved by the community management prevents the GA from
anonymizing subscribers, independent of message rate and delays.
The key management introduces an anonymization step to prevent
the association of key and therefore attribute with participants, event
against a malicious TTP.
In summary, AnonPubSub protects publisher anonymity against
the IA and publisher as well as subscriber anonymity against the GO
as well. AnonPubSub protects anonymity against IA for an anonymity
set size k that can be estimated by the number of neighbors by each
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node v: k  |N−a (v)|+ 1. The next section analyzes the attacker GA
and IA via simulation and determines parameters for PF and the SG.
scalability and low overhead In terms of memory over-
head, AnonPubSub scales proportionally with the number of attributes
and neighbors. In terms of communication overhead, advertisements
cause the most signaling costs by ﬂooding the basic overlay per at-
tribute. The signaling costs for subscriptions and notiﬁcations are
bounded by diameter(G)× |Sa| where diameter(G) denoted the diame-
ter of the basic overlay. The distribution of attribute knowledge via
random walks and forest ﬁre further reduce the signaling overhead.
PF and the SG cause additional signaling costs. Each shell game
between two nodes v1, v2 requires the amount of messages indicated
in equation (82) including the two-phase-commit protocol. This equa-
tion contains the messages both swapping nodes have to exchange
with their respective overlay predecessors and successors.
The overlay diameter reaches its maximum with |N+a (vx)| ≈ 1.
The total message overhead can be therefore approximated with 3×
|N−a (v1)|+ |N
−
a (v2)|+ 4 messages for this case. The actual signaling
costs of the SG as well as PF highly depend on the basic overlay topol-
ogy and have to be analyzed further via simulation in Section 5.3.
msgs = 3× |N+a (v1)|+ |N+a (v2)|+ 3× |N−a (v1)|+ |N−a (v2)| (82)
5.3 quantitative simulation
This section analyzes AnonPubSub in detail via a realistic network-
based simulation using IPv4 and UDP. For that, AnonPubSub is
implemented as application using UDP sockets, which requires the
application for instance to comply with the UDP maximum transmis-
sion unit. This quantitative simulation will provide insights into the
parametrization of AnonPubSub, PF, as well as the SG. Furthermore,
the inﬂuence of the basic overlay, e.g., network topologies, and par-
ticipant distributions are investigated. Most signiﬁcantly, anonymity
attacks have been implemented into a this framework and allow ana-
lyzing attacks given varying attacker capabilities.
This section is structured as follows: ﬁrst, an overview of the sim-
ulation model is provided. Second, the evaluation metrics for this
model are discussed. Next, AnonPubSub is analyzes with this model
starting with the basic membership.
5.3.1 Simulation
The simulation for AnonPubSub is based on the OMNeT++ [115] dis-
crete event simulator in combination with the INET1 framework as
introduced in Section 2.5.2, page 30. INET provides the means to
simulate the IPv4 stack including associated protocols such as DHCP,
1 http://inet.omnetpp.org
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as well as datalink layer protocols such as Ethernet and PPP. The
simulation uses one central router to provide routing in between all
nodes. This topology denotes a worst case scenario for anonymity as
the GA can establish the communication relation between all nodes
by observing this one router. Every node is connected via an individ-
ual link, each having its own data rate and transmission delay. The
internal structure of the nodes is shown in Figure 35. Every node is
connected via network interfaces to the Internet, having the ISO/OSI
layer 3 depicted in the center, and layer 4 implementations like UDP
on top. AnonPubSub has been implemented as a UDP application and
is anchored at the position of the red marking in Figure 35.
Figure 35: StandardHost structure in the INET framework representing a
node v ∈ V .
The selection of UDP allows AnonPubSub to control packet frag-
mentation internally in order to prevent the unintentional emission
of packets such as acknowledgements and fragmented packets to the
GA. The internal structure of AnonPubSub is depicted in Figure 36.
The highlighted red connection links to the node just introduced. The
central module realizes the forwarder role, the top module the pub-
lisher role, and the bottom module the subscriber role. The optional
attacker module to the right represents the malicious insider. Various
other components such as the GA have been implemented as well.
5.3.2 Setup
Every node is equipped with an initial neighborhood for basic mem-
bership. This initial neighborhood is assigned from a randomly gen-
erated topology that follows a given structure. This evaluation uses
small-world networks generated according to the Watts-Strogatz model
[165], scale-free networks generated according to the power law out
degree algorithm [108] with recommended parameters α = −0.08 and
β = 4.5, as well as random graphs. The Watts-Strogatz model reﬂects
a social graph as it would be used by darknets [24]. The scale-free
models reﬂects OSNs with few highly connected and many minimal
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Figure 36: Overview of the AnonPubSub implementation in OMNeT++ as
UDP application.
connected nodes. The random graph models an ideal basis for an
anonymization systems and is also reﬂected by P2P systems such as
SCAMP aiming to maintain a constant neighborhood size. The result-
ing basic overlays have an average diameter of 5 − 6. This follows
the best practise established by Tor [44], i.e., a sender, a receiver, and
3 guard nodes. For instance for the scale-free model with |N| = 500
nodes, this results in an average node degree of |N(v)| ≈ 6.875. Table 7
summarizes the parameters of the simulation model. The parameter
μ models the probability of each node for probabilistic forwarding.
The parameter λ controls the exponential decay of the shell game.
The parameter Ca ⊆ V denotes the set of malicious insiders. The
parameter δ with a default setting of δ = U(1ms, 20ms) describes the
delay distribution of edges in the basic overlay. Here, U(1ms, 20ms)
represents the uniform distribution within the interval [1ms, 20ms].
With this distribution, the slowest connection is by a magnitude of 20
slower than the fastest one.
According to the description of AnonPubSub in the previous chap-
ter, the system is simulated with three setups: base line (BL) for the
baseline system. PF for probabilistic forwarding, and SG for the shell
game.
5.3.3 Evaluation metrics
The following metrics (Table 8) measure the outcome of the experi-
ments: the number of overlay nodes in comparison to all basic mem-
bership management nodes, the total signaling costs in messages, the
total number of performed swaps (position changes due to the SG),
the ratio of leaf subscribers among all leaf nodes within the overlay,
and the global attackers accuracy for classifying subscribers, the at-
tacker’s information gain, and the inter-node distance.
The size of the attribute mesh |Va|, and the accuracy of the adver-
saries’ subscriber classiﬁcation, which is the ratio of correctly classi-
ﬁed nodes among the total number of overlay nodes. Lower accu-
racy therefore means better anonymity. The entropy / information
gain (cf. Section 2.2.3, page 18) describes the attacker’s success in
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parameter explanation
|V| = [100, 1000] size of the basic overlay
|Sa|/|V| ∈ (0, 1) ratio of subscribers among |V |
|Sa|/|Va| ∈ (0, 1] ratio of subscribers among |Va|
|Pa| = 1 number of publishers per attribute
|A| = 1 number of attributes in the system
publications ∈ N number of publications from publisher
|N(v)| ∈ [2, 16] node degree in the basic overlay
ϕ ∈ [0, 0.2] ratio of node churn
μ ∈ [0, 1] forwarding probability (PF)
λ ∈ [0, 1] decay parameter (SG)
|Ca| = [0, 5] set of malicious insiders
δ = U(1ms, 20ms) connection delay distribution
runs = [25, 300] repetitions per setup
Table 7: Simulation parameters
metric explanation
|Va| ∈ [1, |V |] size of the attribute mesh
costs ∈ N signaling costs in#messages
swaps ∈ N no. of swaps performed
|Sa ∩ L(Ma)|/|L(Ma)| ∈ [0, 1] ratio of leaf subscribers in Ma
accuracy ∈ [0, 1] subscriber classiﬁcation accuracy
g ∈ [0, 1] information gain
Table 8: Simulation metrics
breaking anonymity incrementally over time. The information gain is
calculated as entropy delta between an attack step and the initial a
priori entropy. The gain represents the overall success of the attack.
The next paragraph describes the information gain in detail.
The arising signaling overhead, e.g., with PF, is measured via costs
and describes the total number of messages sent. The ratio of leaf sub-
scribers among the total number of overlay leaf nodes tells whether
the overlay topology exposes information to GA, i.e., a higher ratio of
leaf subscribers than overlay subscribers, or not. The number of pub-
lished messages is collected as a time and overlay invariant measure
of the system age.
information gain The attacker gains information in de-anony-
mizing members of the set Sa during his attack against subscriber
anonymity. To asses the effectiveness of the attack manyfold metrics
can be used (cf. Section 2.2.3, page 18). This evaluated is based upon
sizes and information gain, a metric derived from entropy. These met-
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rics are explained in the following with respect to the system model
at hand.
The set size is the ﬁrst metric. For that, the relation of the estimated
size of the subscriber set |S ′a| and the real size |Sa| has to be calculated.
The ratio |S ′a|/|Sa| represents a metric similar to the k-anonymity [150].
The attacker attempts to reduce the candidate set S ′a towards the real
subscriber set Sa. Obviously, A can exclude Ca, so S ′a is initialized
with Va \ Ca. A high value shows the inefﬁciency of the attack, the
members of Sa are hidden in a large anonymity set, the overlay.
As the ﬁrst metric is coarse and does not allow a detailed statement
about the membership to Sa per node in the overlay, a probability
distribution to describe the information gain of the attacker in more
detail has to be constructed. The probability distribution contains the
probability of each node in Va being part of Sa from the perspective
of the attacker. The probability of a single node v ∈ Va of being part
of Sa is described as follows: The probability is 0 if v ∈ Ca, as the
node obviously can be excluded since it is controlled by the attacker
itself, if v /∈ Ca, the probability is the |Sa| divided by the number of re-
maining candidates |Va|− |Ca|. This is the a priori assumption of the
attacker. Using this probability, the sum of all probabilities is equal to
the number of subscribers. To build the probability distribution, the
probability of each node by dividing it by |Sa| is normalized. For each
node in Va, except the adverse ones Ca, the same initial probability
is used to compose a vector v holding the probability for every node
of being a subscriber to a as given in Equation (83).
∀v ∈ Va : v[v] =
{
0 if v ∈ Ca
|Sa|
(|Va|−|Ca|)∗|Sa| else
(83)
∑
vi∈Va
v[vi] = 1 (84)
Constraint (84) ensures that the probabilities remain valid. The
attacker adjusts the map vs in every attack step s. The entropy Hs
is calculated to quantify the information gain gs of the attacker in
every attack step. Equation (86) deﬁnes the entropy based upon the
difference between the initial and the current probability per node
(Equation (85)). The information gain gs is deﬁned as difference of
the entropy of the preceding attack step s− 1 and the entropy of the
current attack step s, shown in Equation (87).
pdiff(vi, s) = 1− |v0[vi] − vs[vi]| (85)
Hs = −
∑
vi∈|Va|
pdiff(vi, s) ∗ log2(pdiff(vi, s)) (86)
gs = Hs−1 −Hs (87)
Hence, an attacker attempts to minimize H by maximizing gs in
each step, which can be accomplished by eliminating nodes from vs
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(setting their probability value to 0). The elimination of nodes is pos-
sible if the attacker can estimate the position of subscribers in the
overlay Ma and therefore exclude nodes from begin members of Sa.
5.3.4 Basic overlay properties and attack accuracy
This section analyzes the inﬂuence of the basic overlay, the overlay
constructed by the basic membership building blocks. In particular,
this section addresses the following research questions:
1. Does the neighborhood of the basic overlay inﬂuence the ano-
nymity, considering the global observer threat?
2. What is the inﬂuence of the number of subscribers per attribute
on the anonymity?
To analyze the inﬂuence of the node degree on the attackers sub-
scriber classiﬁcation accuracy, the node degree of the basic overlay is
varied and simulated each with BL, PF, and SG.
The subscriber ratio |Sa|/|V|= 0.1 is ﬁxed, and the average node
degree is varied with |N(v)| ∈ [2, 16]. For PF, the forwarding proba-
bility is set to μ = 0.7. For SG, the decay factor is set to λ = 0 (no
decay). All metrics are measured after 500 swaps. A preliminary
simulation study indicates that this subscriber ratio creates overlay
networks that span across the whole diameter of the basic overlay.
Furthermore, μ = 0.7 appears to balance anonymity and signaling
overhead.
For BL, the classiﬁcation accuracy is expected to increase with node
degree. A higher degree leads to a lower diameter of G and there-
fore shorter paths in the attribute mesh, containing less forwarders.
For PF, an overall lower accuracy is expected. Probabilistic forward-
ing should beneﬁt from more neighbors and therefore result in lower
classiﬁcation accuracy with higher node degree.
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Figure 37: Evaluation of the anonymity attack accuracy.
Figure 37a shows the accuracy for the three experiments. The at-
tacker accurately picks subscriber in AnonPubSub without protective
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measures (BL). The attacker achieves a mean accuracy of 0.927 with
a node degree of 2, and reaches 0.988 with a node degree of 16 (BL).
Thus, BL is vulnerable against the global attacker. PF does not only
compensate higher node degree, but also beneﬁt from the number of
available neighbors. Therefore, PF can improve anonymity by lower-
ing the attack accuracy (0.787 for a node degree of 16). SG provides
the best anonymity protection in the scenario (0.29 for a node degree
of 2), but the protection degrades with higher node degree due to
the lack of forwarder in the attribute mesh (0.536 for a node degree
of 16). As reference, |Sa|/|Va|= 0.299 determines the chances of ran-
domly picking subscribers from overlay nodes.
The ratio |Sa|/|V | inﬂuences the size of the overlay as well as the
ratio of subscribers to forwarders in the attribute mesh. A varying
subscriber ratio |Sa|/|V | is used to evaluate its inﬂuence on the accu-
racy of the GA when PF or the SG are applied.
The same parameters as in the experiment before are used, but
with a larger average neighborhood of |N(v)| = 4. The simulation is
performed with |Sa|/|V | ∈ [0.1, 0.9] and the classiﬁcation accuracy of
the GA is measured each after 500 swaps.
With increasing |Sa|/|V|, more subscribers are expected to take the
forwarder role as well. Hence, the classiﬁcation accuracy for PF should
drop. However, for very high ratio, the availability of nodes not part
of the attribute mesh shrinks, and thus PF should not be able to con-
ceal subscribers any more. For SG, low ratios should lead to the low-
est attack accuracy as many forwarders in the overlay can be used to
swap.
Figure 37b shows the attack accuracy with both variations. The
accuracy for PF reaches its lowest point with |Sa|/|V | = 0.65. Here,
μ = 0.7 leads to the best mixture of subscribers and publishers within
the overlay. Higher ratios lead to higher attack accuracy again, as
expected. SG beneﬁts most from low ratios of subscribers as this leads
to the lowest attack accuracy.
In summary, while it appears the PF delivers better anonymity pro-
tection than the SG for high subscriber ratios such as |Sa|/|V | = 0.65,
it has to be noted that such a scenario is hard to achieve. This sce-
nario would indicate that the majority of the participants using the
system are interested in one particular attribute. In this case, the fact
that a participant is using the system is statistically already sufﬁcient
for de-anonymization. In comparison, the SG performs very for low
subscriber ratios.
summary To summarize the research questions, the neighborhood
does indeed inﬂuence the anonymity. A bigger neighborhood neg-
atively inﬂuences the anonymity for the SG, whereas the anonymity
for PF improves. Regarding the number of subscribers, the anonymity
with PF improves with the subscriber ratio, but only up to a turning
point of about 67% subscribers. The anonymity with the SG degrades
with increasing subscriber ratio.
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5.3.5 Forwarding probability and attack accuracy
This section analyzes the mechanism PF with the following research
questions:
1. How does the forwarding probability μ of PF inﬂuence the anonymity?
2. What is the inﬂuence of PF on the signaling overhead?
The forwarding probability of μ = 0.7 has been used in the previ-
ous experiment to analyze the impact of the basic membership man-
agement. This experiment analyzes the inﬂuence of μ on the attack
accuracy and the signaling costs to identify good values of μ.
Compared to the previous experiment, the subscriber ratio is ﬁxed
|Sa|/|V | = 0.1 and PF is simulated with μ ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. Throughout the
experiment, the attack accuracy, the induced signaling costs of cover
messages, and complete overlay size are measured to determine if PF
exhaust available nodes.
The attack accuracy should decrease proportionally with increas-
ing μ as this corresponds to a ratio of μ leaf nodes covering them-
selves with PF. Likewise, the costs due to signaling overhead should
increase.
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Figure 38: Inﬂuence of PF on the anonymity attack by the GA.
Figure 38a shows the decreasing attack accuracy over increasing
μ. With only one publication from the publisher, the accuracy drops
proportionally as expected. However, with 20 publications (blue tri-
angles), altering neighbor selection during PF, e.g., due to node churn
in the basic membership management, neglect the beneﬁts of PF.
In order to explain this effect, another simulation with μ = 0.7
and |Sa|/|V | = 0.3 is performed. Figure 38b shows an increase in
attack accuracy with every publication. Thus, nodes of the attribute
mesh should ensure that an attacker cannot intersect candidate sets
over time (here publications), e.g., by selecting the same neighbor if
possible or even leaving the attribute mesh.
Figure 39a shows the signaling costs in our system. With one pub-
lication, the number of cover messages seems to increase proportion-
ally as expected. However, with 20 publications, the cover messages
increase polynomially. A leaf subscriber, in a basic overlay network
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with node degree 4, may forward probabilistically to up to 3 neigh-
bors, e.g., to replicate and maintain topological properties of the at-
tribute, instead of only one. In any case, the anonymity optimum
of accuracy = 0.5 is not being reached, and neither reach worst case
costs of (|V |− 21) = 479 for one publication with 21 subscribers, and
479 ∗ 20 = 9580 for 20 publications via broadcast each.
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Figure 39: Overhead caused by PF.
Figure 39b explains this increase in signaling costs with respect to
the overlay size. That is forwarders, subscribers, and cover nodes.
Compared to BL (μ = 0) with an attribute mesh of 141 nodes, PF with
μ = 0.6 doubles the overlay size (282 nodes).
In summary, μ should be chosen large to protect the anonymity.
The only exception applies to attribute overlays that are short living,
i.e., are used to exchange one or very few notiﬁcations.
summary To summarize the research questions, the anonymity
improves proportionally with the forwarding probability μ. The over-
lay size and the signaling overhead however also increases with μ.
These metrics even double between μ = 0.4 and μ = 0.8.
5.3.6 Shell game parameter and attack accuracy
This section analyzes the SG with the following research questions:
1. How many SGs are necessary to hide leaf subscribers?
2. Which assignment of the exponential decay parameter λ for the
SG ensures that leaf subscribers are hidden while maintaining a
low signaling overhead?
The exponential decay function (cf. Section 4.8) controls the be-
havior of SG. Good values for the function parameter λ have to be
discovered in order to protect subscriber anonymity against the at-
tacker on one hand and to minimize the signaling overhead induced
by the shell game on the other hand. The SG is simulated with vary-
ing λ, and the ratio of leaf subscribers among leaf nodes over time is
measured as indicator for the protection of anonymity. Furthermore,
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the global number of swaps is measured as indicator of the signal-
ing overhead. The time indicates how quickly anonymity is achieved.
The parameter is simulated within the interval λ ∈ [0, 0.05]. To pre-
vent colliding swaps of adjacent nodes as well to reduce signaling
costs, every node waits for a random time interval after each shell
game. This time interval is drawn from the exponential distribution
with mean 5s, i.e., the mean is greater than the inter heartbeat time
of 1s.
To achieve a position mixture of forwarders and subscribers in the
overlay, nodes are expected to be able to swap once across the diam-
eter of the overlay. In case of a single publisher, this is the height of
a tree. With basic overlay of 500 nodes and |N(v)| = 4, the overlay
tree height is estimated to be within log4(500) = 4.48. In terms of
total number of swaps, 141 × 4.48 = 587 (141 overlay nodes taken
from experiment PF) swaps can be assumed to be sufﬁcient to shufﬂe
the whole overlay. As nodes play the SG independently, the duration
until this state is reached can be estimated as 4.48× 5s = 22.4s.
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Figure 40: Convergence of the SG (1).
Figure 40a shows the average convergence of the leaf subscriber
ratio towards the overlay subscriber ratio over the total number of
swaps with λ = 0. The ratio converges indeed around 587 swaps.
However, AnonPubSub with the SG seems to reach the optimal ra-
tio before this convergence. This occurs as subscribers already play
the shell game before the attribute mesh is connected. However, sub-
scribers are likely to swap into leaf position as the diameter of overlay
sections is low in this stage. Hence, the ratio of leaf subscriber ﬂuctu-
ates before reaching convergence.
Figure 40b shows the convergence for λ ∈ {0.03, 0.04, 0.05} over time.
The ratio of leaf subscribers (|Sa ∩ L(Ma)|/|L(Ma)|) reaches the target
ratio before the expected 22.4s, as for the number of swaps. However,
the ratio of leaf subscribers converges slower to the optimal ratio than
expected. This is due to collisions of swaps played by adjacent nodes,
which causes delay for some swaps. Hence, it takes slightly longer
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than 22.4s to swap 587 times (≈ 4.22 swaps initiated by every mesh
node).
Higher values of λ, e.g. 0.05 (purple crosses in Figure 40b) scatter
over time. This happens as the systems decay function lowers the
number of swaps per second. The average ratio depends on fewer
measurements. A value of λ = 0.05 starts to scatter once anonymity
optimal accuracy is reached, λ = 0.04 scatters later, i.e., unnecessary
swaps later. As a conclusion, λ = 0.05 seems to be a good value
for low signaling overhead, whereas λ = 0.04 is a more conservative
estimation.
Figure 41a illustrates why the decay function depends on each
nodes attribute mesh membership time rather than the played swaps.
By eliminating the inﬂuence of the decay function with λ = 0, SG
works as expected (bottom plot). However, for a very high value of
λ = 0.5 |Sa ∩ L(Ma)|/|L(Ma)| it converges away from optimum (top
plot). The same effect occurs for smaller values as used in Figure 41a.
While the overlay is not connected, nodes close the leaf positions cool
down early, thus leaving many subscribers back in leaf position.
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Figure 41: Convergence of the SG (2).
Figure 41b illustrates the high sensitivity of SG against the sub-
scriber ratio (cf. Figure 37b). In particular, a massive increase in the
number of swaps by lowering λ (compare 300 swaps with 700 swaps)
cannot sufﬁciently compensate. The SG therefore has to be combined
with probabilistic forwarding for higher subscriber ratios.
In summary, λ must be chosen very small to allow for sufﬁcient
node swaps. With the parameter selection at hand, a selection of
λ  0.05 works well. Higher heartbeat rates may allow for a higher
λ. It is important to note that a high λ may cause nodes to swap
back into their original position. This behaviour causes the SG to
be counter-productive: message overhead occurs while no additional
anonymity protection is achieved.
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summary To summarize the research questions, every node needs
to initiate about as many SGs as the height of a distribution tree (pick-
ing a single publisher as root) within the overlay—about 4 − 5 SGs.
Still, nodes participate in more SGs, but not as initiator. For the basic
overlay setup uses here, a decay with λ = 0.04 seems to be ideal to let
every node initiate the SG about 5 times before becoming less active.
5.3.7 Probabilistic forwarding & shell game
While SG provides good protection against the global attacker for low
ratios of subscribers, high ratios of overlay subscribers require prob-
abilistic forwarding in addition. For instance, if the |S|/|V | exceeds
0.25, 0.514 of all overlay nodes are subscribers (cf. Figure 41b). PF
can be used to increase the ratio of overlay forwarders. The results
in Figure 39b give an indicator how to adjust μ to lower the ratio of
overlay subscribers below 0.5.
However, probabilistically selected neighbors have to act oppor-
tunistically as the may have no initial successors. Furthermore, as
the total number of subscribers in the system is unknown to nodes in
AnonPubSub due to anonymity protection, good parameterizations
of the probability μ can only be estimated.
5.3.8 Request / response-based internal attacks
This section analyzes the inﬂuence of the malicious insiders capa-
bilities with the introduced request/response-based attack. Certain
parameters such as the topology of the basic overlay are expected to
inﬂuence this attack. This section therefore addresses the following
research questions:
1. What is the inﬂuence of the connection delay of the basic over-
lay on the attackers ability to determine the distance to the sub-
scriber?
2. How much does the connectivity of malicious nodes Ca, i.e., the
number of neighbors, inﬂuence the information gain?
3. Does the distance between colluding nodes Ca inﬂuence the
information gain?
4. How much do additional controlled nodes, i.e., more collusion,
improve the information gain?
To answer these questions, a setup is described hereafter that as-
sumes that no prior attribute overlay Ma exists as malicious nodes in
Ca may spoof messages to disassemble the overlay before each attack
step. The attacker is a combination of global observer and (colluding)
malicious insiders as introduced in Section 3.3, page 41. This attacker
knows the topology of the basic overlay G as well as the subscriber
ratio |Sa|/|V|. This attacker model is strong in comparison to related
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parameter explanation
|V| = 200 size of the basic overlay
|Sa|/|V| = 0.1 ratio of subscribers
|Ca| = 1 number of colluding malicious nodes
|Ca|/|V| = 0.001 ratio adverse to genuine nodes
|N(v) ′| ∈ [1, 5] neighbors used by attacker
runs = 25 repetitions per setup
Table 9: Default parameter settings for internal attacks.
anonymization services, which only use one of the stated capabili-
ties. Given an attribute a the attacker tries to establish a set S ′a as an
approximation of the real subscriber set Sa.
Speciﬁc settings and setting boundaries for these experiments are
given by Table 9. All other settings remain as in Table 7. The follow-
ing paragraph address the four research questions each.
end-to-end delay To analyze the inﬂuence of connection delay
between nodes on the correct estimation of the subscriber distance,
the delay distribution as well as subscriber and attacker positions
are varied. A single malicious insider determines the distance to the
closest subscriber via each neighbor from Na(v). The settings are
given by Table 9, with varying δ of uniform U(left, right) and normal
N(mean, variance) distributions.
For this experiment, 200 repetitions per distribution with random
placements each are used. Then the attacker’s distance estimation
|path(v0, v ′s)|, with the IA as v0 and estimated subscriber v ′s, is com-
pared with the real distance |path(v0, vs)|. The attacker uses the Re-
quest Round-Trip approach to approximate δavg.
The static delay serves as reference and a linear increase of the
hop error rate for the normal distribution is expected as the average
accumulated variance should not exceed one edge delay for several
hops. Compared, the uniform distributions should quickly approach
the error rate of a random guess.
Figure 42a shows the error rates in dependence of the distance
|path(v0, vs)| in between v0 and vs for the ﬁve delay distributions.
As expected, the attacker well compensates normal distributed delay
across the average basic overlay diameter of ≈ 6 hops. The uniformly
distributed delay already produces high error rates from the second
hop onwards.
Concluding, delays from a narrow normal distribution, e.g., within
a LAN, have only minor impact on the correct hop-count estimation.
However, delays from a uniform distribution effectively prevent the
attack. A uniform delay with a parameter range that covers the diam-
eter of the basic overlay renders the attack infeasible.
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Figure 42: Inﬂuence of the basic overlay on the IA.
attacker connectivity To analyze the inﬂuence of the attacker’s
node degree on the information gain,the number of neighbors the at-
tacker uses is varied. The settings are as given in Table 9, with the
ratio of subscribers |Sa|/|V| ∈ (0, 0.5), and the attacker successively
uses |N(v0) ′| ∈ [1, 5] of his available |N(v0)| neighbors.
Increasing N(v) ′ is expected to cause a linear increase in informa-
tion gain as the attacker can exploit more attack paths in case no close
cycles exist.
Figure 42b shows the information gain per subscriber over the sub-
scriber ratio for the different number of used neighbors. For an in-
creasing subscriber ratio, the attacker gains slightly less as more sub-
scribers on the same path mask each other. However, a second neigh-
bor almost doubles the information gain.
Concluding, the attacker’s additional advantage of good connec-
tivity becomes smaller with every neighbor. Furthermore, large sub-
scriber ratios render the attack harder.
distance between colluding nodes Two malicious nodes
|Ca| = 2 are used to evaluate the inﬂuence of the hop distance be-
tween attackers. Both malicious insiders are randomly placed and
the results grouped by their distance. The information gain is mea-
sured as the combined result of both attackers.
The settings are as given in Table 9, simulated with a low and high
subscriber ratio |Sa|/|V| = {0.05, 0.15}. The experiment is repeated 300
times to obtain sufﬁcient samples for every attacker distance. Two
random nodes are select vx, vy as adverse ones each. The results
are grouped by the shortest path length |path(vx, vy)| between the
attackers. The information gain is used as metric.
First, a large subscriber ratio should yield to a lower information
gain per subscriber as shown by the previous experiment. Second,
a longer path between the attacking nodes should increase the infor-
mation gain: given two attacking nodes vx, vy and a subscriber vs, a
longer path |path(vx, vy)| should increase the probability of pairwise
distinct nodes in path(vx, vs) and path(vy, vs). Hence, the attacker gets
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more distance measurements to the subscriber and can rule out more
forwarders.
Figure 43a shows the average information gain per subscriber over
the distance between attacking nodes. An increasing distance be-
tween controlled nodes shows no signiﬁcant improvement of the in-
formation gain. It appears that the attackers improve on distant sub-
scribers, but loose on very close subscribers.
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
1 2 3 4 5
Attackerdistance[hops]
g
|Sa|/|V | = 0.05
|Sa|/|V | = 0.15
(a) Information gain over the distances
of attacker vx, vy for |Sa|/|V| =
{0.05, 0.15}.
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
|Sa|/|V |
g
|Ca| = 1
|Ca| = 2
|Ca| = 3
|Ca| = 4
(b) Information gain of a colluding at-
tacker over subscriber ratio. The addi-
tional gain drops with each additional
node.
Figure 43: Anonymity attacks by the IA with collusion.
Concluding, the distance between colluding nodes, and thus the
placement of the attacker’s nodes, has only minor impact on the at-
tack outcome. Additional simulations conducted by us with higher
graph diameters indicate a slight decrease of the gain for large dis-
tances.
collusion of malicious nodes Having analyzes the connec-
tivity and distance of colluding attackers, the amount of colluding
attackers is of relevance. For that, the number of colluding nodes is in-
cremented successfully and each simulated with multiple subscriber
ratios. The settings as given in Table 9 are used with subscriber ra-
tios |Sa|/|V| ∈ (0.0, 0.5). The number of malicious nodes is varied as
|Ca| ∈ [1, 4].
More colluding attackers should obviously lead to higher informa-
tion gain, similar to higher attacker connectivity: additional nodes
should improve the information gain as the delay approximation be-
comes more accurate and as the attacker can identify more close by
subscribers accurately. However, high numbers of attackers should
also lead to more duplicate paths and thus the additional gain should
be limited.
Figure 43b shows the information gain per subscriber of colluding
nodes over the subscriber ratio. The attackers |Ca| = 2 clearly im-
proves over |Ca| = 1, however the addition gain between |Ca| = 3
and |Ca| = 4 becomes smaller. Furthermore, the gain of additional
nodes for very low ratios of subscribers is relatively low. The sce-
nario with two attacking nodes causes larger conﬁdence intervals due
to the varying distance between both nodes over the 25 runs each (cf.
Section 5.3.8).
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Concluding, many colluding nodes only beneﬁt scenarios with high
subscriber ratios. Furthermore, the additional gain decreases with ev-
ery additional node.
summary To summarize the request / response-based attack, the
connectivity of an attacker seems the be most relevant threat to ano-
nymity. The number of colluding attackers appears to have a similar
effect. That means, double the connectivity is equally beneﬁcial for
an attacker as double the number of controlled nodes. The distance
between an attacker and a subscriber seems to have only minor effect
on the anonymity. The delay distribution of the basic overlay connec-
tions has a high impact on the anonymity. Nevertheless, even with a
high delay variance, the anonymity attack is still effective.
5.3.9 Attacks based on churn and disconnecting nodes
This section analyzes the success of attacks against subscriber ano-
nymity based upon churn and disconnecting nodes as published in
[39]. Churn may cause forwarders to leave an attribute overlay, e.g.,
when their last subscriber left. Such behaviour can be used by the
GA to identify the forwarder as a forwarder and likewise reduce the
anonymity sets of subscribers. An opportunistically acting forwarder
may remain in the attribute overlay to protect the anonymity of other
other participants. The question of how much advantage an attacker
obtains when forwarders are not acting opportunistically remains.
With disconnecting nodes, the IA attempts to use the SG to obtain a
position next to a leaf node. By interrupting the connection to the leaf
node via the IA, the GA can distinguish non-opportunistic forwarders
from subscribers, similar to churn. However, this attack is time con-
suming and may reveal the attacker. It is therefore important to know
how beneﬁcial this attack is in the ﬁrst place.
This section answers the following research questions:
1. How do churn rates inﬂuence the attacker’s information gain?
2. How much information gain can the attacker obtain with the
node cornering attack, and what is the inﬂuence of PF?
impact of churn The effects of churn allow the global observer
to distinguish subscribers from forwarders. However, it remains un-
clear how much the global observer gains from churn.
The settings from Table 7 are used for the simulation. The number
of nodes |V | as well as the ratio of nodes involved in churn ϕ ∈
{0.05, 0.1, 0.2} is varied, and g is measured.
A linear correlation of g with ϕ is to be expected as the global
observer can observe more overlay repairs with increasing ϕ. Fur-
thermore, we g should increased in linear relation with |V | due to
longer path lengths in the overlay and thus more nodes affected by
churn.
Figure 44a depicts the results of the simulation. As expected, g
increases with ϕ for small amounts of nodes. However, the global
140 evaluation
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 250 500 750 1000
|V |
g
ϕ = 0.05
ϕ = 0.1
ϕ = 0.2
(a) Inﬂuence of churn on the attacker’s in-
formation gain.
0.00
0.05
0.10
250 500 750 1000
|V |
g
μ = 0.2
μ = 0.5
μ = 0.8
(b) Information gain with corner attack.
Figure 44: Anonymity attacks performed by IA.
observer does not seem to beneﬁt from high churn for higher number
of nodes. This is because more subscribers become part of every
patha(p, s). These nodes cause the path to remain stable (persists
for many snapshots T ). Hence, the global observer identiﬁes less
forwarders. In summary, the simulation results indicate that churn
poses a high risk to nodes being de-anonymized.
node cornering With node cornering, the malicious insider ex-
ploits the position changes to explore the overlay guided by the global
observer. The global observer observes the node behavior after the in-
ternal one disconnects them. However, it remains unclear how many
cover nodes the attack can identify.
The same parameters as before are used, and the number of nodes
|V | as well as μ ∈ [0.2, 0.5, 0.8] is varied to measure g.
The gain g should increase with μ, as the attacker should be able
to identify more cover nodes. Furthermore, a decrease in g with |V |
is expected due to a slower growth of |patha(p, s)|avg compared to the
growth of |V |.
Figure 44b depicts the results of the simulation. As expected, the
gain increases with μ and drops quickly with increasing |V |. How-
ever, even with high μ, the overall gain for a single malicious insider
remains low compared to other attacks.
In summary, this attack is hardly effective as a single malicious
insider can only learn when moving into one branch of the overlay.
The malicious insider can only compensate by waiting for other nodes
to initiate position changes and thus “pull” the malicious insider back
again. Alternatively, the malicious insider could collude. Still, the
attack is invasive and could be detected by collaborating nodes.
5.3.10 Summary of the simulation
This section performed a quantitative evaluation of AnonPubSub by
exposing the simulated system against the global observer GA and
the malicious insider IA. For the latter one, a new timing-based attack
were proposed that uses request / response semantics of an anony-
mous communication system. The attackers aim at breaking the
5.4 proof-of-concept : twitterize 141
anonymity requirement, in particular subscriber anonymity. The eval-
uation of anonymity was complemented with an assessment of the
signaling overhead that is caused by measures to protect anonymity.
The results showed that AnonPubSub without PF and the SG may
protect against the malicious insider, but the global observer may still
violate the anonymity. PF mitigates the success of the GA partially.
Increasing the parameter μ causes a linear decrease in the attacker’s
success (accuracy, information gain). This holds even for large sub-
scriber ratios, i.e., when the advantages of PF diminish. However,
a higher μ also causes an additional polynomial signaling overhead.
Compared, the SG reduces the attacker’s chances of de-anonymizing
subscribers signiﬁcantly. The best results are achieved with low ratios
of subscribers as well as low node degree. The desired overlay ran-
domization via SG is reached quickly. The decay function to reduce
the signaling overhead of SG therefore works well. Moreover, SG and
PF can be combined. This helps to compensate for the SG’s lack with
high ratios of subscribers.
Opposed to the global observer, the malicious insider can hardly
de-anonymize subscribers, even without PF and SG. The results showed
that for the malicious insider, high connectivity is as desirable as
many colluding nodes. In particular, the additional gain of an ad-
ditional malicious insider becomes quickly marginal. Randomized
transmission delay between nodes impede the attacker signiﬁcantly.
However, even the addition of high random delay—magnitudes of
the actual delay—does not fully prevent the attacker from reasoning
about subscriber identities.
Concluding, the global attacker GA poses the highest threat to
anonymity. Given the system, the malicious insider IA is highly de-
pendent on the GA to de-anonymize nodes. To mitigate anonymity
attacks, opportunistic node behaviour is the key strategy. The two
mechanisms PF and the SG mitigate anonymity attacks as well with-
out relying on opportunistic node behaviour. However, the following
crucial points have to be considered: PF works best with attribute
overlays that have few forwarders, but causes signiﬁcant messaging
overhead with every notiﬁcation. The SG works best with attribute
overlays containing many forwarders, but requires an initial pause
to garble the attribute overlay. A ﬁnal takeaway point regarding
anonymity attacks is the diameter of the attribute overlays: the pre-
sented attacks are most effective for low-diameter attribute overlays.
However, with an increasing diameter, i.e., an increasing number of
nodes, the success of such attacks reduces signiﬁcantly.
5.4 proof-of-concept : twitterize
This section introduces a proof of concept (POC) for the anonymous
Pub/Sub system AnonPubSub as published in [35]. The POC imple-
ments the protocol introduced in the previous section as an Android
app for micro-blogging as an instance of the citizen journalisms sce-
nario. This app integrates with Twitter but also protects conﬁden-
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tiality and anonymity as well. For that, the app uses the Twitter
social graph as basic membership, which can be used to send com-
mon tweets as well as anonymous tweets via the proposed proto-
col. This POC shows how AnonPubSub can be applied practically to
a most prominent Pub/Sub application that demands for anonymity.
The results indicate that only mild overhead is caused compared to
non-anonymous communication.
Section 5.4.1 discusses related applications. Section 5.4.2 explains
the building block selections and adaptations for the app. Section 5.4.3
concludes the discussion of the POC via an evaluation.
5.4.1 Privacy-preserving twitter apps
Twitter is a most popular example for citizen journalism with hun-
dreds of million active users every month. Most signiﬁcantly, Twitter
played an important role on political movements such as the Arab
Spring [93]. Here in particular anonymity of users is crucial to pro-
tect them from political persecution. As a result, several privacy-
preserving Twitter alternatives have been proposed in recent years
Hummingbird [28] is an app that mimics Twitter functionality, but
uses a separate infrastructure. Hummingbird encrypts tweets (conﬁ-
dentiality), provides access control, and allows users to follow hash-
tag via oblivious matching (subscription conﬁdentiality). Anonymity
is not protected by Hummingbird. Another app, Twister [58], in-
troduces pseudonyms. Senders register a pseudonym, their nick-
name which is bound to a key pair via the Bitcoin [104] protocol.
Pseudonyms enforce non-repudiation and cause all actions from the
sender to be linkable. Senders publish signed tweets via the Bit-
Torrent [26] protocol. In combination with an anonymization ser-
vice, senders and receivers are unlinkable. The actions of a sender
are however linkable. Twitsper [141, 142] uses Twitter in combina-
tion with a second central server to realize private group commu-
nication. Senders notify receivers via direct Twitter messages, the
receivers then obtain further information from the Twitsper server.
That means, Twitter can link senders and receivers, but cannot access
messages. The second server may access messages, but cannot link
senders and receivers. Senders and receivers must know each other
for the key exchange. Besides conﬁdential and anonymous communi-
cation, some approaches [140] perform metadata anonymization, i.e.,
prevent global observers from linking tweets and creating proﬁles.
Fort that, techniques based upon k-anonymity [150] are used.
In summary, privacy-preserving Twitter as well as micro-blogging
apps in general focus on conﬁdentiality. Anonymity as deﬁned in Sec-
tion 3.2, page 39, can only be protected with add-on anonymization
services.
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basic membership twitter
V (nodes) Twitter users
N(v)− (outgoing neighbors) followers
N(v)+ (incoming neighbors) following (inverse N(v)−)
madvt (advertisement) tweet
msub (subscription) direct message
mnotif (notiﬁcation) tweet
Table 10: Basic membership management in Twitter
5.4.2 Twitterize
The Twitterize POC addresses several of the building blocks intro-
duced in this thesis. First, the basic membership via Twitter is ex-
plained. Next, content distribution and attribute localization via AES
and pseudonyms are summarized. Third, matching and key manage-
ment via NFC and QR-code are introduced. Finally, an overview of the
POC implementation for the Android platform is provided.
basic membership management The app uses the Twitter so-
cial graph as basic membership management. For that, Twitter users
represent nodes V and followers represent the neighborhood setN(v)−
with directed edges. Furthermore, tweets represent messages. Ta-
ble 10 summarizes the mapping from the basic membership manage-
ment notation to Twitter.
??????
?????????
?????????
????????
Figure 45: Twitter social graph with follow relation and tweet ﬂow. The
bold arrows represent the overlay for a hashtag on top of the
social graph underlay.
Figure 45 depicts an example of a Twitter social graph. Users fol-
low each other (dotted arrows) and thus receive status update tweets
(solid arrows) from the users they follow. The app exploits this so-
cial graph as basic membership management and constructs hashtag
overlays on top. In this example, the two forwarders in the center for-
ward tweets from sender to receiver. Therefore, sender and receiver
remain decoupled and no single forwarder can link sender and re-
ceiver together.
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content distribution and attribute localization Tweets
are also used for content distribution. As each tweet is delivered to
every follower—point to multi-point communication as opposed to
point-to-point communication, it becomes harder for an attacker to
determine the actual receiver for every communication hop. This be-
haviour of Twitter to some degree mimics the effect of anonymity pro-
tection mechanisms PF introduced in the previous chapter. Symmetric
cryptography with AES in CBC mode protects the conﬁdentiality.
Attributes are mapped to twitter hashtags. However, the app uses
the encryption of the hash of each hashtag as pseudonym for attribute
localization. Formally, the pseudonym ta is deﬁned as ta = {H(a)}Ka
where H is a hash function, and Ka a shared secret. Advertisements
are ﬂooded via tweets through the follower relation. As this relation
is uni-directional, subscriptions are performed via direct messages.
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Figure 46: Advertisement tweets propagate in Twitter over timelines to fol-
lowers. If an advertisement is new for a follower, the follower
increments the hash element and posts it to her own timeline.
Hence, the follower becomes a forwarder.
Figure 46 illustrates this process with Twitter. A publisher p tweets
the advertisement as a status update to her timeline (step 1). As for-
warder f follows p, the advertisement tweet will automatically show
up on f’s timeline (step 2). Forwarder f the forwards this advertise-
ment by incrementing the hash element and posting another status
update to her timeline (step 3). Finally, subscriber s receives the ad-
vertisement tweets as s follows f.
? ? ?
???? ? ???? ? ???? ?
????????? ???????????? ???
?????????????
?????? ??????
Figure 47: Subscription tweets propagate via direct tweets in Twitter. Users
have to main a routing table as state outside of Twitter for the
protocol.
Figure 47 illustrates this process from right to left. The subscriber
s sends a subscription via a direct tweet to f (step 1). Forwarder f
then updates its internal state, the routing table, and forwards the
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subscription to p (step 2). Finally publisher p receives the subscrip-
tion and updates her internal state as well. As direct tweets are being
used here, the social graph may remain directed.
matching and key management Matching is performed via
the comparison of pseudonyms ta. As the pseudonym is derived
from a secret, publishers and subscribers are only required to share
one secret. Subscribers can precompute the pseudonyms and thus
are only required to perform a binary comparison.
The key management is performed out-of-band via NFC and QR-
codes. Both mechanism are available to Android devices and allow
the fast exchange of secrets via physical convergence of devices.
implementation For the evaluation, the POC has been imple-
mented for the Android mobile device platform as summarized in
Figure 48. The implementation makes use of the Android API, the
twitter4j library2, AES and an SQLite database3 as provided by the
Android APIs.
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Figure 48: Software design of the Twitterize application. Parts of the design
a shown as part of the information ﬂow. From left to right: infor-
mation ﬂow and design for publishing tweets, forwarding tweets,
and receiving tweets. The app es each shown at the top, functions
provided by Twitter at the bottom.
Distributing an anonymous and conﬁdentiality notiﬁcation works
as follows: ﬁrst, the publisher creates the notiﬁcation, encrypts it with
AES in cipher block chaining mode, attaches an attribute pseudonym,
and sends the message as a tweet to Twitter. The publisher also notes
down all this information the database, and may also split the mes-
sage in multiple parts to meet the length limit of a tweet as enforced
by Twitter.
2 http://twitter4j.org
3 https://www.sqlite.org
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metric twitterize twitter
CPU load 8.454 7.739
Standard deviation (σ2) 5.142% 3.906%
Power. consumption 2, 216mW 2, 117mW
Standard deviation (σ2) 622mW 571mW
Table 11: Basic membership management in Twitter
Every application acts in the forwarder role and pulls new tweets
on a regular basis from Twitter (PullTweetTask). It is then decided
based on the tweet if this message is already known—discard—or
new—forwarded. Known or duplicate tweets can occur as the Twitter
social graph allows cycles and duplicate paths. To forward a message,
it is again published as a tweet.
Every application with on or more subscriptions matches the at-
tribute pseudonym in addition to forwarding. If the message matches,
it is decrypted and stored in the database as well as displayed to the
user.
5.4.3 Evaluation
This section evaluates the POC application with respect to the speciﬁc
advantages and shortcomings of this implementation. First, empirical
usage results are discussed in the context of an Android smartphone
application. Second, the Twitter social graph is discussed as basic
membership management.
empirical usage To analyze the overhead that the app imposes
over normal smartphone operations, CPU load and battery drain
have been measured as means of processing overhead. For that, a
LG Nexus 5 smartphone running Android OS version 4.4.3 as been
used with the Trepn Proﬁler from Qualcomm4. The measurements
have been compared with measurements for Twitter version 5.13.1
as reference application. The pull rate is set to r = 1/60 (once per
minute), measured over 15 minutes in wake state with no user inter-
action, and obtained 8, 850 samples each.
The results are summarizes in Table 11. The mean measurements
for Twitterize compared to Twitter are very close considering the high
standard deviations. In summary, Twitterizes induces 9% higher CPU
load and less than 5% additional power consumption.
The attribute localization process via ﬂooding requires non-interes-
ted users to main some state information as forwarders and potential
forwarders. However, the Android implementation requires to store
48Byte per hashtag. Hence, every participant can manage more than
21, 000 hashtags per megabyte of storage space.
4 https://developer.qualcomm.com/mobile-development/
increase-app-performance/trepn-profiler
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metric limit
Tweets 2, 400 / day
Bulk tweets 15 / window
Window duration 15 minutes
Direct messages 250 / day
Timeline access 3, 200
Table 12: Twitter limitations
The routing through a hashtag overlay causes delay of messages
compared to normal Twitter usage. According to Watanabe and Suzu-
mura [164], several samples of the Twitter social graph indicated a
degree of separation of up to 4.71 users in 2012. Using this parameter
for the Twitter underlay and pulling once per minute, the average de-
lay is calculated as given in Equation (88) for a tweet with davg = 142
seconds (dmax = 300 seconds upper boundary) until delivery to all
receivers.
davg =
4.71
2× r ; r =
1
60
(88)
twitter limitations The selection of Twitter as basic member-
ship management imposes some restrictions. Twitter limits the usage
of their API to prevent abuse. Table 12 summarizes the limitations as
of November 2014. The total number of tweets limits the number of
notiﬁcations and advertisements. The bulk tweet limitation increases
the delay during high usage times. The number of direct messages
limits the number of subscription messages. The accessible timeline
history restricts the number of messages the app can recover after con-
nection loss / ofﬂine period. However, the tweet limit of 2, 400 tweets
per day restricts the app from forwarding messages more than the
history of 3, 200 tweets.
Figure 49 puts the tweet limitation into perspective of the number
of attributes |A| and notiﬁcations per attribute. Further insights re-
garding to overlay sizes can be found in Section 5.3.
5.4.4 Summary of the POC
This section has presented a real-world POC implementation of Anon-
PubSub called Twitterize. Twitterize shows that AnonPubSub can be
implement with various basic membership approaches, including an
OSN such as Twitter. Moreover, the system works with tight resource
constraints such as small message sizes and message per time limita-
tions.
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Figure 49: Tweets per hashtag over the number of hashtags in the system.
The system degrades quickly with increasing overlay sizes, e.g.,
max overlay size. However, with an overlay membership rate of
10%, the system can still handle one tweet per hour for 1, 000
hashtags.
5.5 summary
This chapter provided three means of evaluation for the anonymous
Pub/Sub contributions introduced in the previous chapter. First, the
qualitative discussion focussed on security and privacy requirements
other than anonymity. Second, an extensive quantitative evaluation
with a simulation exposed the contribution to anonymity attackers.
Third, an empirical evaluation with a POC studied the scalability and
overhead of the contribution.
The qualitative discussion showed that the presented contributions
impede anonymity attacks performed by malicious insiders, similar
to Darknets [24]. In particular, the absence of global node IDs pre-
vents malicious insiders from gaining knowledge about nodes be-
yond their direct neighborhood. This aspect, which is also the basis
for onion routing [44], makes anonymity attacks hard and requires
ultimately the collusion with a global observing attacker. While the
protection of conﬁdentiality is not the focus of this thesis, the used
mechanisms prevent attackers from learning the content of notiﬁca-
tions. Furthermore, the privacy of subscriptions and advertisements
is preserved against unauthorized participants. The presented sys-
tem also ensures the scalability and protects the availability due to
the mechanisms in place in the basic membership building block: as
duplicate and looped messages may occur due to the anonymity of
messages, effective measures are in place to detect and discard such
messages quickly.
The simulation studies showed that the SG protects well against the
anonymity attacker with global observing capabilities, even in collu-
sion with the malicious insider. PF can be used to even the statistics
of attribute overlays by increasing the size of anonymity sets. Several
anonymity attacks were presented and evaluated as well. The pre-
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sented anonymous Pub/Sub system seems to resist these attacks. At-
tacks performed by the global observer pose the highest threat to the
anonymity of participants. While the malicious insider may augment
these attacks, the process is slow and may be observed by benign
participants. The key takeaway lessons of this study are:
• A short attribute overlay diameter beneﬁts the anonymity at-
tacker.
• High node churn also beneﬁts the attacker. The beneﬁt, how-
ever, reduces with the overlay diameter.
• PF demands a high forwarding probability μ  0.5 to effectively
impede attacks. This causes signiﬁcant messaging overhead.
• PF is most effective for attribute overlays with few nodes solely
in the forwarder role.
• The SG effectively mitigates attacks assuming sufﬁcient forwarders
in the overlay.
• The SG requires some startup time to shufﬂe the overlay. This
time, however, scales well with the number of nodes due to the
parallel nature of the SG.
• Artiﬁcially introduced message delay has only limited effect on
the attack mitigation.
The anonymous Pub/Sub system presented in this thesis is imple-
mented as a mobile Twitter application for the citizen journalism sce-
nario as well. This POC shows that the proposed mechanisms also
work with a centralized and OSN-based network as basic member-
ship and, therefore, supports the partitioning of anonymous Pub/Sub
into building blocks. While this centralized basic overlay may be
considered a SPoF for availability, it also avoids typical connectivity is-
sues of mobile devices such as connection interruptions and network
address translation (NAT). Moreover, the POC also uses a P2P key man-
agement well suited for mobile applications. The empirical study per-
formed with this POC indicates that the signaling overhead required
for anonymous Pub/Sub only increases the battery drain and CPU
load mildly. A drawback arises from the tight usage restrictions en-
forced by Twitter: the scalability regarding the number of supported
attributes and notiﬁcations remains limited.

6
CONCLUS ION
This section recapitulates the work of this thesis. Section 6.1 sum-
marizes the work and lists the key contributions and ﬁndings. Sec-
tion 6.2 outlines future research directions that have been identiﬁed
throughout the course of this thesis.
6.1 summary
This thesis tackled the challenge of fusing two research and technol-
ogy areas, Pub/Sub and anonymous communication. Both areas are in-
herently hard to combine as they have diametrically conﬂicting prop-
erties: Pub/Sub depends on inspecting the messages in detail to route
them to their destination. Anonymization explicitly prevents the in-
spection of message with cryptography and signiﬁcantly limits, e.g.,
routing knowledge to the previous and next hop.
To meet this challenge, Chapter 2 ﬁrst provided a foundation for
both disciplines, Pub/Sub and anonymization services, as well as P2P
systems. P2P systems seem to be a prime technology to construct
systems with built-in anonymity. The main reason is that with P2P
no single, or even central entity knows all participants of the sys-
tem. Moreover, in particular with unstructured P2P, end-to-end (E2E)
addressing of participants is not required; sending a message in a
speciﬁc direction is sufﬁcient. This thesis considered routing in a di-
rection, therefore, as partitioning a P2P system into anonymity sets
according to the number of possible directions. As another insight,
Chapter 2 showed that splitting anonymization services from appli-
cation has led to multiple attacks that rendered the anonymization
service ineffective via application layer information. Anonymity and
application on top are intrinsically related, and it is, therefore, desir-
able to construct both in conjunction.
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the related work. To structure
this overview, seven building blocks were introduced to encapsulate
the functions of anonymous Pub/Sub systems.
• Basic membership ensures connectivity between participants—
the nodes in a network. The connectivity can be established, for
instance, via gossiping algorithms. The encapsulation of basic
membership into one building block enables the quick adapta-
tion of anonymous Pub/Sub to different technologies. This is
proven in the evaluation by the usage of two very different tech-
nologies: a general-purpose P2P system and a centralized sys-
tem for mobile devices.
• Attribute localization connects publishers with subscribers, one
of the most anonymous critical building blocks. It can be per-
formed, for instance, via ﬂooding. Two additional methods are
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introduced in this thesis: a combination of the forest ﬁre algo-
rithm with a random walk, and a double random walk. This of-
fering of attribute localization alternatives makes the presented
anonymous Pub/Sub system extremely versatile as the alterna-
tive can be selected by the popularity of attributes to keep the
message overhead as low as possible.
• Key management supplies publishers and subscribers with the
keys necessary to encrypt, decrypt, sign, and verify signatures.
Related work often assumes out-of-band key management. Key
management, however, is also critical to anonymity. Two key
management methods are adapted for anonymous Pub/Sub in
this thesis: a centralized double-TTP and P2P key exchange via
QR-codes and NFC. The ﬁrst variation is well suited for Internet-
connected devices. The second variation works best with per-
sonal trust and contact, for exalple, for citizen journalism.
• Matching takes care of matching subscriptions to notiﬁcations
and advertisements. This function can become computationally
expensive when combining combinatorial logic with matching.
Furthermore, this function always leaks some information to
anonymity attackers, whether messages match or not. How-
ever, while pseudonyms are used in this thesis for matching,
the capsulation of matching within an independent building
block allows the leveraging of vast amounts of research from
the disciplines of cryptography and privacy-protection.
• Community management ensures that an established distribu-
tion network is connected and well functional, for instance, in
the presence of node churn and node failures. Community man-
agement can be used to optimize attribute overlays, or the com-
munities, given the appropriate mechanisms. Probabilistic for-
warding (PF) and the shell game (SG) are introduced in this
thesis as two mechanisms to optimize the goal of participant
anonymity.
• Content distribution handles the distribution of notiﬁcations
from publishers to subscribers and should be as efﬁcient as pos-
sible, e.g., minimize the transmission delay. The way attribute
overlays are established and optimized in this thesis make the
content distribution extremely efﬁcient. That is, notiﬁcations
are not required to be delayed, cached, shufﬂed, and padded in
any way. Moreover, the transmission rate of notiﬁcations is not
restricted. These properties distinguish this contribution from
many related approaches.
A novel anonymous and P2P Pub/Sub system was presented in Chap-
ter 4. This system establishes overlay networks per attribute, an
atomic concept to route message in Pub/Sub. Nodes are required
to possess the appropriate attribute key material to participate as a
publisher or subscriber in such an overlay. A key management, con-
sisting of two TTPs, the anonymity TTP, and the attribute TTP, supplies
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the nodes with the necessary keys. The overlay is designed in such a
way that pure forwarders are part of the overlay and fulﬁll a similar
role as proxy servers in anonymization services.
The constructed overlay networks protect against malicious insid-
ers attempting to break anonymity. Compared to the related work,
the this thesis focused on the construction of the overlay networks:
Once the construction is complete, the additional overhead to protect
anonymity becomes minimal. Two additional anonymity-enhancing
technologies ensure that the system is also protected against a global
observing attacker. Probabilistic forwarding (PF) pulls additional nodes
into the overlay. Additional nodes increase the anonymity set sizes
within the overlay on the one hand and prevent subscribers from be-
ing exposed in topologically easy to identify positions on the other
hand. The shell game (SG), shufﬂes the overlay network by exchang-
ing the positions of nodes. The SG ensures that an attacker can-
not observe the position change per se, and can thus only reason
about a randomized overlay. Both technologies in combination pro-
tect anonymity against global observing attackers. All contributions
combined, anonymity is protected against the colluding combination
of malicious insider and global observer. Related work typically only
considers either one.
Overlay networks are subject to node churn over time, i.e., nodes
joining and leaving. While overlays are constructed with fulﬁlling
speciﬁc requirements in mind, e.g., distributing load evenly and low
message transmission delay, these requirements can become invalid
due to churn. To overcome this challenge, Chapter 4 also proposed
a novel scheme for anonymous load balancing. The mechanism is
based on random greedy group formation and circular exchange of
counting Bloom ﬁlters. The greedy group formation works on local
knowledge and does not require any prior information of load in the
overlay. Counting Bloom ﬁlters serve as a probabilistic data struc-
ture to exchange load information while concealing the attributes for
which a node is responsible. The same circular message exchange is
then used by nodes to ﬁnd matching partners to hand over the load,
i.e., an attribute.
Chapter 5 complemented the mechanisms with an evaluation. For
the evaluation, novel anonymity attacks were proposed. The request/-
response attack can be used by a malicious insider to identify respon-
ders, e.g., subscribers, in a system. The attacker adaptively sends a
request to different areas of the network and reasons about the re-
sponses. Candidates for the responses are stored in a probability
distribution, incorporating how likely the response originated from
a certain node. Repeated request/response attacks as well as col-
lusion reﬁne this distribution, ultimately exposing responders with
high probability. The simulation results showed that the adaptive
approach is highly successful. Furthermore, even a single attacker
with high connectivity—many neighbors—can reach similar results
as colluding attackers with low connectivity.
Anonymity enhancing technologies such as PF and the SG are ef-
fective in protecting the anonymity against malicious insiders as well
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as against global observers. The protection of PF, however, is limited
and causes high signaling overhead. The SG protects anonymity very
well within the limits of the node distributions in the overlay. Fur-
thermore, the SG only causes mild signaling overhead. Combined
with PF, the node distributions within the overlay can be optimized
while causing only a slight increase in signaling overhead.
The prototype Twitterize completed the evaluation with an An-
droid application for the micro-blogging scenario. Twitterize estab-
lishes overlays per hashtag. Anonymous micro-blogging can be used
in combination with normal micro-blogging. The prototype depends
upon participants relaying messages in a P2P manner. For that, the
application is required to run on the Android devices of all partici-
pants. To compensate for the potential loss of messages caused by
unavailable participants, Twitterize uses the broadcast-like mecha-
nisms of micro-blogging to send a message to all neighbors simul-
taneously. This reduces the possible loss or delay of messages. The
results showed that computation and signaling overhead only cause
mild battery drain compared to normal micro-blogging.
6.2 future work
This thesis covers the combination of anonymous communication and
Pub/Sub, with a particular focus on protecting subscriber anonymity.
Several future research directions may be considered to complement
the work of this thesis.
For one, the protection of sender anonymity, i.e., the anonymity of
publishers, leads to manifold future challenges: How can publisher
anonymity be protected without restricting message delay and rate?
For instance, how can cover trafﬁc be implemented and controlled to
answer this question? Can malicious insiders abuse this system, and
how can potential attacks be prevented?
As a second topic, the area of topological anonymity opens a com-
plementary research area. Related work in the domain of OSNs has
shown [143] that the local graph structure can reveal manifold infor-
mation about OSN users. Likewise, the connectivity within the basic
membership may reveal information.
A third topic is the key management. This thesis assumes closed
groups, i.e., restricted key management. However, future applica-
tion scenarios may require a less restricted key management via open
groups. Open groups will give attackers new capabilities and thus
require mechanisms for anonymity protection.
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